Another Cut: the SPDC Campaign to Erase Mon Culture

February 29, 2008

I. Introduction:

Burma is home to over a hundred ethnic groups and subgroups. While the military government has, quite deliberately, refrained from conducting a thorough or accurate survey of the country’s ethnic make up, it identifies eight “major national ethnic races,” of which there are over one hundred recognized subgroups. Of these groups and subgroups, official census date estimates that nearly seventy percent of the population is ethnic Burman, though this number is thought to be exaggerated in an attempt to bolster the legitimacy of the Burman dominated State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) regime.

Burman dominance was not, however, always the rule; for over a thousand years Mon kings ruled territory that encompassed much of the Southeast Asian mainland. Most of the population in Northern and Central Thailand was Mon until only six or seven hundred years ago, and the Mon remained heavily in the majority throughout central and southern Burma until the 1700s, when they finally lost their kingdom to the Burman king Alaungphaya in 1757.

As should be expected from such a large and historically dominant group, the Mon have had immense cultural influence on other peoples in Southeast Asia. Not without founding have the Mon been called the “vectors of civilization;” evidence of Mon language, art and architecture can be seen throughout the region. The Burmese alphabet uses all Mon characters, and the Mons are most notably credited with bringing Theravada Buddhism to the region.

Ironically, the Mon now mostly occupy Mon State, the smallest state in Burma. In some ways, this disconnect, between their historic and current positions, gives the group a unique grounding from which to position its struggle with the SPDC; where some groups seek to establish autonomy, the Mon are attempting to reclaim it. The Mon’s place atop the history of their region is, perhaps on some level, not lost on the SPDC regime and it has consistently sought to undermine, even erase all together, the group’s history and shared identity. For decades the regime has restricted expressions of Mon culture; language development, as well as the study of Mon history and literature, has been banned, restricted or harassed and cultural cites and museums have been manipulated or hijacked outright.

II. Background:

In 1947, Aung San, the father of independent Burma, addressed ethnic leaders at the historic Panglong Conference and implored them to work together in the struggle against colonial Britain. “If we are divided, the Karens, the Shans, the Kachins, the Chins, the Burmese, the Mons and the Arakanese, each pulling in a different direction, the Union will be torn, and we will all come to grief. Let us unite and work together,” he said and, perhaps because the constitution Aung San championed would grant them the right to secession in ten years, the leaders in attendance agreed. Aung San’s vision for an independent Burma would be realized, but he would not live to see it. He was assassinated barely six months after Panglong, and when willingness to recognize the rights and demands of ethnic groups was not shared by his successors, the country was plunged into a multi-flagged civil war.

While the conflict(s), which featured armed ethnic and political groups fighting the Burmese government, and sometimes each other, had been going on for decades, the targeting of civilians did not begin in earnest until a coup in 1962. After the coup, which replaced the country’s democratic government with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the regime began targeting ethnic peoples across the country, regardless of whether they were men, women, children or armed. The strategy, called Pya Ley Pya, or the “four cuts” policy, was aimed at weakening rebel groups by eliminating their support base. The idea was to cut off rebels from their supply of recruits, intelligence, food and finances. The policy often entailed whole-sale military operations against unarmed civilian populations – villagers were harassed, conscripted as forced laborers, tortured, killed and villages were razed and burned while villagers were forcibly relocated from “black,” rebel-controlled, areas into “white” areas controlled by the government. By the close of the century, the combination of the brutal four cuts policy and geopolitical changes that left ethnic rebel groups without international supporters meant that most of the major armed ethnic groups had little choice but to enter into ceasefire agreements.

In many places, however, the campaign of human rights violations did not cease. While the regime has officially retired the four cuts policy, in reality many of the same tactics continue. Ostensibly, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) – the SLORC’s different-in-name-only successor – only continues its repressive policies because small, splinter groups continue to fight, refusing to recognize the ceasefires of their larger former organizations. But although they fight, the percentage of the country designated as a “white” area continues to grow every year.

Even as the SPDC seems to consolidate control of the country, the specter of strong ethnic groups with secessionist tendencies continues to haunt the regime. In a cruel twist, the regime seems to be using Aung San’s plea for national unity and strength to justify weakening the unity and strength of the ethnic groups that make up the nation. Even where the ferocity of the four cuts policy is not replicated in white areas, the regime continues to implement policies designed to promote the “Burmanisation” of populations. Manufacturing a homogenous, “Myanmar” identity, from which there is no desire, or ability, to launch independence movements, seems to be the ultimate solution to the SPDC’s “ethnic problem.”

III. Attacks on Mon culture

A. Rewriting history

The majority of students in Mon state attend government schools. In spite of the obvious and important role they played in the history of Burma, and all of Southeast Asia, the Mon receive little class-time. Older Mons report that in previous incarnations of junta textbooks, the dominance and contributions of the Mon were downplayed. And in the current edition of SPDC textbooks, the word “Mon” never appears; when important Mon kings are referenced, they are labeled “Myanmar,” the name the SPDC uses to paint over ethnic differences in Burma.

Mon history, for instance, tells of a bell made in 1480 by the Mon king Dhammazedi. The bell, the largest in the world, was lost when the raft of a Portuguese trader attempting to steal it sank in the river. The bell has never been recovered, and much has been made of doing so because the bell is reputed to be crusted with gems and cast of copper and gold. In SPDC textbooks, however, not to mention coverage by government-controlled media, the bell is credited to the “Myanmar king Dhammazedi.”

This example is not an exception; it is the rule. SPDC attempts to rewrite history are not unsuccessful, and HURFOM researchers report encountering people who believe the country has always belonged to Burma.

B. Erasing a language

Mon language and culture cannot be studied in government schools. While even the SPDC admits that there are two million Mon people in Burma, and nationalist leaders put the number closer to four million, no more than a third are estimated to speak Mon. While some contend that the dearth of Mon languages skills stems from lack of interest of the people, a more likely reason is that the SPDC makes it very difficult to learn Mon.

In “liberated” areas controlled by the NMSP, the NMSP Education Department has been able to open Mon National Schools, of which there are currently one hundred and fifty five, plus an additional forty-nine after-school Mon classes held at government schools. All subjects at NMSP schools are taught in Mon, with the exceptions of Burmese and English language classes. But NMSP schools have faced harassment at the hands of regime officials and the army, especially since 2003. Parents in Southern Ye Township report being pressured by the army to stop sending their children to NMSP schools and send their children to government schools instead.

Similarly, a teacher in Khaw-zar Sub-township, also in Southern Ye, reports being harassed by troops in the area. She was threatened, told to stop teaching Mon language and pressured to quit the NMSP school and work at a new government school. “I had a total of seventy students, but only fifty attend the class because they are afraid of the authorities.” She, like many Mon teachers, eventually fled to the Thai-Burma border. The regime makes life difficult in other ways.

Some students face a long journey to attend school, and risk being shot or tortured for breaking curfews before they can return home. Monasteries are another location where Mon language and literature has often been taught. A monk in Khaw-Zar, however, reports that in May 2007 he was forced hold Buddhist reading sessions in Burmese, rather than Mon.

The NMSP controls only a fraction of Mon State, and the majority of Mon students must attend government schools. For decades, the Mon Literature and Culture Commission (MLCC) offered Mon language classes to students during the dry season holidays. The regime has used a variety of tactics to obstruct the MLCC project. It prohibits the MLCC from using government schools, in spite of the fact that the schools were paid for and built by villagers. Regime officials have often visited villages and order leaders to halt the classes. The classes have remained popular and, starting in 1996, the regime began holding concurrent Buddhist Cultural Training classes in an attempt to draw students away from the Mon classes.

After years of pressuring communities to stop holding the classes and families to stop sending their children, in July 2006 the MLCC was functionally shut down. Allong with other ethnic cultural organizations, in a move that drew international condemnation the regime refused to renew the group’s mandatory registration.

All cultural and literature groups attempting to teach or organize events must register with the SPDC; failure to do so risks arrest. The de facto MLCC ban was lifted in early 2008, but only after regime authorities replaced members of the MLCC with members of the regime-backed Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA).

For former members of the MLCC, the lifting of the ban is cause for concern, not celebration. “We are worried the USDA members will teach our Mon classes this summer,” said the former MLC chairman. Former members of the group have also been under close watch because the regime suspects that the MLCC was involved in the September 2007 protests. One former member, Zaw Min, escaped to the Thai-Burma border after he was detained and interrogated by special branch officers.

C. Hijacking museums and cultural artifacts

Since early 1990s the government has sponsored construction of new national museums intended to create “Myanmar national culture.” Dovetailing with this, the Mon Cultural Museum in Moulmein, the capital of Mon State, is facing ongoing attacks from the regime. In December 2007, the SPDC Cultural Ministry changed the name to the Literature and Cultural Museum. A few months later, the regime modified statues in front of the museum to hide their traditional Mon garb. The statues were originally painted to look as if they were wearing red and white Mon national dress, but are now painted completely white.

Access to important artifacts has also been restricted by the regime. Mon manuscripts written on palm-leaves are stored on the museum’s first floor, which has now been closed to public. The texts are vital to people researching Mon history and literature, and Mon historians worry they will be destroyed by the regime, said a Monk in Moulmein.

The monk, who visited the museum to view one of the most famous texts, “A Brief Account of Mon Kings,” written by a well-known monk in 1745, could not find it in its usual place. “At first I couldn’t find it and thought it was stolen,” he said. “Then I asked a museum official and he said it had been moved to the first floor.” The monk also reported that the museum staff, which used to be entirely Mon, mostly students and graduates from Moulmein University, has been changed and now primarily features regime sympathizers. Taken alone, the incidents may seem slight, but historians and local residents feel that, as a whole, they are neither coincidental nor benign.

D. Targeting important cultural symbols

Expressions of Mon culture have also been restricted. Brahminy Ducks prominently placed at the entrance of Moulmein have been removed and replaced by lacquer. The ducks, also known as the Golden Sheldrake, are highly symbolic for Mon people, and appear on the Mon National Flag.

Another important symbol of Mon culture is traditional dress. This is made up of a longyi, which is an ankle-length cloth, wrapped around the waist and worn like a sarong. For men, the longyi is traditionally red with a pattern of delicate white checks and worn with a white shirt, often marked by a pattern of red checks. Traditional dress for women is similar.

For many Mon people, wearing traditional dress is an important symbol of cultural solidarity, and is displayed with pride. The regime does not like such displays, likely for the same reasons, and people wearing tradtional Mon dress often face harrassment or extra scrutiny. A former member of the MLCC, Zaw Min, reports that anyone wearing traditional dress in Mudon Township is likely to be followed and targeted by special branch officers. A Mon human rights worker confirms this elsewhere in Mon State, and reports that he recently had to change out of Mon clothing after he arrived in Ye Township and was followed by special branch officers.

The regime has also issued official bans on Mon dress. Last year, students at Moulmein university were prohibited from wearing Mon dress on campus. While there are some reports that this restriction was eased in late 2007, University offiicials still frown upon the demonstrations of Mon culture. Children at government schools also cannot wear the national dress, although a group of students at Kamawet Village high school, in Mudon Township, are reported to have worn the national dress in protest against restrictions on Mon National Day celebrations.

IV. Conclusion

Burma is home to over a hundred ethnic groups and subgroups. The economic utility of this is not lost on the SPDC, and tourists and vistors who wish to experience a taste of Burma’s many cultures are encouraged to view an “ethnic village” in Rangoon. The village exhibits houses built in the style of various ethnic groups from Burma, and “villagers” dressed in traditional dress go about the daily activites of traditional village life.

A viewer with no prior knowledge of the SPDC would likely, and reasonably, assume that the country is home to a variety of ethnic groups, all celebrated by the regime. Such an assumption would be wildly off base. Every participant in the displays is a hand-picked supporter of the regime and the difference between the freedom given ethnic peoples across the country and the freedom advertised in Rangoon is sizable.

These government controlled exhibitions of ethnic diversity are perhap the only instances in which such displays are looked upon benevolently. Everywhere else in the country, SPDC fears of secessionary ethnic movements translate into policies designed to erase ethnic difference.

That the show in Rangoon features “Mon” villagers wearing traditional Mon dress is especially ironic, given that the exact same action in Mon State risks harrassment by the regime. More importantly, and insidiously, the regime continues to inhibit the teaching of Mon language, obscure symbols and expressions of Mon identity and restrict the study of its history and literature. “If the literature is destroyed, the people will disappear,” goes a Mon expression. The regime seems to agree.

Written by HURFOM · Filed Under Monthly Report