In early January 2010, the Burmese government State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) announced a nationwide salary increase for all government employees. Under the announcement No. 104/2010, from the SPDC Department of Finance and Customs in Nayphidaw, the pay hike was implemented concurrent with the SPDC’s heavy-handed campaign to secure civilian support during the 2010 election. The pay hike raised the salary of all active members in the government workforce a flat 20,000 kyat per month, regardless of position or rank. Download report as PDF [143 KB]

However the timing of this salary increase, along with the supposition that it will only be enacted for 15 months, has lead many government employees and observers to believe that the small cash windfall was intended to meet the SPDC goal of winning the support of the government’s own staff prior to the election. However, despite the apparent boon of a pay hike for Burma’s nearly 2 million civil servants1, the surface-level benefits of greater pay have been swept away by the significant lopsided impact on the national economy.

While many government employees have reported being thankful for receiving the small pay increase, an even greater number have reported that the subsequent surge in commodity prices has ultimately cost them more than the salary increase provides for.  For employees stationed near Burma’s Thai border, retired civil servants who are reliant on pensions, and citizens who are not employed by the government, the sweeping commodity price increases have severely jeopardized their economic survival. Without government control over commodity or transportation prices, knock-on effects from the current pay hike are undercutting the livelihoods of Burmese civilians nation wide.  One of the most troubling consequences of the pay hike has been its impact on the potential democratic process. Besides the widely held belief that the increase is meant to win government employee support, some civilians report that they will likely be unable to participate in the election, forced to focus instead on their survival living hand to mouth.

In this February report, HURFOM will continue its theme of 2010 election-related research, specifically focusing on the economic fallout from the recently enacted government salary increase, and its impact on civilians prior to the election. Using the individual accounts from current government employees, retired government officials, and regular Burmese civilians, HURFOM details how the salary increase has lead to a drastic surge in commodity prices. Beginning with current government employees, then retired civil workers, and lastly, regular civilians, these personal accounts are the subsequent reactions to the effect of the financial impact and understanding of how and why this salary increase has been carried out. The report will then close with a discussion of the impact of this financial crisis on the democratic process.

The individual accounts cited in this report are drawn from interviews conducted by HURFOM field reporters in Ye, Thanbyuzayat, Mudon, Kyaikmayaw, Kyainnseikyi, Three Pagodas Pass and Moulmien Townships and Pegu Division, since the pay hikes were first implemented in early January. Given the sensitivity of the subject, these interviews are a sampling from the government work force, retired government employees, and civilian populations.  All listed salaries of current civil servants include the January 2010 salary increase.

The Salary Increase:

To better understand the significant negative impacts the recent pay hike is causing within the Burmese economic sector, the enactment must be considered with similar historical precedents set by 4 similar pay hikes under the SPDC2.  The practice of salary increases has gone hand-in-hand with significant inflation, as the “excess of cash reflects the broader problem that the regime funds much of its spending through the simple, but highly destructive, means of printing the kyat in whatever volumes it requires” 3.

With the continued printing of unguaranteed cash, the regular prices set for commodities shrink in value, forcing trade guilds that are located in villages and towns throughout Burma to recalibrate prices nationally, based on the international market value of each product. Thus the practice of salary increases ultimately undermines any potential gain in wealth for government employees, similar to prior salary increases where, “the salaries of civil servants and military personnel were raised significantly in April 2000, [however] inflation also increased rapidly, eroding the value of the salary hikes”.4

The last salary increase for government employees was enacted in April 2006, which increased salaries nearly 10 fold. The result was a 20% increase in commodity prices over 6 weeks.5 As reported by Scott Turnell, to the US senate foreign relations committee, at that time the actual market exchange rate was nearly 200 times what the government officially posted6, and that the inflation rate between 2005 and 2007 averaged around 30.1%. It is now estimated to be close to 50 % according to the US State Department.7

Details of Commodity Price Increases:

The fallout from the 2010 salary increases has been dramatic.  In the past month as HURFOM has documented the unfolding economic tribulation, commodity prices increased across the board. Due to the widespread problems of collecting economic data in Burma, from extreme security dangers, constant shifting economic values, and a lack of consensus on data, it is difficult to determine an average income for residents. According to the CIA World Factbook, the GDP per capita income is $1,200, which when broken down to a daily income, would be $3.29 a day, or approximately 3,290 kyat. While this only a general guide, the amount gives a picture of how difficult it is for average civilians to pay for basic costs. The commodity price increases have, in particular, increased the costs of basic necessities. According to the UN 70% of household expenditures are spent on food.8 The following are prices of common everyday commodities necessary for basic survival for families in Burma:

1 pack (50 Kg) of rice increased from an average price of 20,000 to 23,000 kyat
1 vis (1.54 Kg) of onions increased from an average price of 600 to 700 kyat
1 vis of cooking oil/ peanut oil increased from an average price of 600 to 750 kyat
1 vis of chili increased from an average price of 3,000 to 3,200 kyat
1 vis of fish paste increased from an average price of 300 to 350 kyat
1 gallon of diesel fuel increased from an average price of 6,000 to 6,500 kyat
1 vis of fish (salt water) increased from an average price of 6,000 kyat to 6,500 kyat

Voices of Current Government Employees:

Even though the government salary increase has only been enacted as of January 1st 2010, most government employees interviewed have already reported to HURFOM that they are struggling for survival due to the rapid explosion of commodity prices. The increase in commodity prices has been so widespread and abrupt that the majority of interviewed civil servants have stated that the salary hike provided no financial benefit, or was even insufficient in covering inflated prices.

According to Khin Mg Win, Chief of Police of the Department of Drugs and Crime, in an undisclosed township, whose current salary is 58,000 kyat:
In my opinion, the government increasing the salary for their staff is related to 2010 [election] and manipulating the economic system. In Burma, there are a lot of jobless people. Also our income is not matched with the commodity price that we spend daily. These are the reasons the government is raising the salary to make their employee feel a little less pressured and help to get out of the economic crisis. However they’re also trying to make it easier to win our support to be involved on their side [in the election].

A Police Sergeant, Zaw Myint, whose current salary is 52,000 kyat in an undisclosed township, described that even though the military government was raising staff salaries 20,000 kyat, some government staff, like himself, still report having difficulty providing for the survival of their families:

Although the government gives me another 20,000 kyat, I cannot provide for the survival of my family. The commodity prices are increasing at the same time as they increase our salary so there is no increased benefit from us getting more salary. My family has 7 members. If they have to wait on me for my salary, they would no longer survive. The salary increase that they’ve given me does not even get one package of rice. At the movement I’m serving in the border so my family faces even more difficulty for their daily survival.

Aung Thu, who works at the Ministry of communication and information, in an undisclosed township, is currently paid 52,000 kyat:
The increase in staff salary didn’t surprise me or make me happy. Everyone understands that the government must ultimately hold power during the election in 2010. As the election is prepared there have been many problems between the government, the National League for Democracy [NLD] and the [ethnic] ceasefire groups. They do not believe that the election will be fair. Also within the government staff, there have been some problems with people and their jobs. I think the reason they are increasing the staff salary is they are trying to get us to on their side in the coming election…Before the salary increase the commodity prices had already increased a little bit. But, after the salary increase the commodity prices skyrocketed. Even though the government increased the stipend it is not enough for our family. If we did not get extra jobs it would be difficult for all of us to survive. As for the government staff who have children that are attending school? Its even more difficult [for them].

Zaw Min Htun is employed by the Customs Department, at a salary of 52,000 kyat, and is from an undisclosed township. He explained to HURFOM about how little benefit the salary increase provided, and in particular noted the increased cost of commodities on the borders of Burma makes the augmented salary even less effective:

I think this is all part of their policy. They should be increasing [the salaries] because the commodity prices have risen very high. If they don’t, their staff will not longer be able to work in government positions because they must find extra work for their livelihoods. In addition they’re [staff] not focusing their attention on the election if their standard of living is at risk. I think the government gives a little more money to grab their [staff] attention to support their [government] side in coming election. By giving an extra 20,000 kyat instead of a real salary they help the staff who stay towards the inside of Burma, but not the staff who are based on the border like me.’’

According to Tar Bhu from the Ministry of Communication, whose current salary is 52,000 Kyat, and is from an undisclosed township:
I’m not interested in the extra 20,000 kyat increase. We cannot support our family despite the government having increased my salary. I only pay attention to the outside income. I have been working setting up or fixing satellite dishes. I got more money from that job than I do for my salary. I’m not interested what the government is doing or what their policies are in increasing their staff salary. I’m not interested in what the government has there…it seems to be that I will get no benefit so its none of my business. What I do care about is how my family will continue surviving.”

Ko Win Myint, from the Land Survey Department in Paung Township, Kywe Chan village, who is paid 53,000 kyat, said:
The government spends our money for building bridges and constructing roads. When it’s finished, they just come for the opening ceremony to cut the ribbon. Now is the same thing – they increase our salary and create a big celebration to appear as if they really care for and think about their employees. After [giving the salary increase] I think they will point us towards which party [they say] we have to vote for.

Naing Lee Mor, who is a primary school teacher, from an undisclosed township and whose current salary is 52,000 Kyat, said:
As for the government’s staff located on the border like me, I do not think this is enough to spend for our families. If we exchanged our salary to Thai bhat, we do not even get 2,000 bhat. So, we have to consider about accommodation rentals, electricity, and water costs with that money. If my husband does not have a job, I don’t know how our family’s lives will be. Now, the salary has been a little bit increased; we are a little better off for our family’s well-being. So, anyway, if we compare with the normal daily worker, our life is a little bit more stable. I’m happy because I got more salary…

U Moe Kyaw, a middle school teacher through the Ministry of Education from an undisclosed township, and has a current salary of 60,000 kyat, said:
For teachers like us an increase in salary made us happy. It’s the government showing some good will and thought for their staff. But, it’s difficult – whenever the salary increases the price of commodities also increases. We don’t have extra money to save. Our family has never dreamed to be wealthy like other people. Our government jobs do not provide for us a stable way of life. We have to move whenever they want us to move. The best way to stay all right is saying nothing – either good or bad.

U Tin Oo from the Municipal Department, whose current salary is 52,000 kyat, and is from Thee Pagoda Pass town, said:
I’m not really clear on weather the act of increasing salaries is related with the coming election or not. I recognize that the government would like the lower levels of their staff to have enough for spending – I think that’s the reason they increasing the salary. Yet in the last couple of years they’ve also increased the salary because the price of commodities has increased. I think, this time it’s the same thing as before.

They are considering commodity prices and increasing their employees’ salaries. Before they’re increased the salary [20,000], the market price began to skyrocket. If we stop and consider the situation nowadays, the increased salary has resulted in nothing new. Even though it’s had a big effect on our lives, we can spend a little more than before. I think that probably the salary increase has not helped the staff who take responsibility in the borderline areas, but it’s enough for the staff inside [Burma].

Soldiers have also been included in the recent salary increase. In early January, according information that was gathered by HURFOM from a source close with the Burmese army battalion community, 3 divisions under control of Infantry Battalion (IB) No. 66 based in Pegue Division, Pyee District, defied their commander’s orders because of insufficient payment for household and family expenses. Also reported by the Burmese section of British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Voice Of America (VOA) news agencies, some political observers who analyzed this case, found that because of this conflict amongst the troops, the government increased their salary polices. “The increasing salary would relate with the conflict within Battalion No. 66,” said U Khin Maung, a retired government staff member in Pegu.

Voices of Retired Government Employees:

While the government policy of a flat 20,000 kyat pay increase could be construed as benefiting its recipients, the policy completely neglects the pension funding of retired civil servants. The average compensation after 30 years of work is 10,000 kyat a month. Most of the retired civil servants interviewed have reported that the inflation driven commodity price increase has so significantly undercut their meager pensions, and their ability to provide for their families has been severely crippled.

According to U Myit a 64 years old retired government worker in Mawlamyine, since the 20,000 kyat increase was only for current staff, no benefit was extended to retired persons:
The government increased their staffs salary, but only those who are currently serving, because of they want to solve their staff living standard problems. But, I don’t think they can solve those problems. The government knows their staff are not getting enough salary to spend for their families well being, so the government has tried to reduce their staffs’ stress by giving them more salary. But in my life, I’ve served over 30 years for my country. Because of the terrible administration of the country, our lives get worse and worse when we retire with a pension. I have many old co-workers who are in the same situation as me.

Daw Thein May, a 58 year old Thanbyuziart resident who retired for health reasons, said:
A little over 30 years ago government staff were very popular, I mean, like, the residents recognized us as gentle and considered us to be of a high position. During that period the Burma Socialist Program Party [BSPP] government led the country, and if we had one government staff in our house, all the members of our family could rely on his or her salary. But by 1989, because of the poor of the military government administrative system, most of the government staff were facing financial difficulties in maintaining their living standards or just surviving. Every time the salary increased, commodity prices would also increase. So increasing the salary is just a name, in reality its not benefiting anyone. Our house is the house that was provided by the government. Because we were government staff, we dare not to speak about politics. I’m not sure they are acting on good will for their staff, but I know they are not good at their administration. As far as I know, all middle class government staff are struggling for their survival. Compared to my family the money I get is not enough to use to support my family. If we did not get extra income from my children, our family would no longer be able to stay here. Getting a pension – many at only 3,000 kyat per month – makes it impossible to stand on your own in your life.

Daw Thein May also told HURFOM that the reasoning behind increasing the salary of 20,000 kyat for all staff, who are currently serving in the government service, is related to the coming election. She noted that other government efforts have been towards attracting civilians and staff to become involved and to vote for the political party backed by the SPDC.

According to U Tin Yuu, retired from the Ministry of Trade, from Phatkain quarter, Moulimein city:
The government gave this increase the title of “Additional Funds”…But [this increase] seems to me like stopping the children who are crying b/c they are hungry by giving them a snack. They do it to make their employees feel good in their jobs and prevent them from thinking about uprising. They pretend that they are a good government and to that they will give them votes in coming election. But they’re just manipulated their current staff. This is not the first time that this has happened – In 1988 and 1990 it also happened. At that time, the government tried to get their staff to vote for the party that they [government] controlled through the back end, the National Unity Party [NUP]. They tried to do the same as what they are doing now. You can see the Union of Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), militias and administrative Township Peace and Development Councils (TPDC) that are very active for them [the government]. They’re trying to get well organized and well prepared for the coming election. These new bills are probably just from the printing factory. The disadvantage here is that now our money is becoming like when the Japanese ruled our country. The money had no value at that time since they just produced money but had no grantee to back it. Then what happens is that retired persons like us have a big challenge for living. Because of the inflation, the commodity price has quickly gone up all over the country.  What will happen is that the government we are now being ruled by is a mismanaged corrupt government, and the future of the country cannot be seen under this government. If we compare with other countries and the people who serve as its staff, they [other countries] will not just leave their staff that had served the country in poor situation like in our country. Just in Thailand, where my children are working, they said their boss is a retired government staff, but he can buy a car and a house from his pension money. This is just only our very close neighbor country. This is the situation that is like oil and water [opposites]. Their government is so good to them – I don’t think I will see a good government in this country until I die. This is my fortune.

Some retirees are currently living below the poverty level, at the lowest living standard in the country. The government set pensions so low that now with the increase of all costs, retirees can’t afford to eave go to collect their pension.

According to Naing Noe from the Ministry of Transportation, a 56 year-old retiree based in Ngentae quarter, Mawlamyine said:
I’m not interested in the 2010 election. I also don’t see any party that I prefer. I spent the entire my life serving my country. Now I’m afraid of these political problems. Currently, increasing the salary is not for us who are retired persons from the former pay period [prior to the salary increase]. I do not withdraw my pension money for long periods of time because I spend more then the pension on the cost of traveling to come get my pension [Naing Noe must travel to Moulimen from Ye to get his pension money]. Because I got cancer, I had to retire from my job early. Now the commodity prices are skyrocketing. My wife sells flowers in the market to get some income for our family. But I would offer one piece of advice to our new generation – do not want to be government staff, never be government staff in our country.

According to U Kyi Thein, who served 30 years as a government staff member, located in Kyaikmayaw Township, Mon State:
They are becoming twisted to be faithful those with higher positions and discriminate against people with lower position. It’s mentally affecting the staff. Another thing is the staff income, economy, social services and health care are decreasing in quality after the State Law and Order restoration Council (SLORC) and State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) came to power. The staff have developed the bad habit of corruption over the last 20 years. If they did not do though they cannot get enough money to spend on their families survival. The high position people know about this situation, but they turn a blind eye. But for the staff, with low positions, they do not benefit from this. Only higher rank government staff benefit from corruption. In the coming election, the military government have presented the USDA and NLP, and are stay in the background to support them. I think increasing salary is indirectly the government’s effort to try and convince their staff to vote for them [these groups] and stay on their [government] side in the coming election. We get nothing, just effects from the economic crisis. I got nothing during my service with the government. Also, my family did not get enough food during my work as a government staff. I have sympathy for all the government staff who face difficulties in their livelihoods. I pray that our people get freedom from this dictatorship and bad government system.

A 65 year old former teacher from Thanbyuzayat Township, who preferred to remain unnamed, explained:
In my opinion the government just tried to get the votes from their staff. That’s the reason they’re increasing their staff’s salary. Another reason is to make their staff happy with them. I heard this month that there were some problems caused in the military community in which soldiers acted against the orders from the higher ranks above them. The military government is very worried about cases that could lead to the destruction of their military. To solve these fears, they…increase their [soldiers] salary. But it does not matter because they just produce more money. It’s a consequence, the commodity prices becoming so high. We are being affected the inflation of our money. They are just concentrating their effort to make their power more stable.

Voices from privately employed civilians:

While the vast majority of the country’s wealth is distributed within the military’s ruling elite, and civilians heavily connected to the junta, the remaining nearly 48 million people in the country will only experience pay hikes through the knock on effect of inflation.  With 32.7% of Burma’s civilian population living below the poverty line9, millions of residents will struggle even further to cover these costs. HURFOM field reporters have found that the families most severely challenged are day laborers and subsistence workers. Many of these families, who at the same time face regular pressure to form uncompensated militia groups, lose land through confiscation, and pay arbitrary taxes, are in fact the populations that now hardest hit on basic survival goods.

According to a U Gyi Myin, from Pa’an, who takes an interest in politics and the movement of SPDC forces, told HURFOM field reporter that:
The government is not solving the main problems of its citizens, it just wants to win the election and get lots of support from its own staff…[so they will] vote for them. If government really wanted to solve the problems [of the country] they would not need to do that [get support from staff members]. Really, they just need to reduce the price of goods and create jobs for citizens. Imagine how many people had to flee their villages and find jobs. How much outside money comes back into this country [from migrant workers]? As for now, the government doesn’t analyze what people need and how to solve the country’s problems. They only want to make a small amount of the country’s population feel better, but not the rest. They only care about their staff. The SPDC’s purpose is very clear; after they increase staff salaries, the price of goods for sure will increase. Villagers  [will] have to struggle more to fill their stomachs and feed their families so villagers will have no time to think about politics and what is going on in the country.
According to Nai Banya tun, even though the regime added 20,000 kyat per month for their staff, the salary hike has been a failure due to the regimes inability to regulate prices with in its own country.  All but the highest ranking staff would suffer, and that most of the employees “could not buy a pair of shoes for their wives. As for small staff they only got enough to pay for their tea  and cigarettes”.

The amount of government added 20,000 kyat per month could not solve any problem for their staffs but the regime thought that after they added 20,000 kyat per month they could persuade their staff to support them for the coming election and for another is the regime want out side world to see the regime already started changing in the country. This is all they thoughts about after they added 20,000 kyat per month. The amount of the regime increased salary 20,000 kyat per month was very small amount because the currency in the country now is not stable. With paper money the can print as much as they want. All the regime did was to persuade their staff to support them. The regime also wants to show their staff that they care for them and if their staff want to rely on the government they must support them to win. When they added 20,000 per month for their staff’s salary, they want to show their staffs that after they win the coming election they [staff] will get more profit from the government.

According to Saw Ao Bow Mu, a university student who has focused on analyzing pre-election preparations by the SPDC, and activities carried out by regime staffs in his village:
The time of the elections is coming closer and closer. Villagers are facing many things, such as high prices of goods, and the expansion of household expenses, but our incomes are not increasing even though the prices of goods are increasing step by step. Villagers have never had good health care or opportunities to develop their communities. Many villagers have to struggle to fill their stomachs. Even though villagers are facing a terrible situation, the regime wants to get support from its staffs and added 20,000 kyat per month to their staffs’ salaries, [so] the prices of goods have risen dramatically.

Ma Khin May Way, 46 years-old, explained of her family to a HURFOM field reporter as their experience:
I have seven people in my family – I and my husband and my six children. My husband and I are daily workers. My husband and I work in cashew nut plantation own by a business man from Rangoon. Our wage is 4,000 kyat per day – both of us earn this. But we cannot work everyday. We can only work some of the times. The other six people cannot not work as they are still young. My husband and I have to struggle very hard to survive. We need rice and cooking materials, the other stuff we can make by ourselves. Still, sometimes we have to borrow some rice from a neighbor to survive. I don’t know why the price of goods has increased. But in the beginning of January the price of goods and the cooking materials increased. We can’t afford even our daily expenses.

In numerous interviews, villagers struggling to provide for their families commented that they believe the increase in commodity prices is intentional or at least is favorable for the regime’s 2010 election preparations, as villagers who struggle to pay for food daily have no opportunity to engage in politics. When HURFOM field reporter asked said Ko Myit Lon 45 year-old resident about election, he explain that:
We’re not interested in the coming election, we’re only interested in how to get food for today and tomorrow, and where we can work. We don’t know about the election but we want to get enough food and live peaceful lives…The regime only wanted to make the lives of villagers terrible with their activities. The regime already knew about residents situations’. If they do this what will happen to residents? They do not want residents interested in election or thinking about election; so they create another problem for villagers to think about. If villagers have no food they have to struggle for with their daily expenditure and not think about politics. All the regime just wants villagers to work harder to get food.

Analysis:

While the intention of increasing civil servant salaries will unfortunately remain ambiguous with out direct SPDC comment, the actual consequences of this policy are clear.

The timing of this salary increase, regardless of any potential cause, has already significantly affected the potential of this election to be conducted in a fair, informed and democratic manner. HURFOM would like to make clear that even if the other ongoing efforts towards manipulating voter opinion were disregarded, the systemic shock this salary increase has, and will continue to have, has had a drastic impact the electoral process.

In considering the target of the salary increase, it seems that at face value, few votes would be won over by the flat rate salary increase, especially as the increase has prompted such widespread price increases.   Even amongst the government’s own staff at whom the salary increase was directed, the majority of those interviewed by HURFOM expressed their displeasure and concern over the commodity price increase.

For the remainder of the population that are either retired civil servants or privately employed citizens, the problems of an already unstable economic system have been exacerbated.  The basic commodities necessary for daily life have increased in value, which in turn will impact not only a person’s immediate capacity to feed themselves and their family, but more long term, disrupt their survival as they attempt to compensate for the inflation.

Thus this pay increase has the very real likelihood of subverting the democratic process in both urban and rural settings. As Christina Fink notes historically of the regimes economic volatility, “People were so busy hustling to survive that they had no time for politics.”10 If the most basic daily costs now becoming the stumbling blocks of daily existence for civilians, it would appear that indeed there will be more emphasis on immediate survival then on any sort of political inclination.

Conclusion:

Since the implementation of the salary increase for civil servants in early January, the Burmese government’s propensity towards printing cash without financial backing has exacerbated Burma’s already volatile inflation rate.

With widespread commodity price increases hampering the livelihoods of current civil servants, retired government workers, and civilians alike, the SPDC salary increase is unlikely to win support among the disaffected population that will struggle with greater financial burden.

The reckless disregard for inflation by the current government has perpetuated an economy that will be inherited post 2010 election.  Though the fiscal carelessness that is exhibited here cripples the possibility of a democratic process, it will continue to undermine the legitimacy of a newly formed, ostensibly civilian, government. As long as the economic system cannot guarantee civilians access to the most basic commodities in life, no real transition or political evolution can occur.

(Footnotes)

]]> http://rehmonnya.org/archives/1341/feed 0 http://rehmonnya.org/archives/1309 http://rehmonnya.org/archives/1309#comments Fri, 05 Feb 2010 06:04:05 +0000 HURFOM http://rehmonnya.org/?p=1309 Introduction

Between December 2009 and early January 2010, South-East Command Major General That Naing Win issued a series of orders to local and regional Burmese government administrators in Mon State, mandating that their offices begin lobbying the residents of the areas under their administrative control for political support, in preparation for the 2010 election. These orders coincided with a rapid increase in human rights abuses targeting the citizens of Mon State. Download report as PDF [176 KB]

The most common instances of these abuses, forced militia trainings, extortion of election funds, forced rice donations, land confiscations and mandatory summer rice paddy cultivation, have been continuously documented by HURFOM in its November and December 2009 reports.

This month’s continued documentation of abuses by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) forces has painted a stark portrait of pre-election efforts by the military government, that are directly intended to ensure it will maintain its grip on state power after the supposed transition to a civilian government post-election.

This month, HURFOM continues its series of reports documenting effects of SPDC preparations for the coming 2010 election. Previously published information pertaining to pre-election human rights violations, along with updates in Thanbyuzayat township, serve as a backdrop for a discussion of the methods by which the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has begun to increase its control over the voting population of Mon State.

HURFOM then addresses the three-pronged approach by the Burmese government to maintaining control of the voting population in Mon State: census-gathering of village and township population levels, identification checking and travel restrictions, and checks placed on monastic communities.

In response to the SPDC’s ongoing campaign, HURFOM hopes in this report to highlight the actual responses from Mon state villagers to increases in government pressure.  As noted in the Karen Human Rights Group’s 2008 report “Village Agency”, rural communities are often over looked as agents of political action or thought in the state. However HURFOM hopes to highlight that by providing individual accounts from a diverse array of dissenting voices, including monks, TPDC chairmen, truck drivers, and government staff members, this report will reveal a clear and strong community response, regarding their perceptions of and reactions to these growing efforts to undercut any real democratic process.

Background

The human rights violations that HURFOM documented in the months of November and December 2009 pertaining to SPDC preparations for the 2010 election have persisted into the first month of 2010. Here, HURFOM includes a short update on reports of increasingly intense pre-election abuse in Mon State.

Starting in early December 2009, Military Operations Management Command No. 19 in Thanbyuzayat Township forced between 10 and 30 residents from each village in its controlled area to act as “observers” for the military government. These individuals were forced to complete military training, and then were ordered to act as unofficial spies for the Burmese government in their villages, motoring each settlement for anti-military election sentiment.

The other residents of these Thanbyuzayat villages were forced to support the individuals selected to be “observers” during their military training. The majority of the villages in the area under MOMC No. 19’s control contain an average of 2,000 villagers each, and during the 2 weeks of militia training, each household in the area was required to contribute between 3,000 and 5,000 kyat to pay for food, uniforms, and other supplies. HURFOM’s reporters also learned that village headmen have used the battalion’s presence in the area as an opportunity for self-gain; many village headmen used the military training taxes as an opportunity to extort money from the villagers under their control.

Methodology

For this report, HURFOM field reporters gathered interviews from Ye, Mudon and Thanbyuzayat Townships in Mon State. Due to increased security risks as government has mounted pressure on communities, reporters relied largely on networks of their own individual contacts for information; many of these individuals within the reporter’s network were responsible for gaining contacts and conducting interviews with village leaders and government staff members. While these accounts are gathered based on opportunity as they occurred to reporters and their network, HURFOM believes these interviews provide a fair account of personal opinion amongst villagers within the townships targeted, and areas within which SPDC forces have conducted 2010 election preparations and perpetrated abuses in relation the election.

Census-gathering

Continuing since October 2009, the SPDC has carried out an aggressive and detailed form of census taking, targeting different elements of civilian communities throughout Mon state.  This campaign to gather information about the state’s civilian population has transformed over the past four months, as efforts by the SPDC towards securing community support have evolved.

According to HURFOM’s field reporters, near the close of 2009, the Burmese government issued identification cards to Burmese citizens not yet in possession of identification.  The government’s Department of Immigration, in conjunction with the Burmese military, lead the issuance of identification cards, and then conducted censuses of the voting population in each village in Mon State, which were ordered to be concluded by the 31st of December. Such measures will provide the Burmese government with exact figures of expected voter turnouts in these regions.

In first week of December 2009, The Burmese military government ordered the local administrators in Ye and Thanbyuzayat Townships to conduct censuses in the areas under their control, as a means of establishing the numbers of potential voters before the upcoming 2010 elections.

The orders were issued directly to local battalions, Township Peace and Development Council (TPDC) chairmen and Village Peace and Development Council (VPDC) chairmen. The village chairmen were ordered to initiate the censuses in their individual villages. The SPDC first demanded village names, and then asked about the number of households located in each village, and the total population of each village.

According to a Ye Township resident, the census was conducted by a number of battalions based in both northern and southern Ye Township. These battalions include Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) No. 587, based in Kon Du Village; LIB No. 299, based in Marn Aung village, LIB No. 586 based in Myo Daw Oo village, and LIB No. 343 base in Aru Taung village. The battalions themselves registered identification numbers and tallied the number of residents in each village, also counting the numbers of villagers currently employed abroad. The remaining sections of the census demanded political and economic information that many township members felt exceeded the boundaries of a normal census, raising suspicions that the SPDC planned to use this information to manipulate voter populations during its 2010 election campaign.

U Khin Yee, a 45 year old villager and member of the Ye Township TPDC, detailed the questions included in the document for HURFOM’s reporter:

The census they [the government] gave us was very detailed. It also included [questions on] religious leaders and staff who live in monasteries, churches, and mosques in the area. Other [details collected] are: the number of government staff in the area, the amount of property they own, and what organization they are working for in the area. The census form also asked for the amount of ceasefire-group members who are based in the area. They also wanted to know the number of clinics, libraries, small bridges, and large bridges that have been funded by the area’s budget [taxes]. I think, they will try to use this information in their election campaign.”

U Myo Thet, a 64 year old retired high school teacher from Ye Township, explained to HURFOM’s reporter how he believes the censuses collected of government staff information will allow the SPDC to manipulate its voter levels:

The local government collected lists of the retired people in Ye Township. There are around 15 individuals who collected the census list. This group included members of Infantry Battalion (IB) no. 61, Military Operation Management Command (MOMC) No. 19, advanced trainers for the government’s civil service, and the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). I heard they would collect lists of all the retired government staff in Ye Town. The local authorities would not directly say that the list was for the 2010 elections. They claimed that they wanted to know the voters list in the area. As for me, I will vote properly for party that I believe in. I want the party that I prefer to get power and win in the election. I could not accept a government who forced the population to vote for them and intimated the residents into supporting them in their election. If I believe that a party is not appropriate for the residents, and I do not agree with their ideas or systems, I will not vote for them. It is my decision. We must have freedom to vote [as we wish], and justice in our election. Now, the way they are collecting the retired government staff lists is a way of preparing them [the staff] to vote for the government’s party. I think, by collecting the retired staff lists, the government will change our votes so that we vote for their controlling party. It’s an unacceptable idea.”

Movement Restriction Against Civilians During the Pre-election Period

In a step beyond previous efforts to pressure civilian communities in to support of the SPDC in the coming election, military forces have now been documented actively restricting civilian movement.  Restriction of movement is an abuse commonly practiced in brown and black ‘free fire’ areas where SPDC forces still face resistance from insurgent groups.  The implementation of this tactic in relation the control of non-threatening civilian communities is an exceptional indicator of the SPDC’s increased focus on pre-election preparations.

According to HURFOM’s field reporter, in the beginning of January 2010 the military government in Naypyidaw ordered Brigadier General That Naing Win, chairman of the South East Command (SEC), to ensure that all Light Infantry Battalions (LIB) and Infantry Battalions (IB) in Mon State be ready to maintain security in preparation for the 2010 election. Among the security measures demanded by the Burmese government was the implementation of rigorous checkpoints, and increased travel restrictions on travelers moving around rural areas, or between rural area and urban sites.

Resultantly, since the start of January 2010, the residents of southern Mon State have encountered a surge in travel restrictions and identification checkpoints. According to HURFOM’s reporters, travel has become especially difficult for individuals from neighboring states and divisions, as government authorities have been ordered to subject outsiders to particularly intense questioning and identity checks. Individuals traveling between townships in Mon State itself have also experienced travel restrictions.

Kon Aye, a 29 year-old resident of Aru Taung village in Ye Township, told HURFOM’s reporter that he feels that the travel restrictions in his region are an attempt to limit awareness of the human rights abuses occurring in Ye Township’s “black areas”:

In my opinion, the authorities in the township do not want people from other states and divisions to come into this area because they do not want news spread in other states and divisions about what they have done in this area. In the last few months, the local authorities have collected the numbers of people in different villages, including the villages of Aru Taung, Marn Aung, Kyaung Yaw, Kon Du, Myo Daw Oo and Hangan. The authorities were trying to get the number of people in each village in preparation for the election.

HURFOM’s field reporters also learned that during the second week of January 2010, the government authorities in Moulmein, and those at checkpoints along the Thanbyuzayat to Moulmein highway, began particularly intense traveler investigations, checking identification cards and searching baggage. According to reports, the severity of these checks is only increasing.

Targeting of Monastic Communities:

While traditionally seen as the religious and moral compass of the nation, the monastic population of Burma has come under increasing scrutiny and outright pressure from the SPDC. The nation’s monk community curries significant respect from civilian groups, is wide spread, well organized, and fosters a high degree of education, and is for these reasons seen as a threat to the continued domination of the junta in Burmese politics.

As the SPDC’s 2010 election preparations have evolved, increasing amounts of military pressure have been placed on Mon state’s monastic communities. Members of monasteries throughout Mudon, Thanbyuzayat, and Mudon townships reported increases in questioning, identification checks, and movement surveillance to HURFOM’s field reporters.

According to a monk in Kon Du Village in Ye Township, LIB No. 587 commander Than Win not only gathered a census of the number of people in his village but also gathered the identification numbers of monks living in the area, despite the fact that monastic communities are not permitted to participate in the voting process.  Reportedly, this commander also asked monks in the region to inform him when monks from neighboring villages arrived at the monastery. Than Win reportedly demanded that the Kon Du monastic community to also contact him immediately, should they hear rumors of other monks being involved in anti-election movements.

A 29 year-old monk from Kon Du temple described the investigation of his monastery by LIB No. 587’s commander. The process included specific orders from the commander regarding appropriate monastic pre-election behavior:

The battalion commander came and questioned the abbot in the temple every week. Some weeks he came two three or times and questioned the abbot. It seen to be he came and checked the list of the monks’ visitors in my temple. Every temple in Ye township was in the same situation. The battalion commander also warned the abbot not to get involved in movements against the election If other monks get involved, we have to tell him about it. If someone gets involved in movements against the election, they must face severe punishment.

According to HURFOM’s field reporter, military checkpoints at Thanbyuzayat, Mudon and Phaung Sein have placed particularly intense focus on students and monks, given the role both groups played in the 1988 and 2007 protests. Traveling students and monks who talked to HURFOM’s reporters claimed that the rigorous treatment they faced at checkpoints made them extremely uncomfortable, and many feared being accused of inciting anti-government sentiment and being forced to pay bribes. Travelers reported that checkpoint authorities led rigorous baggage and personal searches, and held long, threatening interrogation sessions.

Particularly intense travel restrictions began in the northern and central areas of Mon State after an anti-government movement called the “no 2010 campaign” took place over New Years. Participants all over Mon State graffitied the words “No 2010” on various roads and buildings throughout the region; the protest prompted a state-wide frenzy among Burmese military forces based in Mon State. According to inside sources in the Thanbyuzayat monastic community, on January 7th, a monk heavily involved in the Mon Literacy and Culture Association was arrested in Thanbyuzayat in conjunction with the “ No 2010” campaign. Security maintains extremely tight for travelers throughout Mon State, and travelers report that they now must show identification at every checkpoint.

Community responses to SPDC manipulation

Despite the upsurge in security measures designed to ensure the SPDC’s retention of power after the 2010 election, a large contingent of Mon State civilians, government workers, and monks interviewed by HURFOM’s reporters continue to voice their own opposing political beliefs and desires. Many of the sources who spoke with HURFOM’s field reporters used the opportunity to share their disapproval of the Burmese government.

HURFOM hopes to highlight that these interviews are an important indicator of community members’ retention of their own political agency and will, despite the Burmese government’s widespread efforts at coercion and repression of their capacity to act. Though unable to physically carry out openly confrontational forms of political resistance, these interviews illustrate a firm understanding and clear set of ideals and principles on which Mon State community members intend to act, regardless of SPDC repression.

A VPDC chairman (name and location concealed for security purposes), who attended a Township-level administrative meeting in his district on December 2nd and 3rd, 2009, expressed to HURFOM his extreme reluctance to implement the Burmese government’s orders given to tactical commander, battalion commanders, and TPDC officials:

The authorities commanded us to work a certain way. First, they ordered us to campaign for the government. They do not care if I and the residents are interested or not, the resident must be forced to vote for the government’s party. Voters are their [the government’s] target, if they don’t vote they are the government’s enemy. They force us to continue forcing the residents [to support the Burmese military government]. They know that if we [village leaders] force our residents then we will get into conflicts with our people. Second, they ordered us to force the residents to vote for them by forcing them and intimating them. Not only this meeting did they order this, but also in a meeting we attended before. They ordered the same thing. This way [forced participation] means that people will lose their freedom of expression through voting.

Just as government officials seemed increasingly reluctant to participate in the invasive pre-election procedures demanded by the SPDC, so too did civilian sources interviewed by HURFOM. Many Mon State citizens indicated that they had begun to chafe at the increasingly stringent movement restrictions implemented by the SPDC.

According to a Mon State truck driver, who regularly drives from Ye to Moulmein on the Moulmein to Ye highway, in the past travelers were not required to stop at every checkpoint along the route. Following the events of the “No 2010” protest, this truck driver complained to HURFOM that travelers must not only show their cards at every checkpoint, they also must walk through the stations. Truck drivers making the trip between Rangoon and Tavoy report even higher rates of checkpoints, and rates of travelers along road have steadily declined, as travelers grow more discouraged by the length of time it takes to make a journey along Mon State’s major highways. Drivers reported that they must pay increasingly high bribes to get through checkpoints; the truck driver interviewed by HURFOM complained that between checkpoints and the cost of gas, he is left totally devoid of income.

A TPDC member (name concealed for security purposes) detailed some of the preparations already made by the Burmese government for its pre-election campaign:

As for me, I had been attending meetings every single week. Most the government orders are directly from Naypyidaw to the State’s or District’s Administrative Department. In the meetings, they mainly focus on how to get every department involved in 2010 election. In our Township, the MOMC will role for the security in coming election. As you know, the Election Commission (EC) has not declared the election laws yet. We also don’t know about the policies for forming a political party, or a constituency. In contrast, the military battalions have been providing fireman and militia trainings in the local areas. In addition, they have also educated the USDA about the election and what they can do in election. After they finish what they have do to prepare for their party, the election laws will be declared. I heard they would declare them in March. After that campaign, the government will start forcing and intimating people to vote for them.

According HURFOM’s field reporters, the Burmese immigration department began compiling lists of both retired and currently employed government staff, and their family members, in Ye, Thanbyuzayat, and Mudon Townships, in early January 2010. Three of HURFOM’s field reporters interviewed 20 retired government personnel, and 8 currently employed government staff members throughout the three Townships.

Overwhelmingly the government staff members interviewed by HURFOM’s reporters offered dissenting opinions on the election preparations. A former land surveyor named U Soe Thar, aged 62 from Ye Town, said:

This election must be the transition from a military government to a democratic government. For over 40 to 50 years, our population has been struggling under the military government’s control. Now is one of the opportunities that have been appearing throughout our history, to reform our country’s political system. If we vote for the military government, we can’t change and reform the security and country situation. It’s our opportunity to select our future leader. Even though I was a government staff, I must be vote for the party that I believe in.

U Thin, a 62 year-old retired government staff member from Mudon Township gave his explanation for the Burmese government’s delay in announcing electoral law:

My perception is clear. Certainly the government will lie in their election processes to continue holding on to their power. It is an unfair action that they also have not declared the election laws yet. They know that if they declare them late, other parties will not have time for their campaigns. Now they [the Burmese government] are already prepared for the pre-election process.

A Thanbyuzayat education staff member, who insisted that his name be withheld for security purposes, pointed to the role of the 2008 constitutional referendum in the SPDC’s control of the country:

As for my opinion, if the National League for Democracy (NLD) does not participate in the election, the election will not make sense. It’s not fair, the government has been starting its campaign, giving trainings and educating their key members to be ready for the election. They [the government] have already registered their retired employees on their voter lists. And then, the most important thing is the election laws. They have not come out yet. So, we can see that it will not be a fair election. They must play by the rules to win if the election happens. I think our country will not be freed from the military’s control again. In the 2008 constitution, we can review that the military government already takes 25% [of seats in parliament] in the administrative system. Furthermore, if there should be a revolution in parliament, the Ministry of defense can lead a military coup. It was clearly described in the 2008 constitution that every department in the government, such as administrative systems, judges, and the law are controlled by the military. It’ a question of who can accept this idea. As for me, if the election happens, I will vote for the political party that I prefer.

HURFOM’s field reporters interviewed 10 educators and former students living throughout Mon State, in the townships of Ye, Thanbyuzayat, and Mudon.  Many of the individuals interviewed were united in the opinion that without a proper understanding of the electoral process, and a thorough education on the nation’s political system, many Burmese citizens would be swayed by the SPDC’s pre-election efforts.

Mehm Paing Chan, a 28 year- old graduate with a B.A in law, from Thanbyuzayat Township pointed to the importance of both education and free will in the 2010 electoral process:

The election is the top priority in the country, it’s life for our country. It’s a time that we give a good leader and political party the opportunity to have a power in the country. I mean that we will give our future to the party that we believe in. If we don’t know the background of the government’s party, we will vote for them. That is similar to you killing yourself. Now we do not see that the government is preparing for the election like they would in a democratic system. All of their [the government’s] history is just abuse from their guns and their power. We saw in the 2008 constitutional referendum, how the government forced the residents to vote for its constitution. Nothing from our free wills was included in the constitution. We knew the constitution was not fair, but they forced us to agree with their constitution. If this time they force us to vote for their party again, we will have lost twice.

An educator and member of the National League for Democracy in Thanbyuzayat Town told HURFOM’s reporter that he believes the government’s delay in announcing election laws is a ploy to keep both the Burmese people, and the international world, uneducated about Burma’s political situation:

We can’t just say that the election will be in 2010. Before the election period, we should educate the population and provide knowledge about issues that are related to the election. Also, the election laws should appear very early, and there should be freedom to form political parties. The government should also give opportunities to other parties to use the radio and television for their own campaigns. Now, the election laws have not appeared yet. The population does not have any idea what the election is about. Also, other political parties have not started their campaigns yet. I think, the government did not give much time to other political parties for their campaigns. As a result, the population will get less knowledge and less experience with other parties. So, the entire body of these uneducated votes is just for the military government’s party. In addition, the government will force people to vote and finally they will point guns to the people’s heads to get their votes. The resident will be afraid and they certainly will vote for the military. This is the government’s strategy for the coming election. We have to try to educate the residents. And monitor what kind of human rights abuses will be caused by the coming election. We need to express to the international community that it needs to know that the government is abusing human rights in their election process. It’s necessary that the international community know that the election will not be fair and free.

Conclusion

The climate in which HURFOM continues to publish this series of reports on SPDC election preparations is one of increasing tension, as all forms of Burmese civil society find themselves under the ever-increasing influence of government pressure. After exploring what these abuses against civilian communities entail during the previous 2 months, this report has explored 3 primary invasive techniques designed to limit Mon States communities’ capacity for active political participation.

Census gathering, with the issuing of identification cards, continues to be a baseline effort by administrative bodies to gather detailed information on communities prior to promulgating the election law. These censuses infringe on the rights to privacy of the civilians in Mon state. By restricting the movements of civilian groups, SPDC authorities are targeting one of the most basic elements of personal freedom – the right to move freely from one place to another.  By targeting monks, the spiritual keys to Mon State communities, the SPDC hopes to curtail an entity possessing the potential to catalyze real political resistance.

However, civilian response to the current series of preparatory measures highlight a heartening reaction in which Mon State’s residents are able to retain their own personal sense of agency. In particular, given the significance the SPDC has assigned to controlling Mon State’s civilian population, community voice and the potential of divergent political opinion is perceived by the Burmese government as a very real threat. Thus, HURFOM hopes to underline that even in the midst of ongoing abuses, the retention of personal agency and opinion carries a great potential for action amongst Mon State citizens, into a period of increasing uncertainty as the 2010 election approaches.

As preparations by the Burmese State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) for the elections slated for 2010 mount, an increasing amount of pressure will be placed on already burdened rural agricultural communities in Mudon, Thanbyuzayat, Ye and Kyaikmayaw Townships. As previously noted in HURFOM’s October and November election reports, these preparations have targeted rural communities with the intention of securing political dominance in advance of the government’s announcement of the 2010 electoral rules. In taking farmers and community members from their time sensitive-cultivation and harvests of rice crops that are critical for community survival and economy, these preparations have place an excessive burden on agricultural populations. Download report as PDF [ 328 KB]

This HURFOM report will explore how the last 3 months of agricultural disasters and excessive human rights abuses committed by the SPDC have impacted farming communities, so that election preparations undertaken by the government will dramatically impact the livelihood of farmers involved.

The 1st section of this report will begin by laying out the background conditions that have contributed to the regional agrarian instability.  The 2nd section will focus on the most recent instances of abuse documented by field reporters in Mon State that have most severely impacted agricultural communities. The 3rd section documents instances of militia and “fire brigade” trainings that take farmers from their crops at crucial times during the agricultural season, after which in the 4th section HURFOM will offer analysis on the seriousness of the burden election preparations now place on Mon state farming communities.

Devastation in the 2009 crop season:

To better understand the significance of the human rights abuses carried out against farmers in Mon state, HURFOM will detail briefly the impacts of the environmental catastrophes explored in this report.

Due to a series of environmental catastrophes, both natural and man-made, that have befallen farmers during 2009-2010 rice harvests, the livelihoods of many farmers in Mon state have been severely undercut.

This year’s abnormally heavy rains and subsequent mass flooding, coupled with the invasion of insects and rodents into rice farms, has impacted Mon State’s rice industry in a manner far more catastrophic than anticipated.

Many Mon State farmers have lost significant portions of rice crops for the 2009 rainy season, leaving them with no income or monetary resources to invest in summer paddy farming.

The Win-pha-non dam in Mudon Township, and the Katiak dam in Paung Township, have also contributed to significant crop loss through flooding. The dams, originally erected to reserve water for dry season rice paddy agriculture in Mon state, suffer from several design flaws.  Neither dam is large enough to accommodate the amount of water that annually pours into the reservoirs during rainy season, and poorly designed spillways must routinely open to flood surrounding paddy fields with water, during the time of year when the nearby agricultural fields need it the least. These conditions have been exacerbated by the August 2009 rainfall in Mon State, leading to the loss of over 70,000 acres of rainy season rice paddies in the resultant flooding. Extensive crop damage has also been sustained in 2009 due to pests. Farmers in Mon state have reported crop losses of un-hulled rice paddy to mites and rats.  Furthermore, a blight of insects that lay their eggs in the stem of rice plants has surfaced. The infested rice plants wither and die in the fields, and massive crop losses have been reported in Mon State; rice prices for the remaining harvest have doubled since December 2008.

Ongoing Abuse:

The following abuses are those most commonly committed against farmers living in the Mon State townships of Kyaikmayaw, Mudon, Thanbyuzayat and Ye. These abuses have continued unabated since the SPDC began placing pressure on Mon state communities for support in the election.

Arbitrary seizure of farmland:

The seizure of farmland by the SPDC has been a long-standing human rights abuse committed against Mon State farmers.  Farms that have often been owned by generations of families are taken for use in government building projects or to use as state run farms.  This abuse is inarguably one of the most crippling committed against farmers.  With millions of kyat invested in cultivation, and few alternative economic opportunities, farmers whose land is sized end up destitute.

During late October 2009, over a hundred acres of farmland were confiscated from 22 farmers living in the Kamawat Sub-Township area in Mudon Township, Mon State. According to a source from Kamawat, the confiscated farmland is largely land that has been left to lie fallow for the past year due to the financial problems faced by many farmers in the area.

According to Nai Sa Neh, a Sein Taung resident who lost 5 acres, starting in May 2009, a number of high ranking battalion commanders from Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) No. 209, and authorities from the Mudon township land record department, arrived in a number of villages in the Kamarwat region. The battalion commanders and land authorities collected the names and information of farmers who had opted to leave portions of their fields unfarmed during the 2009 rainy season, the areas of fallow land were measured. This resident informed HURFOM’s reporter that LIB No. 209 and the Mudon township agricultural authorities returned to Kamarwat near the end of October 2009, and confiscated unfarmed land in question for the Burmese Army’s use.

According to Mi Yin Aye, a Sein Taung village resident:
My farmland was involved in this, 5 acres [were confiscated]. Last year after I farmed I had nothing because my crops were flooded. This year, I though it would be the same situation, so I didn’t want to farm all of it [my land]. In summer time, the authorities don’t allow us to farm the crops we want, they allow us to farm only what they want us to plant.

HURFOM field reporters learned that farmland has been confiscated by LIB No. 209 from many residents of Kamawat Sub-Township, as well from citizens of several nearby villages, including Sein Taung village, Htaung Kay village, and Hbae Doe village. HURFOM’s reporter was also able to speak with individual villagers who had lost farmland. These residents include Nai Bai, a Sein Taung resident who lost 2 acres; Nai Sa Neh, a Sein Taung resident who lost 5 acres; Nai Hla Myint, a Sein Taung resident who lost 6 acres; Nai Poe Ta, a Sein Taung resident who lost 5 acres; and Mi Ma Yee, a Htaung Kay resident who lost 5 acres.

Maintenance duty for gas-pipelines:

During the last few months, research conducted by HURFOM field reporters shows that many farmers in Mudon and Thanbyuzayat townships, Mon State, whose paddy lands are located along the Kanbauk Myaing Kalay gas pipeline, have once again been ordered to perform pipeline maintenance by the Burmese army battalions in change of the pipeline’s security. This process often requires lengthy time commitments and the use of the farmers’ own food supplies and work tools. Farmers suffer particularly when sentry duty is required during harvest time, as unattended crops will languish.

A HURFOM reporter living in southern Thanbyuzayat observed that in the second week of November, roughly 70 individuals, most of them paddy farmers from 4 different villages located along the pipeline in Thanbyuzayat Township who were busy with their rainy season crop harvest, were ordered to work along the pipeline. The residents of these villages have been charged with the task of building fences for the pipeline and reburying areas of pipeline that had become exposed by heavy downpours during the recently-ended rainy season.

A 50 year-old Karen resident of Waekhami village named U Tar Tar told HURFOM’s field reporter that the headman of his village received orders from two gas pipeline security battalions, Infantry Battalion (IB) No 62, and Artillery Regiment (AR) No.315, to take responsibility for pipeline maintenance. In Waekhami village, every household has been ordered to provide one individual for pipeline labor. Each worker has also been commanded to supply his own materials for covering and fencing the pipeline, such as bamboo and coconut branches. Missing a day of pipeline labor results in a 3,000 kyat fine.

“We villagers have had to take responsibility for these kind of activities every single year [after rainy season ends] since the gas pipeline arrived [in 2001],” A villager, U Tar Tar, said, explaining why this duty has caused him troubles. “Even though we are busy on our farms we have to work on it [the pipeline] first.”

According to Mi Aye Myint, a Waeyet villager, both men and women from her village are being forced to work on the gas pipeline; many must bring their small children with them to the pipeline, since failure to arrive for a day of work means paying a fine of 3,000 kyat to Sergeant Sa Yar Kyi, from the Thanbyuzayat-based IB No. 62.

A second Waeyet resident complained, “Villagers in Waeyet have to work on the pipeline nearly every single month. Even though we pay for security, 2,000 kyat a month, every month we still have to work on it. This gas pipeline is a kind of hell for the villagers. Since it arrived [in 1995] it not only fails to benefit us, it also harms us.”

Extortion of money for cost of tractor:

SPDC military battalion extortion of villagers and farm communities is a common abuse in Mon State, one that saps farmers of what little financial or material wealth they may have. Instances of cash or farm animal extortion is widespread. Often seeking some financial gain, battalion soldiers, or village and township peace and development councils, will make demands of ‘taxes’ under the pretense of legal justification.

On October 25th, the Mudon Township Peace and Development Council (TPDC)’s chairman U Kyaw Maung, his secretary, 5 members of the General Administration Department (GAD) and the agriculture committee held a meeting in Kamawat village to order local residents to donate money towards the purchase of a farm tractor to be used within the region.

The three villages that were included in the meeting were Kalotort, Kamawat, and Taung Pa villages. At the meeting the Mudon TPDC informed the three villages that each would have to pay a total of 200,000 kyat. The TPDC and individual VPDCs began collecting the money, however, according to HURFOM field reporters, during the collection process TPDC members collected more money than was originally decided by the TPDC at the meeting. This taxation will continue into 2010 and 2011, according to villagers.

Residents in the area’s villages were skeptical of the proposed intention of purchasing a community tractor. “I don’t believe the TPDC chairman when he talked about buying the farm tractor. But, we need to pay if they collect money from us because they are the ones with power,” said Nai Myoe, a 55 year-old Kamawat villager. “If I estimate the extortion payments I’ve had to pay in October, the cost is over 7,000 Kyat [not including the cost of the tractor].”

Previous TPDC proposals to purchase community mini tractor have yielded nothing, making area residents skeptical of this new proposal. Min Shin, a 36 year-old Kamawat Ywa-thit villager explained, “A couple years ago they said they would buy a mini tractor and collected residents’ money. But we have not seen any mini tractor they [supposedly] bought. I think now again they will make me play the same role.”

For farmers in the area, the cost of a tractor puts even greater pressure on the already trained funds available to farmers after this year’s poor harvest. “For farmers like us, it is not sustainable to live for long term in this village. We are only relying on our farm products [to earn a living],” Nai Myoe clarified to the HURFOM field reporter. “This year, we only harvested 60% of our farm’s produce. The authorities don’t know the plight of their residents. They just know about collecting money. It’s the reason our life is difficult to continue in our future.”

Forced summer paddy cultivation:

Rice paddy farmers in Mon state are now regularly forced to grow a summer season rice crop in addition to the normal rainy season yield. These summer crops provide little financial benefit to farmers that have already spent the previous few months growing rainy season crops. Farmers are often forced to choose between planting the summer season crop or paying hefty fines to local battalions. Farmers that do agree to plant summer season fields often then must pay for large quantities of fertilizer to prepare their fields for a second crop.

On the third week of November 2009, the Mudon TPDC commanded farmers in Mudon Township to plant summer paddies on their farmlands. According to the Nai San Nyunt, who was forced to plant 5 acres of summer rice paddy, “we don’t have enough money to plant summer paddies. We also lost about 2,000,000 kyat on our rainy season paddy this year. We cannot plant a summer paddy without money. I think our family must borrow money from our neighbor to plant the 5 acres of summer paddy commended by the TPDC.”

Information from HURFOM’s field reporters proved that the forced planting of summer paddies between the years of 2008-2009 was the result of a direct command from the Burmese government in Naypyidaw to authorities in the Mon State townships of Ye, Mudon, and Thanbyuzayat.

According to a government staff member, who is working in the Township Administrative Department:

They [Naypyidaw government, Township Administrative Department] already know that the farmers did not get enough rice from their rainy season paddy crops. The orders are related to the country’s economy. If we compare it with the previous years’ rice paddy production, this year is only one-third [of the expected production rate]. The only thing the government can do to increase the rice production for this year is by forcing the farmers to plant summer rice paddies.

In second week of November, HURFOM’s field reporters went to the two villages in Thanbyuzayat Township where authorities have already commanded farmers to plant summer paddies. 10 farmers were interviewed about the struggles they faced planting summer paddies.

Nai Pan Htun, a 50 year-old who was forced to plant 5 acres of summer rice, explains why he was ordered to plant more rice paddy:

The Township Agriculture Committee and Land Survey Department commanded us to plant summer paddies in the places that VIPs [government officers] can see when they are traveling. The Agriculture Manager promised that they would give gasoline for the water pump engine, and that they would give us fertilizer. They also promised this last year, but nothing happened. Last year, we could plant rice well because we succeeded in our rainy season paddies. But I can imagine for this year [how bad planting rice will be].

Nai Mya Maung, who was forced to plant 6 acres of summer rice paddy, explained the difficulties and risks that endanger farmers forced to plant a second rice paddy crop:

If we begin planting our summer paddies, it will cost us at least 70,000 kyat for each acre. If we plant, there are many steps to worry about: In May, the paddy plants will sprout; in March, the rice paddy plants will bloom, and the final step is cultivation in June. If the rain falls in June, our entire paddy will be destroyed. It’s the primary steps to worry about when planting the summer paddies. Our farmers never get support from the government if we compare ourselves with other countries. We saw how in other countries, the governments give farming materials and money to support their local farmers to help them implement their farms. But, we have to stand on our own feet and use our own money to implement summer farms here. At the end, nothing will be left from our farm. We will just waste our money and time implementing summer paddies.

Forced summer paddy planting has also been noted outside of southern Thanbyuzayat Township. Farmers in the western Thanbyuzayat villages of Kwan Tart, Kyone Kadat, and Kyaikami, have been pressured by local authorities to plant summer rice paddies.

Mi Than Kyi, who owns 20 acres of farmland in the area, said:
Only one-third of the expected rainy season rice was received in this year, we had not finished cultivation yet… In total we got around 4 cow carts of rice.

Now the local authorities have pressured us to plant summer paddies. They forced us to plant 5 acres of summer crops. The village headman said ‘if you do not want to plant, you have to pay 50,000 kyat for one acre.’ If we plant rice, we also have to spend that same amount of money [50,000 kyat] to plant one acre’s worth of a summer rice paddy crop.

According to HURFOM’s field reporter, local authorities have decided to plant 80 acres of summer paddies as a token gesture in Kyaikami and Kwan Tart areas. At the end of November, the authorities collected about 30 farmers in the region, and pressured then to plant summer paddies.

Forced labor on agriculture projects:

Forced labor details often take villagers from their homes and farms for long periods of time. Without financial compensation, villagers are expected to provide for their own food. In addition to being physically demanding, the forced labor can come with risks of construction accidents or the rare assault from insurgent forces. Here, HURFOM examines recently documented cases of forced labor suffered by farmers living near two of Mon State’s dams, Win-pha-non and Azin.

Due to the previously mentioned heavy rains of 2009, the Win-pha-non and Azin dams’ water runoff canals filled up with excess silt. The Mudon authorities ordered farmers in region who live near the dams’ water canals, to dredge the canals during the first week of November.

In early November 2009, Mudon TPDC chairman U Kyaw Maung, and authorities from the Mudon Irrigation Department led by U Win Maung, commanded farmers living near the dams to spend a week deepening the water canals that run across their farmlands; the forced labor occurred during the farmers’ rice paddy cultivation periods. The villages in question that are crossed by the water canals are the settlements of Mayan, Kwan Tar, Kawkapone, and Hmeinkanein.

Mi Aye Than, a 40 year-old of Kawkapone villager, explains how she and her family were forced to dredge the canal rather then attend to their crop:

The Irrigation Department came to our farm and measured how many feet deep more we had to dig the canal. They wanted the canal to be 5 feet deep but we needed to dig 3 feet to get 5 feet. They said that if we didn’t want to dig deeper, we had give them 5,000 kyat a day, while they dug it deeper for us. We stopped our cultivation for a while and our family dug deep into the water canal.

Nai Pan Sein, a farmer from Kwan Tar village, Mudon Township, had to pay for the costs of dredging the portion of canal near his house:

My farm is one in the area that the water canal flows across the most. So the Irrigation Department comes to my farm for digging, but I had to pay them 25,000 kyat for their gasoline [for excavator digging the canal]. About 100 farmers’ land has been cut across by the water canal. Some farmers dig the canals on their own but some pay money. The authorities get a lot of money.
Forced sales of discounted rice to the Army:

The SPDC practice of forcing farmers to sell their rice products below the cost of market value is a significant financial abuse. Farmers invest millions of kyat in seeds, fertilizer, manual labor and other preparations, and are dependent on the intended profit to allow their families to survive in the off season as well as to pay for next years rice cultivation. Though the SPDC announced in 2003 that it would no longer be collecting this ‘rice tax’, the abuse continues in Mon state with SPDC battalions forcing the sales of rice at 2/3rds to 1/2 the market price.

Local farmers who live in Kyaikmayaw told HURFOM’s reporters that the local Burmese army battalion has been collecting rice but only giving farmers low amounts of payment.

Ko Myo Wai, 26, a son of a farmer with a 15-acre farm living near Kyaikmayaw town explained:

They [Burmese privates] are still collecting rice paddy from the local Mon farmers with a price two times lower than the current market price. The village headmen told us that the instructions came from the local Burmese battalions Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) No. 210 which is based in Kyauk Tha Lone. The village authorities and 3 quarter masters from LIB No. 210 formed a paddy-buying committee in our village on this November 25th. Then, they demanded our help selling rice with discounted prices to the army’s food supply programs. Thus, villagers who cultivated the rainy season rice paddies this year were instructed to sell out their rice at the rate of 3 baskets per acre. They [the army’s food supply program] paid 2,500 kyat per baskets but in the market, a basket cost 5,200 kyat in Kyaikmayaw.

Similarly, the residents of Pain-nae-gone village who cultivate rice have also has been forced to sell their crops at low prices for LIB No. 210’s food supplies program. “All of us, approximately 145 farmers, were ordered to sell our rice, 15 to 30 baskets each, to the LIB No. 210. I just received half of the current market price,” a Burmese-Indian farmer who live in Pain-Nae-Gone village told HURFOM reporter.

Similar instances of forced rice discounts were reported in the Infantry Battalion (IB) No. 61 controlled areas of Ye township of southern Mon State, in the last week of November 2009. IB No.61 is operating under the command of Military Operation Command (MOC) No.19, based in Ye.  These abuses reportedly occurred in Andin and Duya village-tract.

Nai Ong Than, a witness from Duya village, told HURFOM’s reporter on November 26th:

According to their [army officers’] orders, people have to send their rice to the VPDC compound, located in the middle of the village. They have been taking rice from the local farmers, about three baskets of paddy per acre [a basket contain 66 kg], they ordered this yesterday, and about 200 paddy farmers from my village were ordered to send the rice in on time, and the deadline is December 1st, 2009. They promised that they [the officers] will pay 2,000 per basket.

A 55 year old ethnic Mon farmer from the area explained to a HURFOM field reporter why he fears that he and his family will face a food crisis in 2010:
Battalion and VPDC official told us that they will pay 2,000 to 2,500 depending on how good our rice is…at this time, I am really concerned about next year. I don’t think I can feed my family with the 50 baskets of rice that I produced from 7 acres of paddy fields. I am worrying about this all of the time.

Impacts:

The human rights abuses documented above by HURFOM are a sampling of the daily conditions under which farmers in Mon state hope to make a living. The difficulties that these farmers report operating in are the climate in which the current SPDC 2010 election preparations occur. For the vast majority of villages with in these 4 townships, it is the agricultural community that will bear the full brunt of these preparations.

This means that in addition to the disasters and abuses farmers in Mon state face, they also must bear the full weight of requirements by SPDC election organizers to participate in 2010 election training and activities.

Ongoing SPDC trainings for 2010 election:

Sanyaie, a 56 year-old farmer, from Kropie Village, Thanbyuzayat Township, told HURFOM’s field reporter, “The training was in Thanbyuzayat Township from November 1st through the third week of November. It took about 15 days total. The organizer for my village was the chairman of the VPDC, Nai Kharton, who is also the leader of the village militia.”

HURFOM’s report learned from Sanyaie that 5 farmers from his village, including him, were forced to take part in the fire-brigade training in Thanbyuzayat Town; he was forced to attend, despite his age, because all of his children work as migrant workers in Thailand and Malaysia, and he had no sons to take his place in the training course.

First I understand that it was a fire brigade training, because they gave the course the title ‘Upgrading Fire Brigade Skills Training’. In reality, the trainer spoke in Burmese and focused more on basic militia training, including using weapons and guns. During the training period all participants got a chance to use the gun in their own hands. In the course, most of the participants were Burmese speakers. They were people who back them [the Burmese military government]. Also there were a lot of people from different villages…I left my job in the village at that time – my monsoon paddy had not been finished harvesting yet. I had to hire other laborers and it cost another 15,000 kyat.
A villager from Kyone Kadat village worked as a laborer on his family farm, who wished to remain unnamed out of security concerns, explained:

As my village is close to Thanbyuzayat town, in the training the majority of the participants were from my village…We were collecting rice from the farm and were nearly finished at that time.  So he and his laborers were working and I went to the town to join the training. That was in November – other people are now forced to join [the training] as well. Some villagers already knew that the trainings are not only fire-brigade training.  Most people are not interested in the training subjects. And also there were a lot of rumors about the trainings that those who trained the people are going to use them in the 2010 election period.  It means they are very well organized. During the 15 days we were trained to use ammunition, to use guns, and clean weapons.

According to this source, the training also involved trainings on beating people and dispersing protests with through violence, as well as how to surround and contain protests. The Joan Kahdet villager continued:

It seemed like a really advanced training. There was also a political subject training included. Our participants’ education levels were not the same. Some had basic education while others had higher education levels, so for those with basic education, they  [the trainers] focused more on how to use guns and sticks. For those who are graduated or have some higher education, they learned how to organize the people. How to conduct a census, and how to give the education of the people for the coming election.

In the case of another villager who refused to give his name due to security concerns, from Taung Pha Lut village, commented on the forced training in his village, and what he believes will be the result of the trainings:

In my village there were a total of 10 participants forced to join the training in November. I cannot say how many farmers had to go – however most of the villagers in my village are paddy farmers and rubber farmers. What I can say is that they had to leave their work and go and join the training, so the rest of the households had to support them by paying 3,000 kyat per household and we have 700 households in this village. We are the tax payers, we are the supporters, and we are forced to support this training. There is no doubt that they are going to use the se people in the future political movements.

Impact of election preparation trainings on farmers:

For farmers in Mon state, it is a cruel coincidence of fate that the year 2009 has brought such pressure on efforts to grow crops.  However with that being the condition farmers have worked under, pressure by SPDC government forces to coerce farmers into participating in junta backed “fire brigades” and village militias will threaten their already precarious agricultural situation.

The problem is that from each of these abuses, farmers in Mon state face significant economic impacts after an extremely limited rice paddy harvest.

For many of the farmers, with reduced volume of paddy they were able to harvest, the addition of these abuses puts an extreme strain on budgets, plunging many farmers into debt.  Even in instances where SPDC administration insists on farmers growing a summer season paddy crop, the costs to farmers outweigh and financial benefit that might be gained.

For farmers that have been dependent on cultivating and harvesting their remaining undamaged crop of, missing 1 to 2 weeks of work in paddy fields to attend training can be catastrophic.  Farmers that are able will hire laborers to complete the cultivation or harvest for them; however this also adds an additional unconventional cost. The concern that HURFOM hopes to highlight is the long-term negative impacts these preparations will have on farmers.  In addition to the possibility to losing any profit, there is an even greater danger of food crisis.  Without a large enough harvest, farmers and community member will be forced to choose between rice as a commodity to be eaten, and the means to plant next season rice harvest.

Conclusion:

As these preparations for the 2010 election continue, communities in Mon state, including farmers, will face extreme difficulty surviving. The pressure of the abuses noted above is immense, and each plays a role in undercutting the ability of farmers to survive for another season of farming. Government seizure of farms is an obvious killing stroke for a farmer’s livelihood. Forced sowing of summer paddy wastes farmers’ resources, energy, and time in the cultivation a weak crop for government benefits. The extortion of funds, and the forced labor farmers must perform on agricultural and gas pipeline projects, steals the few resources farmers have to cultivate their crop with – money and time.

With much emphasis being place on election preparations by the government, there is little to no demonstration of understanding of economics in the region. By taking farmers who work at the time-sensitive job of growing rice, and placing them in militarized election training, the Burmese military government’s election preparations threaten to undermine the livelihood of the entire region.HURFOM hopes to strongly emphasize that these practices are ongoing, and will continue as SPDC forces continue to aim for removing community autonomy in the coming election.

Without successful rice crops, or legitimate support for farms to renew their capacity to cultivate next season, these 4 townships will likely encounter issues of food shortages and economic stagnation in the following years.

While the Burmese government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), has yet to release the election rules for the coming 2010 election, the SPDC has been proactive in preparations to secure its grip on power within a newly formed civilian government.  The result has been a systematic effort by preexistent government controlled civilian groups and military forces, to create a climate untenable for the development of resistance or political thought separate from the SPDC party
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This report by the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) is the 2nd in a series that will detail these SPDC pre-election preparations.  In this report HURFOM has focused its documentation efforts in the area of Mon and Karen States, and Tennaserim Division, on 3 key elements of SPDC preparations for the 2010 election. First, on the use of information reporting and spying within communities, second, on militia recruitment disguised as community welfare training, and third on the increase in militia and police recruiting in communities.  In the final section before the conclusion, HURFOM has documented instances of tax extortion to fund the increase of police and militia forces in the area, as villagers are forced to pay for the cost and maintenance of new units.

Background:

The Burmese military government has long sought a way to legitimize its rule, both to internal dissent, and to the international community that has often criticized the widespread social unrest, and human rights abuses in Burma.

In 1990 the then ruling military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) allowed the first democratic election in the country to take place since 1962. Having proposed political party registration days after regaining power in a coup, the SLORC aimed to follow through on its promise for a “democratic” election.  Behind an effort to pacify the raw emotion that stemmed form the 1988 student uprising, the government hoped to legitimize its own rule by ensuring the victory of its own party, the National Unity Party.  To ensure its own victory, SLORC administrators imposed numerous restrictions on members of parties registering, arrested viable competitors and party supporters, restricted travel, and threatened candidates and supporters with violence.  Despite this an estimated 20.8 million voted in the election, with little reported disruption, and much to the surprise of the SLORC, elected the National League for Democracy, led by Daw Aung San Su Kyi, to 392 or 485 parliamentary seats.

Despite the overwhelming electoral success of the NLD, SLORC officials refused to cede power to the election victors.  Ultimately as members of the NLD moved towards creating their own government despite SLORC stalling to all the formation of a new government, the possibility of a real democratic transition failed as SLORC  troops arrested politicians who had won in the election, and violently suppressed protests by students and monks.

political registration

After the constitution was amended by the Burmese government, it was approved in 2008 in an election that has been heavily criticized as being fraught with abuse and fraud.  This constitutional amendment has set in motion the Burmese government’s goal of holding elections in 2010. For many Burma watchers and political observers inside and outside the country, this election represents an opportunity for the Burmese military regime to attempt to legitimize its rule through an election process.  HURFOM believes that despite broadcasted pretenses of intentions  to hold free and fair elections, the SPDC firmly intends to use the current pre-election period to overwhelmingly organize communities in its favor to ensure its electoral success in 2010.

Use of Information Reporting and Spying Among Communities in Pre-election Period:

One of the key tactics employed by SPDC forces has been to divide civilian population and rely on widespread surveillance and fear to suppress dissenting opinion. HURFOM field researchers have documented numerous and often completely transparent accounts of civil servants, teachers and civilians being forced to recruited to work as informants.

According to an order intercepted by HURFOM, the Anankwin based SPDC Tactical Command, operating under SEC of Moulmein, instructed all its military camps located in Kyainnseikyi Township to make widespread use of informants and spies within their populated areas under their control. The order states, “All commanders from Infantry Battalions [IB] and Light Infantry Battalions [LIB] operating under the Anankwin Tactical Command must undertake their duty to organize the educated young people to be able to use as our informants and concrete [key] members within the communities before the upcoming general election.”

On October 18, 2009, Colonel Myat Aye Htun, 46, commander of LIB No. 283 which operates under the command of Anankwin Tactical Command, started collecting young men who have high levels of education in the battalions’ controlled areas. “They collected 70 young men, most of them are young ethnic Karen, and some Burman, men,” reported Saw Doh, a 34 year-old local resident of Anankwin village, Kyainnseikyi Township, Karen State. “The training started on October 25th under the title of “Information Reporting Training,” organized by LIB No. 283 trainers. The training took a week and the venue was at the LIB No. 283 battalion compound.”

A HURFOM field reporter was also able to meet with one of the trainees from the battalion’s “Information Reporting Training”, who divulged that most of the topics covered during that training addressed how to secretly report on and gather news and information from the villagers and communities. “This training was sort of on spying on people and how to report back to the official or the authorities in a short time. The trainers mostly focused on how to participate in leadership roles in the upcoming general election which will be run by the government in 2010.” said Saw Nay Htoo, a 22 year-old Karen resident of Kyainnseikyi township.

As a result of widespread use of informants by SPDC forces and local authorities, ethnic Karen villagers from Kyainnsekiyi and Phayathonezu Township have felt threatened and insecure, local residents have reported to HURFOM field reporters in the area. Authorities have been recruiting and forcing locals to undergo training to gather information in an attempt to catch people giving information to exile news agencies.  Additionally, authorities have led trainings to track and observe the movements of the individuals who are supporters of the Karen Nation Union [KNU], its armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army [KNLA], and non-government ethnic culture, religion, literacy, community based, and charity organizations.

“Even though they attempted to set up spies and informants in this community, I don’t think they would benefit from their newly recruited members. Most of the young man who joined were not willing to participate to the training – most of them were forced to join to fill the numbers of required participants by LIB No. 283 soldiers,” explained U Toe, a 59 year-old a former school teacher from Kyainnseikyi Township, Karen State.

According to reports from area residents in Kyainnseikyi town, civil servants and school teachers are also believed to have been tapped by SPDC forces to work as informants, especially to watch the activities of NLD members or armed cease-fired group members’ activities. “I feel quite awful to know that the local government is attempting to appoint more informants. We have to be very careful before saying something about the upcoming general election or criticizing the constitution drawn by the government. As you know, the [the SPDC] dogs1 are located everywhere,” vented a former New Mon State Party member who currently lives in Kyainnseikyi Township, Karen State.

According to a Nai Hong Marn, 26 years old, a member of Mon Literacy Association and a volunteer of the Summer Mon Class who lives in Taung bauk village, Kyainnseikyi Township, the commander of LIB No. 283 recently asked the civil servants and government run schoolteachers to closely monitor the activities of village-level Mon and Karen Youth Associations. “They [local battalions and civil servants] are targeting us because they thought that we could make trouble in the upcoming general election. Non of us are interested in their general election because we already know the winners,” Nai Hong Marn stated.  He continued, explaining that most of the government schoolteachers have been appointed as informants by local authorities’ since the September 2007 monk led “Saffron Revolution”2 and the numbers since. He continued, “Most of the school teachers and some civil servants are also the heads of the Union Solidarity and Development Association [USDA] and they are responsible for constantly reporting about the movement of all associations, KNU and NMSP ex-member activities.

Anytime they could cause harm to any of us.”

In an effort to increase the number of new pro-government members and informants, local SPDC administrators have employed different methods to recruit from among their communities. From the minutes of a Township level USDA monthly meeting obtained by HURFOM in September, The USDA promised all key members who are able to organize 30 recent graduates from local high schools to become key USDA members, that they would receive a CDMA3 mobile phone. According to the minutes, the reasoning behind this decision is that it would give opportunistic existing USDA members who want a CDMA mobile phone for their individual use, a chance to earn one.

A 65 year old former civil servant and resident of Chaung Zone Township, Mon State, expressed his opinions on the USDA’s methods of persuading local educated young people to be their informants or key members:

Nowadays, as you know every family is facing economic crisis’ and these kinds of opportunities provide a [reason] to join any pro-government organizations such as USDA, People’ militia, or whatever they want. It is not because they are willing to join but because of the current economic crisis. The government already learned the weak points of the civilians, so it is not so difficult [for them] to extend their members to be used in the upcoming election.

Another method used by the informants and the members of pro-government organizations is to limit the movement of the community based organizations (CBO) members by closely monitoring their activities and reporting back to local authorities. In order to keep tight security in the area, the battalion commanders and USDA township leaders instruct key members of the village’s USDA and militia groups to watch the resident closely, and to compile a “black list” of unaffiliated villagers.

A young man from Taung Pyin village, Ye Township, who asked to remain anonymous, explained his concern over his personal security after he has refused all attempts to be recruited by pro-junta civilian groups:

The ‘black list’ is a list of the villagers who they couldn’t pressure to become their supporters. Like me; I am sure my name would be on their list because I always refuse to join pro-government organizations. We have been monitored since last summer, when at that time we launched the Mon Summer School Program in collaboration with the Monks Association4 in the village. I think the point of using this method is to sew fear among the communities. So, the fear  [will] grow bigger and bigger so that no one can oppose them, and later [they can] force the people to join the government backed organizations like USDA, Peoples’ Militia or whatever.

Numerous sources from Mudon Township stated that local Military Intelligence (MI) officials and secret police personal have conducted training exercises in the township, on identifying villagers who give information to foreign news media or Burmese exile media sources during this pre-election period. MI officers taught security force personnel methods for identifying press sources. Authorities have also placed increased restrictions on money transfer services, and SPDC military forces have demanded that telephone owners keep a list detailing who has used the phone, to be reported each week.

According to Nai Tamah, a 45 year-old resident of Kyaikmayaw, a key member of the Township Mon Literature and Culture Committee in Kyaikmayaw Township, Mon State, he believe he is being targeted after numerous encounters with government police forces:

During this times, we all have to care about the watch dogs of the government forces and their followers in our communities. We noticed that the township PDC in collaboration with para-milita members, secret police troops and USDA members, are attempting to monitor closely what the CBOs [community based organizations] are doing before the 2010 general election. Additionally they [the authorities] are trying to restrict our movement, including personal traveling. I was stopped 7 times along the road when I visited my sister’s family living in Pegu during the second week of October. The police asked for my ID, the purpose of my visit, the date of my arrival – so many things. It was quite strange them checking me, and I felt that I was on their watch lists.

Since the beginning of October, authorities of Mon and Karen States have been launching a campaign to track down the civilians who give information about government pre-election activities, such as launching military training, collecting families lists and recruiting young educated people, to the internationally based media organizations such as Voice of America (VOA), British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB). At many locations in each township under Karen and Mon States, military officers have been trained in how to identify the sources used by international radio and news agencies.

In addition, authorities have increased their surveillance over phone services.  According to sources from the NMSP communication surveillance section, new phone tapping facilities have been installed with the assistance of agencies from the Chinese government. Local sources that run private money transfer services through Thailand’s registered mobile phones from Mudon township have reported to HURFOM that the MI officers ordered then not allowing strangers to use their services without informing the local authorities first:

Ma Ngae, 28, who has been running a phone business for 3 years, said of the new restrictions against phone owners and on the recruitment of new customers in Mudon Township:

The order from the Mudon Sa-Ya-Hpa [Military Intelligence], with the date of October 1st said that no strangers were allowed to use any mobile phones or money transfer services without permission from the local authorities. This means, each time we get new customers [who want to] use our services, we are required to inform them [the local authorities] first. After the local authorities are finished checking the customers information, they [the customers] can use the services…no political talk is allowed through my phone service because it can totally destroy my business and my life.

Between mid-September and mid-October 2009, government informants, key members of township USDA offices and MI officers have been busy monitoring NMSP leaders’ trips around Mon State and NMSP controlled districts in preparation for the upcoming 2010 elections. Nai Htaw Mon, Chairman of the NMSP, and members of the party’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) have been touring in townships in Mon State and NMSP controlled districts to meet with civil society organizations, Township Literature and Culture Associations, and Buddhist Monks Associations. Nai Htaw Mon and members of the CEC have been conducting meetings to explain and discuss important elements of the NMSP agenda, activities and strategies in advance of the 2010 general election. According to HURFOM reporters based in Mudon Township, plain clothes police personal, and MI agents and informants have been conducting significant monitoring operations at meetings held by Mon leaders, where the potential decisions regarding the SPDC’s offer of forming a Border Guard Force or People’s Militia offers have been discussed5.

A HURFOM reporter in Mudon Township spoke with a 25 year-old Buddhist Monk from Mudon Township, Mon State, who was an eyewitness to undercover agents gathering information at meetings between NMSP leaders and assorted Mon civil society organizations:

I saw many undercover agents and informants communicating though radios, and who were apparently busy reporting about the NMSP and civilian meeting.  I suspect that there were some undercover agents amongst the Buddhist Monks as well. But it is very hard to identify without any evidence…They [the Mon State SPDC] are very serious about the general election information. The time when Nai Htaw Mon from the NMSP and his fellows came and met with the leaders of Mon CBOs [community based organization] leaders in our monastery, I saw more than 5 secret police in plain closes and some USDA members in front of the monastery.

Militia Recruitment Disguised as Civilian Welfare Trainings:

In many instances throughout the targeted areas, HURFOM field reporters have documented SPDC military and junta-backed civilian groups conducting training for community development groups, for example volunteer fire fighters, but are reported to have little to do with the advertised purpose.   Residents have reported that these trainings often contain a high volume of military training, crowd suppression training, and lessons in how to organize villagers to support the junta in the 2010 election.

During October and November of 2009, concerned that there will be anti- government demonstrations in southern Burma, the SPDC and its Southeast Command (SEC) have been working to form various anti-strike groups. These anti-strike groups are formed by the widespread use of civilians, ostensibly friendly to the SPDC, to suppress dissidence in their home villages, break up protests, and provide increased coverage for the SPDC to areas the Burmese army might be spread thin. The formation of the anti-strike has been on the rise recently though these instances have been ongoing since the 2007 Saffron Revolution.

In one example, HURFOM field reporters have documented cases in which SPDC authorities have been forcing thousands of USDA members and local village leaders to arrange these two-week military led training courses under a program titled, “Training for Emergence of Qualified and Effective Fire Brigade”. These military trainings began in early October, in all Mon and Karen States, and Tenasserim Division. According to reporters and local sources, the Burmese Army has trained hundreds of local township and village leaders, young educated villagers and members of the town and village militia forces in these anti-strike tactics thus far. In many cases, training by Burmese army instructors has consistently including basic weapons training –holding, shooting, cleaning and loading guns. In each training, only a small portion of the elements of the course were related to the role of a citizens fire brigade. Apart from the military training sessions, trainees are required to learn how to organize the community, how to lead the civilians in the upcoming 2010 elections, have been instructed in how to confront demonstrators, to use tear gas canisters and to split and disperse crowds.

According to Nai Tun Myain, a villager from Pa Nga, his village headman received a letter ordering the recruitment of 7-15 villagers to undertake a fire brigade training in Thanbyuzayzt, “In the letter, it said we had to attend fire brigade training, but only in the first half-day did they explain about killing fires, during the rest they taught us how look after machine guns and use them effectively. They also taught us about the situation in Burma and talked to us about the 2010 election.”

Nai Tun Myain explained that most of the trainers came from Rangoon. One trainer named U Aung Myint, taught the recruits about the government’s opinion on the situation in Burma, telling them, “All of you have to work for the government and help government to win the election in 2010. All of you are the main key for the government to win election, and to control all of the country by leading at the local level in the villages”.

In this case, the main subjects of the training focused on dealing with villagers who are against voting for the government in the elections, how to detain villagers who attempt to create discord in the village or who try to disrupt the voting process, and how to intimidate the villagers to vote for the Burmese government in the election. The trainees were also instructed to watch the local Village Peace and Development Council (VPDC) members to ensure their allegiance to the Burmese government during the elections. Lastly all trainees had to promise to be faithful to the government, and to follow the government’s rules.

A fire brigade training was also held in Kyaikmayaw Township, according to a Kyaikmayaw resident. In Kyaikmayaw, smaller trainings were held in individual villages, rather than the mass training held in Thanbyuzayat.

Instances of disguised military training have gone on for years, but have been on the rise as pre-election preparations by the SPDC have increased. A retired 62 year-old school teacher, U Myo, reported to HURFOM his experience in the Burmese Army’s military training during 2003.

“This kinds of emergency training courses used to be held in several places in southern Burma by Southeast Command during the past six years. In this time, a lot of school teachers who worked in my middle school in Yebyu township were forced to join a 10 day long military training conducted by local military troops. The authorities forced all government servants including medical workers, teachers and office staff to attend the basic military training school at that time. They divided up the government servants in groups and forced them to attend the military training school in rotating shifts”.

Completely dropping the premise of a civilian community training, those groups that have completed training have often then been equipped with guns by local Burmese army battalions, and formed into “Village Defense Forces”, or “Village Peoples’ Milita Force”’s. Like military units the militia’s have a base where weapons and equipment are stored, though the militia members themselves stay at their homes.

Increase in Militia and Police Recruiting within Communities:

Since September, HURFOM has documented a marked increased in the regime’s recruitment of police and militia personal among communities in each township of Mon and Karen State and Tenasserim Division. In regards to this action taken by the SPDC government, many Burmese political observers both inside and abroad surmise that these are the effects of the government’s local administrative bodies to prepare for the upcoming 2010 general election.

According to reports from northern Ye township, Mon State starting in September 2009, the TPDC and local military authorities have begun actively recruiting from villages in northern Ye, to increase the number of security members, local militia, and police forces in the area.

Nai Maung Nay, a 40 year-old resident of Hangan village, told HURFOM reporters that there were just 10 militia, 5 security troops, and 3 to 4 police previously based in his village. Now local SPDC authorities are now trying to involve villagers in the recruitment of security and militia troops. According to Nai Maung Nay, they have requested at least 50 extra members in the different groups. “I noticed that the numbers of policemen are increasing in the village. Before there were only 3 or 4 police in our village, now they will bring 10 more policemen in to this area.”

In Kyeikmayaw Township, USDA members typically outnumber militia members, however as a result of the new SPDC emphasis on recruitment, militia members now threaten to outnumber their fellows in the USDA. Rather then being a voluntary force like the USDA, the militia members in Kyaikmayaw Township have salaries, earning 60,000 to 100,000 kyat a month through various taxes and extortions levied on their fellow villagers.  In addition each militia member’s uniform costs 20,000 kyat wich villagers are force to pay for.

According to Kyaikmayaw residents, the SPDC gives the militias in the township broad license to extort money from villagers.  As a result residents have stated that they feel the government’s main priority is to control the votes of the villagers for the upcoming 2010 election. One Kyaikmayaw resident, U Aung Kyi, said, “Even though the ethnic politicians hope to get guidelines [for the election] from the government, it is not easy for them to get them because the government has already made plans to win in the 2010 election. The government’s opening of these trainings is one kind of activity [for their cause], to get more supporters for the coming election.”

During training the SPDC intentions for the use of village militias and police forces are clear.  One young Mon man who forced to join the people’s militia training run by the local battalion in Paung Township recalled what his trainer told the trainees, “The trainers from IB No. 62 said if there is a demonstration in the future, we, trainees have to confront the demonstrators and if necessary, they need to shoot the demonstrators with guns equipped by the army.”

Nai Bu, a 30 year-old trader form Pa Nga village, told HURFOM’s reporters that he and 14 other friends from Pa Nga were forcibly enlisted in week long militia training.  According to Nai Bu, when he learned that he’d been enlisted, he begged his village headman to remove him from the recruitment list.  His request was denied on the grounds, as the headman explained, “We do not see you involved in any activity in village development programs, such the United Solidarity Development Association (USDA), or other such programs. You must be involved in an organization; if you don’t want to be involved in any organization you must leave the village”.

According to Nai Bu, all the trainees were taught how to look after and use machine guns, general knowledge about the political situation in Burma, and how to organize villagers to gain their votes on behalf of the Burmese government. 156 villagers were involved in this training and were from several villages such as Kareinha Daik, Kyeikpon and Thanbyuzayat town.

Nai Bu reported that of the many trainers, one named U Aung Myint provided the most explicit explanation of the government’s plans for the 2010 election, and elaborated on the ways in which the government plans to use the militias to secure its election victory. Nai Bu recalled of U Aung Myint explanation that the government feels that it has a 99% chance of winning the upcoming elections, and it will do anything to attain this final 1%. All the trainees at the session were told they were the government representatives for their villages, and that they were in charge of future voter registration and organizing. Nai Bu informed HURFOM that he believes that the trainers feel that by supporting current military government, they can partake in the government’s control over the country.

A former member of the NMSP’s CEC, who lives in Ye Township, claims that the Burmese Army’s efforts to increase the militias and security forces in different villages and towns are part of the SPDC’s preparation for the upcoming 2010 elections. He also believes that by recruiting a few village residents into militias run by the Burmese military, these villagers can pressure their fellow villagers to support the Burmese junta in the 2010 elections:

From what I see, it [the SPDC] is preparing for 2010 election by recruiting the area’s residents. They hope they [recruits] will pressure their fellow residents by using their [militia or security force] power. Another reason they are doing this is that they will use these militia people to recruit and persuade the people in the community…They have their ways of getting residents involved in their system. We can see it when the authorities give the power to jobless people in the village, offering them the chance to have control over the residents in the area around them. Then they will persuade those [that they give military jobs to] to work with them in exchange for doing whatever they would like to do [to make money].

Emphasizing the significance of this election for the SPDC, high-ranking Burmese military officials have toured the country to meet with regional military commanders. According to a HURFOM field reporter in Ye township, Senior General Ye Myint has departed from Naypyidaw, to travel around KS during the 3rd week of September of this year, discussing preparations for the 2010 elections with local military and security authorities.

Arbitrary and Excessive Taxation Abuse From Pre-Election Recruitment:

According to reports from HURFOM field reporters, the most pressing concern for many residents in these areas of increased recruitment has been the threat of extra costs that result from a larger number of militia, security and police forces in the area. Residents of Yebyu Township in North Tenasserim Division have expressed fears that recent orders from the Burmese army to the local militias, ordering increased militia recruitments in various villages in the township, will increase the fees that local militias routinely extort from civilian villagers. An associate of the VPDC, from Yapu village in Yebyu Township, explained that increased militia recruitments in the area were on the direct orders of the SEC and Coastline Command (CC), and that both the SEC and the CC plan to oversee militia training in Yebyu Township:

In the last week of September, the command to recruit more militia troops was directly given to the VPDC office in Yapu village. My friend is working at the VPDC office in the village. Before, they just had 7 militia troops in our village. Now, they command that the militia grow to at least 20 troops, and more if possible. They commanded the village headman directly. The head commander in the Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) No. 282, which is based under the Southeast Command, will directly monitor the militia training.

According to area residents, Yapu village contains over 600 households. Most of families make their living through farming, however a small amount of the village’s residents are jobless. HURFOM’s sources indicate that, while the majority of Yapu village’s residents are uninterested in joining the area’s militia, jobless individuals are likely to see the militia recruiting efforts as a chance at income and notoriety in Yapu. Mg Chan, a 28 year-old Yapu villager said, “I think most of villagers are not interested in joining the militia training. But they [the military] can persuade the residents who are jobless by giving them some opportunity to get some business using their power in the area. It’s probable that they will collect at least 20 people, and maybe more people, to serve in the militia in our village.”

In a recent HURFOM story published on October 7th, titled “Military Increasing in Ye Township”, the reporter detailed how the increased numbers of militia troops place a financial burden on village civilians. Burma’s military government provides militia troops with training and guns, however it does not provide militias with uniforms, stipends or food supplies. The funds for these necessities are expected to come from money extorted from village residents under the SPDC “Self Reliance” policy6. Yapu villagers are justifiably concerned that increased numbers of militia troops will mean increased extortion fees.

Yapu villagers were ordered to pay 600,000 Kyat for their village’s Peoples’ Militia Force [approximately 65 soldiers] to buy uniforms, hats, badges and to provide a stipend for the militia privates’ families. This order was given by LIB No. 410, a battalion that was installed for security along the Kanbauk to Myaing Kalay gas pipeline, based near Yapu. Than Htike, a 34 year-old  Tavoyan, and father of two children explained, “My family has to pay another 2,500 kyat on top of 3,500 every month. If not they already stated they [the soldiers and VPDC] would arrested me.”

Many villages in Ye Township, northern Tenasserim Division, have been forcibly ordered to pay millions of kyat to support newly recruited the militia forces and para-militia forces in advance of the 2010 election. Hundreds of households living under the administration of SPDC battalions have had to pay for the expenses of newly recruited militia troops. Thus far approximately 600 troops have been recruited from 12 villages in western and northern Yebyu Township, according to local sources. HURFOM reporters have been conducing interviews with residents who have had to pay these additional extorted costs:

On 11th of October, the headmen of Kyauk-Kadin village collected money from each household to buy 60 uniforms for the village militia force, U Halae, 43, a betel nut farmer from Kyauk-Kadin village, Yebyu township, explained, “We have been ordered to pay 2,500 kyat from each households for buying militia uniforms. The money they received was more than enough I think.” According to a 34 year-old business man, Ko Hla Oo who is close to the VPDC of Kyauk-Kadin village, the maximum amount for each uniform is around 15,000 kyat which has already been delivered to LIB No. 282, the source of the uniforms, on October 20th.

HURFOM field reporters have learned that these orders have also been given to Kyauk-kadin village’s neighbors, specifically Myinzaung, Yapu, Natkyizin, Lort Taing, Lae Kyi, and Sinswe villages of Yebyu Township. On the 12th of October, Major Thant Zin, 38 years-old, Commander of a military column from LIB No. 282 demanded Natkyizin village to pay 500,000 Kyat for the whole militia expenses including the cost of purchasing ammunition, food supplies and uniforms for 60 militia members.

Nai Ohn Maung, 60, a former civil servant expressed his opinion about the Burmese army’s recruitment of militia in Natkyizin village, Yebyu township:

Our Village was ordered to provide money within a week, according to the order of the Burmese Army from LIB No. 282. Most of the villagers who closed with the village PDC were now involved in the village PDC forces to defense the village. They [the village militia forces] said they are going to protect the villagers but I don’t trust them and I think the purpose of these para-militia forces is for use as pro-government forces like the government uses USDA members to beat and pressure the civilians, like in latest Monk led demonstration.

HURFOM field reporters also spoke with Ye residents who explained that Burmese military groups in their villages, including the militia, security forces and police units are currently being supported largely from extortion money that they get from village residents.

Ma Than Htay, a 45-year-old shopkeeper in Kaloh village explains about the economic burden of the expanded village militia forces:

We have been forced to pay extortion money for the monthly militia for 5 years. The government doesn’t offer the militia food supplies or uniforms. Those materials have been gotten just by extortion taxes from residents. For these costs they collect 1,200 to 1,500 Kyat per household in a month. They just had 20 troops in the militia troop before. Now they are trying to recruit 30 more people to be involved in the militia forces, so we don’t know yet how much more extortion money we will need to pay them. At the moment, they have not achieved that amount of people they want to recruit yet. We heard from our village headman said that they will increase the militia taxes until to 3,000 Kyat a month. It is a huge amount of money for our lower class population. That money does not include the money for the locally based military army’s food supplies and security costs. Both cost would be another 1,000 to 2,000 Kyat more a month.

According to the statistical data gathered by the VPDC, found on signs at the entrance of villages, there are approximately 1,000 households in each of the villages of Mawkanin and Hangan in Ye Township, and between 500 and 1,000 households in each of the villages of Kaloh, Balaingkee, Chaung Gone, and Arutaung. HURFOM’s reporters found that villagers from the above mentioned villages increasingly being forced to pay taxes to cover the costs of the local security, militia and police forces. Mi Aye, a resident from the area, complained that the extorted costs caused economic hardship for residents in Ye township, saying, “For rich people it does not affect their income and survival to pay for the extortion money, but for the lower class residents we face obstacles to get money and to pay for that extorted amount of money”.

Mawkanin village, contains about 1,500 to 2,000 households in Northern Ye Township, and has also reportedly faced the same problems as Kaloh and Hangan villages. Local sources from the area claimed that LIB No. 106, which is based on the Mawkanin village, went to area villages and attempted to convince villagers to join the local militia and security forces.

Nai Thein Zin, a rice trader from the area of Mawkanin village, told a HURFOM field reporter that his fellow villagers are still forced to support to these new recruiting militia members with large amount of money:

Their operations are run by getting extortion taxes from our residents. I believe that if they have more troops they will collect more money. Before they collected about 1,500 Kyat from each household a month. If we combine all the extortion money, including costs for VIP trips, militia and security costs, and battalion extortion money from each months, it would cost [each household] about 4,000 to 5,000 a month. Now they are increasing the number of troops so they will increase taxes to more than they normally collect. But, we don’t know by how much money they will increase the taxes.

Conclusion:

Efforts are underway by SPDC administration and military forces to implement significant and pervasive programs of pre-election organization and pressure on civilian groups throughout Burma. The information and accounts published in this report represent only 3 to 4 months worth of preparation work by the SPDC. While this data is a sampling drawn from communities in Mon and Karen States, and Tennaserim Division, even in the most minor instances these acts pose a significant threat to the credibility of any election to be undertaken in 2010. HURFOM hopes that by documenting the process by which the SPDC engages in opinion manipulation and preparation for violent suppression of dissent, enough information can be gathered to allow for a close understanding of the repercussions of these preparations once the election is underway.

“Think about it, nobody enjoys working as a prostitute.We have no money to survive… we have to work as prostitutes.” -Ma Thit Thit

This report examines some of the reasons why women from Mon State, Burma, become commercial sex workers. WCRP interviewed 11 prostitutes from 10 brothels and restaurants who currently work in Ye Township and Thanbyuzayat Town. The majority of the interviewed women became prostitutes out of economic desperation and a lack of other job opportunities.

Children in Burma are often expected to provide for their parents. Many of the women interviewed said that their parents were unable to  support their families, due to a scarcity of jobs, a poor economy, and spending money on alcohol and illegal lottery tickets.

Background

Burma is one of the world’s poorest countries and is ruled by a brutal military junta called the State Police and Development Council (SPDC). The SPDC’s political mismanagement and isolationist policies have led to soaring inflation and economic stagnation with in the country. The SPDC’s policies make it difficult to gather accurate statistics,1 although estimates indicate that Burma’s GDP grows at an average annual rate of 2.9%  (the lowest rate of economic growth in the Greater Mekong Sub-region2) and that the country’s 52 million people receive an average annual income of $220 per capita.3

The international community, including the U.S., the EU, Australia, and Canada, has imposed trade sanctions on Burma since 1996, leading not only to financial troubles for the military regime but also the closure of many factories.4 In particular, the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 cut off all imports from Burma to the U.S. for 2 years. Burma’s regime estimated that more than 80,000 garment factory workers lost their jobs in response to this act.5 The government-sponsored Business Information Journal in Rangoon claimed that state-owned factories would employ laid-off workers, however in reality, many women turned to sex work.

The US government issued reports stating that in some cases, former garment workers, “entered the flourishing illegal sex and entertainment industries” after losing their factory jobs.6

In 2008 cyclone Nargis devastated Burma leaving, according to ASEAN estimates, almost 140,000 people dead or missing, and it had a “severe and adverse impact” on 2.4 million people.

The cyclone hit the Burmese economy hard, causing an estimated 120 billion kyat in damages and 65 billion kyat in losses.7 Burma’s already weak economy sank even further in 2009 with the global economic crisis, leading to more job cuts and rising unemployment. Nonetheless, the number of Burmese prostitutes working in Burma and its neighboring countries is steadily increasing, particularly among the urban poor.8

According to The Democratic Voice of Burma, the economic crisis of 2009 contributed to a rise in prostitution in Rangoon.9 An article published by The Irrawaddy in July of 2009 attests that the number of prostitutes working along the highway in Burma is growing and most sex workers are “girls from poor villages who can’t find any other job”. The number of roadside sex workers has increased considerably over the last few years and even university students are selling their bodies along the highway in rising numbers.10 The Burmese Government’s extensive security controls, limitations on the flow of information, and lack of transparency make it difficult to access the number of prostitutes and trafficked persons in Burma,11 but it is estimated that there are as many as 40,000 Burmese prostitutes employed in Thai brothels. The majority of them are ethnic minorities.12 Several studies indicate that the number of Burmese prostitutes in Burma and Thailand is increasing, especially among poor and uneducated women and girls.13

Women in Burma face discrimination on many levels and there are no non-governmental independent women’s rights organizations to address the disparity.14. Poverty disproportionately affects women, who consistently receive less pay than men for equal positions. Many women do not have the skills or education to find work outside of the house and in some communities after marriage the women generally rely on their husband for income. If they divorce their husbands, they often have no source of revenue.15

Economic Desperation

In Burmese culture, children usually live with their parents until they are married; some married couples also live with one of the spouse‘s parents. Grown children are expected to provide  for their parents and younger siblings. In some cases, if parents or older siblings cannot provide an adequate income, younger children may also work to support their families.
Many of the interviewed women became prostitutes to financially sustain their families, although few have told their families how they earn money. Ma Thi Thi Win explained, “My family doesn’t know what I’m doing here. I lied to them and told them I worked a normal job. Now, I am ashamed to return home, and I have nowhere else to go.” Ma Thit Thit and Ma Moe Moe Win have also not told her parents that they are prostitutes.

Wages

The women interviewed for this report are paid a range of prices for their services. Most reported that half or more of the money the customers pay goes to the brothel owner. Ma Su Su and Ma Ei Ei, who work in the same brothel in Thanbyuzayat Town, each earn 1,500 kyat per customer, and the brothel owner keeps 2,000 kyat. If they spend the night with a customer, they earn 15,000 kyat, and the brothel owner earns 20,000 kyat.

Ma Chaw Su, who works at a brothel in a small fishing village, earns 1,500 kyat per customer and another 1,500 goes to the brothel owner. Mi Moe Moe Win, who works in a Bayinma restaurant/brothel in Ye Town, earns about 2,000 kyat per night, while the brothel owner takes in the remaining two-thirds of the money.

Ma Thi Thi Win, who works in a restaurant in Ye Township, earns 500 out of the 6,000 kyat the restaurant charges per hour to be with a customer, if sex is not involved. If sex is involved, she is paid 3,500 kyat while the restaurant charges 10,000 kyat for her services.

Ma Hsaung Hnin Wei, who works at Achitnat Restaurant in Ye Town, earns 2,000 kyat per customer, while the customer pays 6,000 kyat. She estimates that she saves around 10,000 kyat per night.

In addition to paying the brothel owners part of their earnings, many women reported paying a broker to arrange for their transportation and food en route to their jobs. Ma Thi Thi Win had to pay 60,000 kyat to her broker while Ma Htoo Htoo Wei had to pay 80,000 kyat to hers. Ma Thit Thit and her friend also found their job through a broker, who charged them 50,000 kyat each for transportation. Ma Hsaung Hnin Wei had to pay her broker 80,000 kyat after she started working.

Circumstances

A large number of sex workers in Burma were not tricked or forced into the trade but became prostitutes out of economic desperation. For example, Ma Thit Thit, an 18-year-old woman from Thirimyine quarter, Moulmein Town, Mon State, who was interviewed by a WCRP field reporter in August of 2009, explained, “Even though it is not a good job, I decided to work as a prostitute so that I could earn a higher income to send back to my family . . .We are poor and need the money. Now I can keep some money.”

Ma Chaw Su, a 17-year-old female Burman from Kyaik Khame Town, Thanbyuzayat Township, left her job growing rice to work as a prostitute with her cousin. Originally Ma Chaw Su worked in Thanbyuzayat Town but in June of 2009 she started working at a brothel in Yetaung village, Ye Township. At the brothel she works with 8 women, ages 17 to 30, most of whom came from Mon State. Several of her customers are fishermen visiting from other villages.

An 18-year-old female Mon prostitute, Mi Moe Moe Win, from Kamarmoe village, Chaung Zaung Township, explained “I used to work at Kyaw Bear restaurant in Moulmein and one night I lost my virginity for 100,000 kyat (about $100, US) to a wealthy Chinese man. Then I came to work here in Ye Town. Nobody enjoys working as a prostitute but otherwise, I would have no money to survive.”  Since July 2009, Mi Moe Moe Win has worked in Ye Town at a brothel known as Bayinma restaurant, which is popular among Mon communities. She works with 19 other girls, ages 17 to 30, of Burman, Karen and Arakanese ethnicity. Since starting her work as a prostitute, she has been able to send 1 million kyat to her family.

According to Ma Thit Thit, “I decided to work as a sex worker, even though I know this is not a good job, because I can earn a lot of money in a short period and I can send it back to my family. My parents do not know what I am doing but we are poor and always face a shortage of money. Therefore, I must do it even though I don’t want to.”

Family

The Burmese government has spent a very small amount of its budget on education, an estimated 1.2% in 2005. Consequently, school is prohibitively expensive for many families in Burma. To help their families and because of fees and economic hardship, students often drop out of school. In this situation girls easily fall into prostitution.16

Ma Thi Thi Win, a 20-year-old Burman woman from Pegu Town, Pegu Division, dropped out of school when she was in 9th standard because her family could not pay her school fees. After leaving school, she and 4 friends left their village together in search of jobs. Since June 2009, she has worked in Irrawaddy 2 restaurant, which is located in Ye Town, Ye Township, Mon State. “I am not happy to work here [as a prostitute] and I want to leave my work, but I need more money to send back to my family. I am glad to help my family but sometimes I get upset when I have bad guests who threaten me. I have no choice because to me, it is most important to help my family,” she tearfully explained.

Illegal lotteries in Burma are very popular,17 and may lead to increased situations of poverty for many families. Ma Su Su, a 21-year-old Burman woman from Halingthaya Township, Rangoon Division, currently works in Thanbyuzayat Town. She explained, “My parents gamble in the illegal lottery and we had to pawn our house to get money. Therefore, I chose this job to earn more money to send back to my family.”

Another woman from Pegu town, 18-year-old Ma Ei Ei, who works with Ma Su Su, stated, “My father gambles in the illegal lottery, drinks alcohol and plays cards. If I did not select this job [prostitution], we would have no money to survive.”

Ma The Su, a 22-year-old Burman woman from Moulmein City, Mon State, said she  also became a prostitute after her family squandered the money she had earned. She has worked in Ziphyutaung Village, Ye Township since July of 2009.

Nargis

Cyclone Nargis which struck Burma in May of 2008, killed thousands of people, devastated millions and destroyed parts of the country. Ripple effects of the cyclone exacerbated poverty throughout Burma thus contributing to the increase in prostiution.

17-year-old Ma Htoo Htoo Wei from Labutta Township has been working as a prostitute since August 2009 at Shwepuntaung Brothel in Ye Township. After her family lost its source of income due to the cyclone, she found a broker and became a prostitute. She now works at the brothel with 14 other women, ages 15 to 30.

Domestic Abuse and Divorce

Domestic abuse and in some cases divorce, have also forced women into prostitution. Ma Kyu Kyu Win, a 22-year-old woman from Botataung Township, Rangoon Division, has worked as a prostitute at Kabyar Restaurant in Ye Township since August 2009. She explained, “I left my husband and came to work in Ye town. I had no options other than to work as a prostitute.”

KTV

Brothels employ a large number of prostitutes in Burma while others work at karaoke bars, known as Karaoke Television or KTV. These bars are a growing phenomenon throughout Burma and offer one-hour sessions with women in private rooms. Since KTV bars are not brothels by name and do not advertise sex, they are able to operate legally. Although customers at a KTV bar are not always looking for sex, in many cases, “sex as well as songs are on the menu”.18 Usually, club managers keep a portion of the money nonetheless, women may earn more than they could otherwise make. A source that recently visited a KTV bar in Moulmein said the bar charged 7,000 kyat per hour for an air-conditioned room and 3,500 kyat per hour for a non air-conditioned room.

Ma Thi Thi Win, a 20-year-old woman from Shwemawdaw Pagoda Street, Pegu Town, Pegu Division migrated to Ye Township in June of 2009. She  now works as a prostitute with 9 other women ages 15 to 30 at Irrawaddy 2 restaurant. For her job, she stays in a private room with each customer for one hour. In total, she was able to send 150,000 kyat to her family in July. She said, “The restaurant’s owner is not bad and I am free to go outside.  But I am still not happy to work here and I want to leave my work. Yet, I have to concentrate…so I can get more money to send back to my family.”

Brokers & Trafficking

In many cases, brokers promising high-paying jobs lure women to distant foreign cities. The brokers regularly charge the women for transportation, food and other costs of living, in exchange for helping the women find work. In some cases, brokers trick women into becoming prostitutes, promising high-paying jobs without informing women of the actual work. According to a 2009 report by the U.S. Department of State, it is believed that trafficking of women and girls to other countries and within Burma for sexual exploitation was substantial in 2008 and that at least several thousand women and girls were victims of trafficking. Most traffickers were small-scale operators working in coordination with brokers.19

Ma Hsaung Hnin Wei, a 14-year-old girl from Shwe Myanmar village, Kyaukpyu Township, Arakan State, migrated to Ye Town with her friends in search of a job. She now works as a prostitute at Achitnut Restaurant while her friends work at various neighboring establishments. She explained, “All of us were trafficked by Ma Nga,  a broker who lives in Rangoon. She promised us that we would get a good job and that she would pay for transportation in advance.”

Ma Tin Thin, a 15-year-old woman, from Kyinmyindaing Township, Rangoon Division, who migrated to Ye Town, where she works as a prostitute, said, “I came with a female broker who promised to provide a job at a store in Ye Town. She said we would earn 150,000 kyat per month and we believed and followed her. When we arrived, we had to work as prostitutes.” Another woman, Ma Htoo Htoo Wei, said the restaurant owner took her ID card and does not allow her to leave the property.

In some cases, customers abuse women. Ma Htoo Htoo Wei stated, “I don’t want to do this job because customers bully me. If they are dissatisfied, they abuse us and break chairs. I am really scared to deal with them. Sometimes I want to fight back but it is not possible to do that because if I don’t talk with the customer politely the owner, who is Burman, will cut half of my monthly salary.” Ma Thi Thi Win added, “Sometimes the costumers intimidate me and I feel very depressed.”

Minors

In addition to laws against prostitution, Burma has laws protecting minors and specifically prohibiting child prostitution. However, these laws are not enforced and many women under the age of 18 work as prostitutes.

According to the report by the U.S. Department of State, foreign diplomatic representatives in Rangoon and Mandalay “noted widespread presence of female prostitutes who appeared to be in their teens. Additionally, some brothels reportedly offered young teenage ‘virgins’ to their customers for a substantial additional fee.”20 Although there are no reliable statistics as to its extent, studies indicate that trafficking of minors within Burma and across Burma’s borders continues to increase.21 2 of the 12 women interviewed for this report were minors when they began working as a prostitute and several of the interviewed women reported working with minors.

Ma Hsaung Hnin Wei, a 14-year-old girl from Shwemyanmar village, Kyaukpyu Township, Arakan State, explained, “ I am too young to have sex with many people and sometimes I feel a lot of pain. But this job provides my with a good income.”

An 18-year-old Mon female, Mi Moe Moe Win, from Kamarmoe village, Chaung Zaung Township, stated, “I used to work at Kyaw Bear Restaurant in Moulmein and one night I lost my virginity for 100,000 kyat ($100 US) to a wealthy Chinese man. Then I came to work here in Ye Town. Nobody enjoys working as a prostitute but otherwise I would have no money to survive.”

Government Involvement

Under the Suppression of Prostitution Act of 1949, amended in 1998, prostitution is illegal in Burma and carries a punishment of 3 years in prison. Owning a brothel, defined as “any . . . place habitually used for the purpose of prostitution or used with reference to any kind of business for the purpose of prostitution,”22 is also illegal, as is forcing or enticing women into prostitution. The Act states that these crimes “shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than one year and not more than 5 years and may also be liable to a fine.”23 Yet despite Burma’s laws, the sex trade is increasing rapidly and the government’s law enforcement efforts have been minimal.24

Not only do government officers fail to implement the law, they are often complicit in the prostitution industry and have been known to accept bribes and turn a blind eye, or use prostitutes’ services themselves. The U.S. Department of State found that, pertaining to the prostitution industry; corruption among Burmese authorities was widespread.25 KTV restaurants are able to offer prostitution without ramifications through unofficial agreements with the local authorities; sometimes restaurant owners are themselves military authorities.

Ma Moe Moe Win, who works at Bayinma Restaurant, said that the owner of the restaurant where she works is a retired Burmese soldier who has a good relationship with the policemen in Ye Town. Several brothel owners pay bribes to police officers. Ma Hsaun Hnin Wei, who works as a prostitute at Achitnut Restaurant, said her restaurant’s owner pays 250,000 Kyat to the Ye Town police each month. Ma Chaw Su explained that her restaurant’s owner pays the Ye Town Police 20,000 Kyat per prostitute.

A 2009 investigation by Ko Htwe of The Irrawaddy found that many prostitutes have sex with police at a discount or for free. They are afraid that if they refuse, the police will arrest them.26 Ma Su Su and Ma Ei Ei said if the SPDC authorities come, they have to give free sex to them without charge.

According to the U.S. State Department’s report, some prostitutes were raped or robbed by police after being taken into custody and those imprisoned were often abused. Women who reported being raped by police or soldiers were sometimes themselves arrested.27

Conclusion

The 11 women interviewed for this report became prostitutes out of economic desperation. Their stories and lives are examples of violations of the CEDAW and CRC which the SPDC willingly signed and claims to uphold. The Burmese government has pledged to impede prostitution and trafficking, although in reality the prostitution industry grows as Burma’s economy deteriorates.

Government  officials compound the problem by accepting bribes in exchange for ignoring prostitution establishments and in many cases partaking in prostitutes’ services. Poverty and corruption are the root causes of the sex trade in Burma and until significant change occurs on these fronts, the country’s prostitution industry will  continue to flourish.

Footnotes

1. Jha, Lalit K/ UNDP. “Burma Drops Further in Human Development   Index.” The Irrawaddy. November 2007.
2. The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html.  January 2007.
3. U.S. Centers for Disease Control, “Myanmar: Child Prostitutes Available at $100 a Night; the Human Cost of Junta’s Repression.” October 2007. http://www.thebody.com/content/art43765.html
4. U. S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “Burma.” Feb. 25, 2009.
5. Jay, Ko. “Karaoke Nights.” The Irrawaddy. Vol. 13 No. 5. May 2005.
6. Manning, Kevin R. “Wooing Women Workers.” The Irrawaddy Online Edition. Oct. 2003
7. ASEAN Post Nargis Joint Assessment Team Report. July 2008.
8. U. S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “Burma.” Feb. 25, 2009.
9. Yazar, Htet. “Unemployment on the Rise in Rangoon.” The Democratic Voice of Burma. October 18, 2009.
10. Htwe, Ko. “Desolation Road.” The Irrawaddy, Vol. 17 No. 4. July 2009.
11. U. S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “Burma.” Feb. 25, 2009.
12. WOMEN” (HTML). Burma: Country in Crisis. Soros. October 2005. http://www2.soros.org/burma/CRISIS/women.html.
13. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “Burma.” Feb. 25, 2009. Sakulpitakphon, Patchareeboon. The International organization to End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes.” http://www.thebody.com/content/whatis/art43765.html. Von Hauff, Michael. Economic and Social Development in Burma/ Myanmar.” Marburg, Germany: Metropolis, 2007. Page 156.
14. U. S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “Burma.” Feb. 25, 2009.
15. Interview of multiple women by WCRP reporter. September 2009.
16. UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2005. http://stats.uis.unesco.org
17. Naing, Saw Yan. “Police Busted in Illegal Burmese Lottery.” The Irrawaddy. March 6, 2008.
18. Jay, Ko. “Karaoke Nights.” The Irrawaddy. Vol. 13 No. 5. May 2005.
19. U. S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “Burma.” Feb. 25, 2009.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Burma Lawyers’ Council. http://www.blc-burma.org/html/Myanmar%20Law/lr_e_ml98_07.html
23. “Burma – Government laws.” HumanTrafficking.org. http://www.humantrafficking.org/countries/burma/government_laws.
24. Sen. B.K. “Women and Law in Burma.” Legal Issues on Burma Journal No. 9, Aug. 2001.
25. U. S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “Burma.” Feb. 25, 2009.
26. Htwe, Ko. “Desolation Road.” The Irrawaddy, Vol. 17 No. 4. July 2009.
27. U. S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. “Burma.” Feb. 25, 2009.

Much has been written on the human rights abuses leveled by the Burmese Army against the Karen and Mon villagers who live along the gas pipeline that runs through the Mon state from Kanbauk, in  northern Ye Township, to Myaing Kalay, in the Southern Thanbyuzayat Township. In recent months, however, ongoing abuse inflicted by Burmese army battalions against the villagers has intensified.  The presence of Burmese Army battalions in the area has plagued the villagers for more than 15 years. Since 1994, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has deployed 20 army battalions in the area as a means of protecting the Yadana pipeline — the second natural gas pipeline that runs through the area — from rebel attacks. Various armed rebel groups exist in the area, including the KNU, the KNLA, and an unnamed, 30 –strong ragtag Mon splinter group.
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The human rights violations documented in this report occurred between early August and early October of 2009. The human rights violations discussed here were perpetrated mainly by  two different Burmese Light Infantry Battalions (LIB) and one Artilary Regiment (AR): LIB No. 106, LIB No. 62, and AR 315.Three kinds of abuse have occurred in this region. First, villagers have been forced to act as human shields between Burmese Army battalions and rebel groups, and many of them have disappeared or died. Second, villagers were forced to work without pay and were taxed. Third, villagers were tortured, in the sense of physical harassment, emotional abuse, and forced interrogation. HURFOM hopes that chronicling the abuses suffered within this area of Burma during such a short time period will provide a snapshot of the ongoing abuse suffered not only by the villagers living in the Ye- Thanbyuzayat border area, but also by the thousands of villagers who struggle to survive along the pipeline.

Three HURFOM reporters and their respective networks of contacts spent three months in the 80 to 85 mile radius of the pipeline. The reporters gathered testimonies from 12 different villages in the region, most of which are ethnically Karen. In all cases reported, names have been changed to protect the identities of their owners, but the ages, occupations, and ranks reported are factual.

Cases of Villagers Forced to Act as Human Shields, and Subsequent Disappearances and Deaths

The “Kanbauk to Myaing Kalay” gas pipeline, which brings gas to two cement factories, has never been sabotaged by rebel soldiers. However, much of the fighting between the rebel soldiers and the Burmese Army has occurred near the soldiers’ base off the Moulmein to Ye road and the Ye to Tavoy railway tracks near the pipeline. Since the fighting between the rebel groups and the army occurs both in the rural areas and near the main road, the local Burmese Army battalion is constantly on high alert. The army is concerned with the security of the whole area in Southern Thanbyuzayat Township, but its main focus remains the security of the pipeline project.

When fighting between the army and the rebels has occurred in the area near the natural gas pipeline, the Burmese army has traditionally accused local villagers of being rebel-supporters. The army has also been known to interrogate local village headmen and their supporters in order to ascertain the identities of rebel contacts or supporters. Occasionally, suspected villagers are arrested and even killed during these interrogations. Alternatively, suspected villagers are sometimes quietly arrested by Burmese soldiers and taken away without any notification to their families. Many of these individuals are later used in porter services or as human shields and minesweepers in the Burmese military’s various operations against the rebel insurgency. Villagers who have been forced into such services are frequently killed during clashes between the Burmese military and the rebel groups. Such killings, disappearances, and use of human minesweepers and human shields, has thus far only been documented in Thanbyuzayat Township, Mon State.

On September 26, 2009, a group of 28 Burmese soldiers led by Captain Thant Zin Latt entered Tu Lae village, which contains roughly 150 households, in Thanbyuzayat Township. They arrested 16 villagers whom they suspected of being of rebel supporters, including two village headmen, and later used them as human minesweepers and human shields. All arrested villagers are ethnic Karen residents of Tu Lae. After the soldiers brought the arrested villagers to the outskirts of Tu Lae village, Captain Thant Zin Latt ordered his soldiers to give each arrested villager equipment, ammunition, and rations to carry. Then, Captain Thant Zin Latt ordered Saw Chit Sein, Chairman of the Tu Lae Village Peach and Development Council (VPDC), and the rest of the arrested villagers to march in front of the military column as human shields. Ah Naing, 35, a Tu Lae villager who witnessed the arrests by the military column of LIB No. 106 in Tu Lae village, recounted the story to HURFOM’s reporters. HURFOM’s reporters were able to obtain the names, ages, and ranks of the Tue Lae villagers included in the arrest; none of the following information has been changed.

1)    Saw Chit Sein, 45, Chairman of village PDC,
2)    Saw Lular, 33, Secretary of village PDC,
3)    Saw Pwin Htoo, 46, villager,
4)    Hti Kaloo, 51, villager,
5)    Saw Kaloh Min, 27, villager,
6)    Saw Ta O Paw, 21, villager,

7)    Saw Maung Kwe, 24, villager,
8)    Saw Taloh, 24, villager,
9)    Saw Thiha, 32, villager,
10)    Saw Chan Tha, 16, villager,
11)    Saw Chala, 16, villager,
12)    Saw Kyaw Linn,20,villager,
13)    Saw Kyaw Linn Phaw, 18, villager,
14)    Saw Taw Pho, 16, villager,
15)    Saw Phar Linn, 36, villager,
16)    Saw Yinn Yoe, 32 villager.

Another female eyewitness, Ma Moe, 30, reported to HURFOM’s reporters that “I also saw Captain Thant Zin Latt and three soldiers beat our Chairman Saw Chit Sein, and Secretary Saw Lutha. Because of their complaints against the military, they were accused of being in contact with KNU soldiers. The group leader [Captain Thant Zin Latt] asked all the arrested villagers about the updated activities of the KNU in this area. The villagers denied the accusations of the captain, but the soldiers still used them as porters and human shields for their military operations against KNU.” Ma Moe is a relative of Saw Chan Tha, one of the victims of the arrest and a resident of Tu Lae village.

About a week later, 12 out of the 16 arrested villagers returned to their home village; 4 more remain missing. One returnee, who asked his name to be withheld, told HURFOM’s reporter the story of Saw Yin Yoe, aged 32,who was murdered by Captain Thant Zin Latt during the armed clash between the KNU and LIB No. 106 groups:

“Since they [the Burmese solders] used us as human shields to prevent injury to themselves, I knew we were in a dangerous situation if the KNU troops came and attacked the Burmese troops. On September 27 at about 3:00 PM local time, the fighting started between LIB No. 106., led by Captain Thant Zin Latt, and KNU troops led by Captain Saw Na Na in Yun Chaung Pya valley, southeast Thanbyuzayat Township. As soon as I heard the gunshots, I laid down on the ground and tried to hide behind a stone. During the fighting, I saw Captain Thant Zin Latt shoot Saw Yin Yoe, 32, while he attempted to flee during the fighting between. The bullet struck under his chin and he died on the spot.”

Unpaid Labor

Like in many other townships in the Mon State, Burmese Army commanders carry more authority than the locally-appointed Village Peace and Development Council (VPDC) leaders, as their battalions represent the national government. Army battalions frequently override the authority of the village headmen. The “self-reliance,” or “self-help program,” as it is officially called, is the Burmese government’s means of allowing its army battalions to form a parasitic relationship with villagers throughout Burma. Under this program, battalions are allowed to force villagers to work on agricultural projects without pay, to demand contributions of foodstuffs and supplies, and to extort taxes. The program began in the Ye- Thanbyuzayat border area in 2003. Battalions LIB No. 106, IB No. 62 and AR No. 315 are based in the region and handle the security of both the gas pipeline and the surrounding area.

In order to gain food supplies and other battalion-related expenses needed to support themselves, these battalions usually order the villagers in to work on their confiscated rubber plantations, to build their army barracks, and to work on other local development projects like repairing bridges or re-constructing roads. The residents have also been forced to work in confiscated rice paddies, to guard the pipeline, and to act as porters during military offensives. The workers receive no recompense for their time or their work
From the first week of August to first week of October 2009, the gas pipeline security battalions forced the local residents to build their security huts and ordered the villagers to handle the security of the pipeline without reimbursement. HURFOM’s reporters received 7 testimonies, all of which report the use of unpaid labor by the local SPDC battalions against those who lived along the pipeline. Villagers who were unable to perform their assigned tasks were forced to hire replacements at the cost of thousands of kyat.  Forced security duties place additional strains on villagers who are already struggling survive.

According to a Ko Maung Shwe, 48, a resident of Wae Won village, Thanbyuzayat Township who was forced to build a security hut in front of his farm:
“The Burmese Army Captain That Naing Soe forced me to build a security hut in front of my farm. I had to buy all of the wood, bamboo and leaves for the roof, which cost about 12,000 kyat. All of the villagers have to pay a set amount to buy building materials, but I had to pay extra for the security hut. But I did not dare to complain to the captain because I know that he is a notorious officer in IB No. 62. Due to the unpaid labor we are forced to do, we are becoming poorer and poorer. I have four children and a spouse to feed, and I need to earn 5,000 kyat a day to support and feed them. In our village, very few parentage families can earn enough income. We suffer a lot of abuses and will never get enough time to earn a livelihood.”

Like Ko Maung Shwe mentioned, most of the residents from Wae Won village have struggled to earn sufficient incomes since the 1994, when the army battalions were first posted in their areas. The worst situations that HURFOM reporters found involved households of elderly individuals with no adult children, and widows whose only children were ages 7 to 16. HURFOM’s reporters found that no families were spared from forced labor.

A 15-year-old boy from Wae Taw village, Thanbyuzayat Township expressed his feelings about being forced by the No. 62 Infantry Battalion to take on sentry duites:

“In my house, there is only me and my eight-year-old younger brother. My parents have worked as day laborers in Thailand for the past two years. When my village headmen instructed me to guard the pipeline, I was very frustrated by the order, but I had to go. I have had to guard two times this year already. No one in this village dares to complain about the Burmese Army’s orders, even village PDC crew. I understand the situation, but I feel sad that it is happening when my parents are far away.”

This boy also informed HURFOM’s reporters that there have been about 5 children under 16 who were forced to take part in sentry duties along the pipeline over the past three months. The use of under-aged children as sentry guards is a major point of contention among Wae Taw villagers, many of whom feel that the emotional immaturity of the children makes them obstacles to the pipeline project’s security.

“My opinion is they [underage children] should be free from guarding the pipeline because they are not strong enough compared to adults. If they see strangers or members of a rebel group who are going to bomb the pipeline, how can they respond? They may not have the ability to take the necessary actions in such cases. It is nonsense to let children take care of the gas pipeline,” said Saw Doh Doh, 46, a local farmer.

Residents from Anaeni village, Thanbyuzayat Township, were also forced to take on sentry duties and to build eleven security huts with their own funds. Guard duties cut into their agricultural time, and many families have found it difficult to find the funds necessary to maintain their fields.

“We are too tired to guard the pipeline. We have wasted a lot of income and time for more than a decade. Because of this pipeline, two acres of my farmland have been confiscated by the army, and I have been beaten by IB No. 62 commanders [for being absent during sentry duties and for not paying security fees] during the past three years. At the moment, all villagers are forced to guard sections of the pipeline throughout the day and night. Commander Major That Nain Soe from IB No. 62 has demanded this of our village PDC since August of 2009. Before that, we only had to guard at night, but now, we must guard the pipeline for 24 hours a day. Consequently, we cannot take care of our crops and plantations. When we harvested this year, we could not buy the required amounts of agricultural products. Most villagers are not able to earn enough money to survive. If we can work freely in this area, without forced labor, taxes and restriction by Burmese Amy battalions, we may become rich families,” U Aung Gyi, 56, a resident of Anaeni village, Thanbyuzayat Township said. [HURFOM reporter talked with him on October 10, 2009 1430]

IB No.62 brigade 2, under Captain Naing Lin, has been based in Wae Taw village, Thanbyuzayat Township, for three years. The troops in the area have forced Wae Taw residents to guard the pipeline’s security for most of that time. According to the Saw Kar Kwel, a Wae Taw villager who was hired to guard the pipeline:

“We have about 40 households in our village. The troops made a rotating system that says that every person in a family has to provide security for the pipeline. Many residents hired me to guard for them. They paid me 15,000 kyat a month. While I was guarding the pipeline, I needed to stay in the army camp all day and night with IB No. 62 troops. When the solders patrolled the pipeline, I also needed to follow them. If the solders were still in the patrol hut, I needed to find wood to make a fire for preventing mosquito or leech bites. I also needed to get fire all through the night. In Wae Taw village, if people can’t afford to patrol the pipeline, they usually hire me to replace them.”

The Wae Won village headman, Saw Sar Loo Bo, told HURFOM that IB No. 62, based in Phown Sein village, Thanbyuzayat Township, forced residents to pay Burmese Army battalions to guard the pipelines. The estimated rates of extortion in the areas are 16,000 kyat per household for 5 months in Anin and Kyaung-Ywa villages, 8,000 kyat per household for 2 months in Welwon village, and 16,000 kyat per household for 5 months in Anaeni village.

In the rainy season, sometimes due to flooding, the pipeline appears above ground. When this happens, the Wae Won village headman claims that the troops force the area’s residents to make a fence to secure the pipeline. On October 5, 2009 the residents had already sent their money to the Battalion.

Villages in the area who do not deal with mandatory guard duty still face financial difficulties due to their proximity to the pipeline. According to HURFOM’s reporters, in 2009, the IB No. 62 commanded that rather than having Wae Kha Mi’s villagers take responsibility for guarding the pipeline, the troops from the battalion would take on guarding responsibilities for a fee of 2,000 kyat per troop.

Villagers in Wae Kha Mi village must also fence the pipeline during the rainy season. According to Daw Thin Thin, a Wae Kha Mi villager, “Flooding from the river washed away the ground that was covering the pipeline. We are usually forced to cover the pipeline with tree branches and bamboo, and to fence in the pipeline areas. Every year, when the pipeline appears out from the ground, we are forced to cover and fence it.”

For the past 5 years, Wae Kha Mi villagers have also been forced to participate in the Burmese government’s castor bean program. In 2005, the Burmese government ordered villagers all over the Mon State to begin planting castor bean plants on their farms. The beans were supposed to be ground and turned into biodiesel, but thus far the beans harvested every year have gone to waste. Wae Kha Mi, village headman of U Pher Hool, told HURFOM that on September 09th, 2009, IB No. 62, which is based in Wae Kha Mi village under Captain Hlaing Soe, forced the residents to plant castor oil beans on both sides of the Ye-Moulmein motor road that passes through the village. The captain reportedly commanded Wae Kha Mi village’s headmen to plant 5,000 castor bean plants in the area; the villagers also had to pay 20 kayt for each plant. After planting was finished, the farmers were required to maintain the plantation, under threat that a damaged field would result in the villagers being forced to replace the plants, again with their own funds. The captain ordered the farmers to finish planting by September 27, 2009.

Arbitrary Taxation by Burmese Army gas pipeline security forces

Besides the financial pressures presented by pipeline guard duty, residents of Wae Won and Wae Taw villages must also pay multiple taxes implemented by the battalions based in the area, and on many occasions, must provide for food and other supplies to the battalions. HURFOM reporters met a group of residents of Wae Won and Wae Taw villages on the Thai-Burma border in early October. They learned that the villagers were abused by SPDC battalions, both IB No. 62 and LIB No. 106. About 4 military columns of 20 soldiers from each battalion have been patrolling the pipeline since 2000.

“We have no more time to work, no money to give them and not enough food to survive,” explained Saw Phoe Wah, 24. His family fled their native village in early May, 2009 to avoid forced labor and the battalions’ arbitrary tax extortions. According to one villager, Dae Phoe, 23, “We had to cut down all the big trees and clean the grounds for them to build their barracks. After we finished cleaning, the soldiers forced us to dig long trenches and build fences.

From my village, we had 3 groups of at least 10 villagers. If a person could not work, they were responsible for finding and paying for a substitute, at the cost of 5,000 Kyat per day. Families with no adults suitable for labor also had to hire someone or pay the soldiers.”

The soldiers also fine villagers who own oxen. Normally, when the soldiers set up temporary bases near the villages, Burmese soldiers warn the villagers to keep their cattle far from their bases. If livestock wander onto a military base, the villagers must pay the soldiers to get their livestock back. Ma Mya Shwe, 31, a female from Wae Kha Mi Village, Thanbyuzayat Township, was a bystander to one such incident. On September 18, after two oxen entered into Temporary Base IB No. 62, Commander Captain Naing Linn and his troops asked the oxen’s owner for 15,000 kyat for the release of each ox. The owner, Nai Ya, age 60, was unable to afford the fine, so the captain lowered the fine to 10,000 kyat and forced Nai Ya to spend the next two days fencing the base as a punishment.

Sometimes, the battalions kidnap villagers for ransom. Higher authorities are often complicit in these acts.  In the first week of September, a military column of LIB No. 106, led by Captain Min Nyan Win, arrived in Lein Maw Chan village, a border village of Thanbyuzayat and Ye Townships. The battalion captured two young villagers and took them to Wae Won village, Thanbyuzayat Township. The commander ordered the village headmen and their families to pay 50,000 kyat each  as ransom to release them. After the villagers were released, they were ordered not to tell anyone about their kidnapping. “As all of us are afraid of the soldiers. We have to keep quiet to avoid unwanted harm from Captain Min Nyan Win,” said Pho Kyaw, 26, who fled to the border.

The combination of land confiscation, forced labor and tax extortion make life difficult for the villagers of Wae Won and Wae Taw. They face a scarcity of land, and are unable to tend to their fields because they must work for the battalions. They cannot afford to pay illegal taxes to the authorities or army.  When these problems became severe, many villagers abandon their native villages and flee to other areas.

Under the military regime in Burma, and by dint of having the pipeline project under their charge, the local battalions have absolute power in rural areas [mostly black or free fire zones]. They also control some administrative activities. Sometimes, they loot the civilians’ belongings and charge fines from traders, businesspeople and ordinary civilians. Villagers have no means of filing a complaint, as the authorities are the ones committing the abuses.   Even village headmen are unable to protect their villagers. “I am very tired of being a headman,” lamented U Hpa Hoh, a village peace and development officer from Wae Kha Mi village. “If the commanders are not happy with me, then my villagers will have more trouble later on.”

Torture

For the purpose of HURFOM’s reporting, torture is defined as any act that inflicts emotional or physical pain for the purposes of interrogation, intimidation or extortion. HURFOM’s reporters have documented 5 different cases of torture in the Ye-Thanbyuzayat border area between August and October 2009. These reports consist of beatings, interrogations, and intimidation.

Frequently, Burmese army soldiers have attacked and critically injured villagers in the area as a means of eliminating a possible rebel army supporter. According to HURFOM’s reporters, Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) No. 106 led by Captain Mya Zaw Aung, made up of 17 troops, arrived at Binkalwe village in Thanbyuzayat Township on September 27, 2009. While the troops were searching for suspected KNU supporters in the village, Mg Shan Pyi, age 35, came back from his farm and crossed the battalion’s path. Without knowing anything about his identity or whether he might be connected to the KNU, the troops attacked him immediately, hitting him with their gun butts. He suffered from a severe head wound and asked for help from the village headman, Mg Tin Lel. The headman informed the battalion that he was a member of Binkalwe village and not a part of the KNU, and asked for an apology from battalion’s leader, Captain Mya Zaw Aung. The captain apologized to the village headman and Mg Shan Pyi for his battalion’s mistake, and swore that such incidents would not again occur in Binkalwe village.

U Pwel, 55, a Binkalwe farmer and witness to the incident, said “Mg Shan Pyi is a quiet man and a normal villager. In our area, [the troops] usually make mistakes like hitting and beating residents without cause and shooting residents. Before, they never apologized to villagers after they made a mistake. Last year, Infantry Battalion (IB) No. 62 shot one villager. His name was Pho Myo, and it happened outside the village. His family didn’t get any repayment after his death.”

Sources near Mg Shan Pyi’s relatives complained to HURFOM that the injury on his head was so severe that he had to go to Thanbyuzayat Township hospital to receive 6 stitches on his head, which cost about 30,000 kyat.

Acts of violence like the incident suffered by Mg Shan Pyi are a tool that the Burmese Army uses to intimidate the villagers of the regions they occupy, creating a culture of mistrust and fear throughout the region. HURFOM reporters learned of a second incident of physical violence, occurring in Thuu Lel village, southern Thanbyuzayat township.

U Myint Maung, age 62, witnessed an attack on her neighbor. “On September 13, 2009, Captain Mya Zaw Aung and his troops arrested Thuu Lel villager Mg Aye Thein near the Shune River, which is 1 mile from the village. [The troops] accused Mg Aye Thein of trying to communicate with the KNU Battalion No. 16 led by Warrant Officer Saw Nar Nar. The Burmese Captain Mya Zaw Aung arrested [Mg Aye Thein] and asked him about the KNU Battalion No. 16 activities in the area. The Captain threatened to kill him if he did not tell about the KNU troops’ activities. Because he couldn’t speak Burmese well, the troops slapped him, hit his face, and dunked his head underwater. After that, one solider hit his head and he lost consciousness. The troops thought he was dead, and they threw him beside the Shune River.”

On September 14 in the early morning, U Myint Maung told HURFOM that he saw Mg Aye Thein near his durian farm and rescued him. U Myit Maung brought him to his house in Thuu Lel village. He tried to treat him with traditional medicine, but was unsuccessful, so he brought him to Moulmein hospital, where he stayed for two weeks. The fees for medical treatment came to about 80,000 kyat.

According to HURFOM’s field reporters, on September 29 LIB No. 106, led by Sergeant Sayar and Khin May Lay, went to guard the gas pipeline. At about 4:00 PM, the troops captured Lein Maw Chan villager A-Chain, age 40, and his cousin Mg Ngae, age 32, when they were on their way home from their farm. The troops accused both of the men of conversing with the insurgent groups in the areas, and of belonging to the KNU. They beat them until they bled from their heads and faces. No one from the nearby farm dared to respond to the men’s cries for help. A villager later informed the village headman and his security officers about the case. The headman informed the military that neither victim had ties to any rebel group.

According to U Hla Win, a 52 year-old Lein Maw Chan villager who witnessed the incident, “The village headman paid 40,000 kyat and 12 chickens to gain their release. The troops warned the headman and villagers that if we knew who was communicating with an insurgent group with plans to blow up the gas pipeline, they would kill all of us.”

Physical and emotional intimidation

In addition to charging villagers for pipeline maintenance and through taxes, battalions often use physical and emotional intimidation to extort additional money from the villagers, in the form of what is often called “security fees.” According to HURFOM field reporters in the area, on September 30, 2009, three villages combined their security fees and sent them to Captain Naing Line Htun, IB No. 62, Brigade 2. Ywa-thar-aye village, including 122 households, paid 16,000 kyat in four months; Pane-nae-taw village, containing 37 households, paid 16,000 kyat, and Ngaputaw village, consisting of 29 households, paid 16,000 kyat.

Occasionally, physical violence and intimidation are combined with extortion. On September 17, 2009, during LIB No. 106, Corporal Myo Thein and 8 fully armed troops took over guarding the pipeline around Sout-palaung village, Thanbyuzayat Township. Thet Naing, age 30, was on his way home from his farm when he encountered the troops.

“A soldier ordered me not to run. I explained to him that I was going home to Sathpalaung Village, but the military refused to let me go. When they saw a knife in my basket, they accused me of being from the KNU Army. The corporal slapped my face and asked for my information. He said he had heard that KNU ordered their troops to explode the gas pipeline in this area. After that, they tied me with a rope and brought me to their temporary camp in Amaeni village. After the Corporal reported to his captain, a soldier said if I gave him 50,000 Kyat, he would release me. The next evening, my relative came and paid the fee to free me from their hands.”

Frequently, villagers in the Ye –Thanbyuzayat area are intimidated into informing on their fellow villagers. A Ye township Village Peace and Development Council (VPDC) clerks said that MOMC No. 19, which is based in Ye Township, forced a security guard to get information and evidence about a gas pipeline that exploded. The security guard forced the residents of Kyaungyaw and Anin villages to get more information and evidence to report to the MOMC 19.

Ultimately, the tortuous acts leveled by the Burmese army plunges the villagers living in the Ye-Thanbyuzayat pipeline area into a world of distrust, uncertainty, and fear; a world where villagers fear to stray from their homes and farms, where residents are loathe to respond to their fellow’s cries of help, and where villagers must pay exorbitant sums for the dubious benefits of the Burmese Army’s “security”.

Conclusion:

The human rights violations suffered by the villagers in the pipeline area between Northern Ye and Southern Thanbyuzayat Township are by no mean occurring in a vacuum. The residents of villages all along the Kanbauk-Myaing Kalay gas pipeline in Mon State contend with arrest, disappearances, guard duty, beatings, and the like, every day. The abuse documented here is disquieting both due the number of abuse cases suffered during three months and the increasing magnitude of the abuse itself; yet the cases listed here merely represent a very small section of a much larger picture of the human rights abuses suffered by the villagers who live along the Kanbauk-Myaing Kalay gas pipeline in Mon State.

Once known as the ‘rice basket’ of Asia, Burma’s long-standing reputation as a leading rice exporter has dwindled as its economy has collapsed after years of rule by several generations of military juntas. Within the country, the leading role of rice as a food product and commercial cash crop has persisted. Yet despite its significant role in Burmese agriculture, the rice paddy farmers of Mon state, who have long been the backbone of rice production in Burma, are finding it increasingly difficult to continue to provide for their own livelihoods and those of their families.

The threat to paddy farmers is twofold, due to both man-made catastrophes as well as natural disasters. Due to the poor design and management of the Win-pha-non and Kataik dams, farms and villages throughout the area have been flooded as spillways running from the damn have failed. Thanks to excess rainfall, farmers in the 6 divisions of Mon State have lost hundreds of acres of rice paddies due to flooding. However, in addition to the destruction of their cash crops, paddy farmers face further loss of income and property from the abusive economic management practices of the Burmese government’s State Peace and Development Council’s (SPDC) agricultural programs.  Despite flooding, seasonal limitations, and lack of funding, government administrators demand that farmers replant their crops to meet government rice quotas.  While they are provided with no economic support, farmers are still expected to meet the quota or face the seizure of their land, and in some cases, forced manual labor.

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Background

Mon state is well known for its strong agricultural output and favorable climate.  Because of its value as an agricultural region, Mon state is home to 7 dams.  The 2 dams responsible for the widespread flooding that HURFOM has been documenting are the Win-pha-non and the Kataik dams.  Both these dams, according to sources close to the SPDC, were built to contribute to the prevention of flooding and to assist local farmers in the cultivation of rainy season and summer paddy fields.

In August 2009 particularly intense seasonal rains fell. In response, government administrators released excess water from the Win-pha-non and Kataik dams. In addition to widespread flooding from the excessive monsoon rainfall, the release of dam water has proved catastrophic, as water has been spilling over the poorly designed dam’s runoff canals around the area.

HURFOM estimates that within the 6 townships of Ye, Mudon, Thanbyuzayat, Kyaikmayaw, and Moulmein, in Mon state, there are about 160,000 acres that have been planted for the monsoon paddy season.  Of those acres planted, over 70,000 acres have been flooded by heavy rain in August 2009.

Concentrating on the causes, effects, and the potential long term impacts of this year’s flooding, HURFOM field reporters have met with nearly 100 farmers located near the Win-pha-non and Kataik dams, and throughout flood impacted areas in Mon State’s 6 Townships. Mon State SPDC authorities have provided no support or attention in response to flooding or to the farmers who have lost their paddy plantations. Farmers and area residents have voiced widespread concern that they will be unable to continue living in the area, due to the financial loss of their crops and the costs of having to replant. Besides individual losses, according to accounts from several HURFOM field reporters, residents and rice traders have predicted that the fallout from this crop failure will raise paddy and rice prices over the next few years throughout the country and precipitate a widespread food shortage. Rather then providing physical or financial support for the flooded region, the SPDC has responded by pressuring farmers to prepare their lands to replant their rainy season paddies in order to meet the state’s yearly rice production quota, despite the impossibility of a paddy crop ever reaching a mature harvestable state as the rainy season ends. Regardless, authorities have threatened farmers who are resistant or unable to replant their farms with land confiscation if they fail to replant their crop.

The report will be divided into 4 primary sections, after the methodology.  In the first section HURFOM details the design failures of the 2 dams in Mon state that have caused massive flooding, and the loss of farmlands that rice farmers face. The next section documents farmers’ losses from heavy rainfall. The 3rd section of this report will highlight the failure of the SPDC to provide support for the civilian population in these devastated areas, and the abusive policies of forced crop growth and land seizer that it has implemented instead. The last section before the conclusion will address the opinions and expectations of area experts, traders, and farmers about the expected wide spread impact of the heavy rains and catastrophic flooding.

Methodology

4 field reporters from HURFOM traveled throughout areas impacted by the heavy monsoon, and interviewed victims who have lost their land to the flooding in August, as well as government staff in various Townships in Mon State. Interviewing and collecting personal accounts from nearly 100 farmers, field reporters have had to work covertly to avoid detection by government agents. Additionally, due to HURFOM’s security concerns, this report will not contain victims’ personal details (however, you can contact HURFOM directly to get more information about the individual cases).

Please note that all numbers pertaining to damaged acreage are estimates given by their farmers. HURFOM was unable to obtain the exact numbers of damaged rice paddies, as the SPDC’s Ministry of Agriculture was both unavailable and unwilling to furnish such information.

The Win-pha-non and Kataik dams

The devastating flooding of Mudon and Pa’an township is directly related to the government’s failure to properly design dams constructed as part of their agricultural development projects. Both the Win-pha-non and Kataik dams suffer from design flaws in their water run-off canals, which in ideal circumstances should carry water away from an overly full dam.

The Win-pha-non dam is located on a hill to the east of the motor road near Abit village, Mudon Township. The fields affected by the dam are located to the west of the motor road that runs from Mawlamyine to Ye. In the construction of the damn, The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation created artificial waterways (canals) from the dam along the natural course the previous stream runoff used to take, widening and deepening old streambeds in the process. This central canal travels through 5 villages in the area.  In addition, they added artificial canals and irrigation ditches that now feed into the central canal.

However, HURFOM field reporters found that of the 70,000 acres of rice paddies farmed in the area, 17,000 are flooded. As a result of the structuring of old streams and the building new runoff canals, the newly built canal and its tributaries have blocked the natural runoff flow of water that collects in the surrounding countryside. Unable to reach its natural outlets along the old streambed, water pools around villages and in paddy fields, dumping silt and flooding crops.

Additionally, while the government has widened and dredged the new canal, it has not widened the canal and runoff channels sufficiently to allow for the volume of water that has been released from the water spillways in the side of the damn. The sides of the canal are too shallow, and during the 6-month long rainy season large volumes of water are released from the spillways that empty into the main runoff canal, creating flooding.

The Kataik dam, the construction of which was completed in February 2006, is located in Paung Township. Kataik was built to provide 28,000 acre feet of irrigation water to the 200,000 acres of rice paddies in the area. Farmers have reported that due to the faulty design of 2 spillways, named Kyone Htaw and Yinn Yein, flooding occurs seasonally from the water runoff from mountains. The spillways in question are not large enough to control the volumes water they are supposed to contain, and must routinely be opened to prevent damage to the dam’s machinery.  However, flooding from the spillways is worse this year due to unusually heavy seasonal rains, which have caused the sea’s tides to rise, and run into the already blocked and flooded canals. As a result, 20,000 acres of paddy have flooded.

According to residents, before the Ministry of Agriculture constructed the dams the water from the area’s villages and paddies drained into the old streams, and flowed out to the ocean through the central streambed.  With runoff escaping naturally, land drained and the rice farmers cultivated one crop of rice a year, during the rainy season. With the construction of dams, the SPDC has often required farmers to plant 2 crops of rice, one in the traditional rainy season, and another summer crop, using water from the dam to flood fields.

The water that has now flooded the villages around the dams is cloudy and dirty with soil erosion. Unable to drain into the flooded streams, excess water fills surrounding paddy fields. The water pools and backs up, depositing soil onto the paddy crops. The soil sticks to the plants and the plants are not able to stand with the combined weight of the water and the soil. Within about 7 days the crops fall over and die.

Dam flooding impacts

HURFOM has found that because of the failures of the Win-pha-non and Kakdai dams detailed above, crop loss from flooding in the region has destroyed the livelihoods of numerous families, and significantly threatens both the health and financial stability of area residents on the most basic levels. Of the 6 townships in Mon State impacted by flooding from dam failure and extreme seasonal rainfall, Mudon Township is the most devastated. According one member of the administration at Win-pha-non dam, another reason for the massive flooding are the fences and bamboo insulators that protect the Kanbauk-Myaigkalay pipeline in the places where it crosses the dam’s canal. The fences collect debris, which blocks the canal and contributes to flooding.

There are about 70,000 acres of paddy plantations in Mudon Township, and HURFOM field reporters have found that over 30,000 acres were destroyed by flooding last month. Despite the extreme loss of crops, there has been no effort by either the SPDC or The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation to assist farmers either financially or in physically attempting to replant their crops. One of the Win-pha-non staff members stated that, “All farmers know that we have been facing flooding every year; so the farmers should be preparing for more planting and keep more paddy seeds to replace in the destroyed fields as the water level comes down.” HURFOM field reporters documented that the villages of Kwankapwe, Hnee Padaw, Abit, Klohthort, Taungpa, Phae doe, Htaungkae and Kamawet have been hit by flooding, and farmers have not been preparing extra paddy seeds to replant again.  The area’s farmers explained that they can’t afford the additional cost of extra paddy seeds after this year’s flooding, which occurred in the middle of the rainy season, when rice is normally grown. Therefore, due to time restrictions, there is no a chance for the farmers to begin planting another crop that will be ready to harvest during the season.

Nai Thoo, a 56 years old Kwankapwe villager, Mudon Township explained that:

“The dam [Win-pha-non] makes our farmers’ lives more difficult every year. When there was heavy rain, they would turn on the water from the dam. If they do not turn on the water, the dam will break. The rubbish has run into the canal, which is too small, so the water can’t flow ahead easily and the water over flows into the farmland Another reason is the authorities have placed a bamboo fence across the gas pipeline that crosses [the central] canal so water can’t flow easily because [the fence] backs up with rubbish. Last year, the water also flooded over our farm but after 2 weeks the water level decreased. This year, the flooding came in the key growing stages and also took about 1 month to begin to drain; therefore, our plantation can’t survive anymore. The authorities suggested that the farmers should prepare the extra seeds to replace the flooded plantations. It’s easy to say that, but when you [try to] do it it that will difficult. The reality [of the situation] is that the authorities have to take responsibility for the flooding, but they blame farmers for being unprepared for the damage. Whatever they do to force us, I will not repair my plantation anymore, only 10% of my paddy plantation is left now. If we repair, we need to pay for repairing the land, buying the paddy seeds and transplanting the paddy. Estimating, the cost would be about 500,000 kyat if we replant again. I couldn’t afford that cost to replant again.”

80 inches of rain were fell August 2009; therefore, more water flowed down from the mountains and the sea’s tides rose into the paddy fields in Paung Township.  Thousands of rainy season paddy fields have been destroyed in Ahlaik, Yinnyein, Sinkyaik, Thelkon, Katon, and Welkyi villages, Paung Township.

Nai Myit Maung, 52 years old of Ahlaik villager, Paung Township, said,
“I planted 15 acres of rainy season paddies this year but 7 acres of our paddy field totally were destroyed by flooding in August. I have lost about 800,000 kyat because of destroyed crops. I think the main reason of our paddy fields flooding is because of the dam near our plantation. Every year there has been flooding in this areas but this year is the longest float the entire my farming experience. My paddy field is located between Katon and Sinkyaik villages that are located near Kataik dam. Because the spillway couldn’t control the water into the dam, the dam released the water and all around areas including my farm are floating nearly a month. The water level flown down in the first week of September; as a result, 7 acres of my farm are totally damaged after the water ran out into the field. Not only my farm destroyed in the area, but also the neighbor’s farm, and the people who depend on the water also have been damaged because of the August flooding. I think, about 40 to 50 farmers had been dealing with flooding around our area, but I’m not sure how much of their paddies they lost. In some paddy field the flood water still remains. Almost a thousand acres of farm land located under the dam areas have been damaged in last month’s flooding.”

The main reason for flooding in Paung Township was due to the Kataik dam. Both of the spillways to Yinn yein and Zaikkaye are not wide enough to drain water from the dam. The water from the mountains flows down, and the dam water combined with the mountain runoff, causing massive flooding in the area,
said a government official at the Kataik dam. He explained,
“Because of about 80 inches of rainfall in August, the dam couldn’t control that amount of water anymore. The dam released the water. Our lands are close to the sea. With the water from the sea rising and the dam water flow around the areas. Those two ways of water line combined each other and the farm lands received huge flooding in August. The government should consider this when they build up the dam. They need to know how much the rain falls in that areas and does the dam control that amount of rain fall. The result of their not considering is that our farmers face an obstacle. I estimated over 4,000 acres of paddy field were totally destroying during the flooding. This year is the year that most of farmers are losing their plantations.”

According from Mi Sein Htay, 40 years old of Katon villager, Paung Township,

“I planted 8 acres of paddy fields this year. My paddy plantations are starting to bud and we just finished putting fertilizer on our paddy plantation in the last week of August. Because of flooding in August the dam water has been flowing day and night, all our paddy fields are flooded and nothing can be harvested from our plantation. Our paddy fields have been flooded about 28 days, so all the rice plants are dying. After the water level decreased the Myanmar Agriculture Service’s manager came and told us to replant again. If we don’t have water he will allow us to use the dam water. You can say that to replant is easy, but we can’t afford fertilizer or to hire people to transplant the paddy plantation. Although we are afraid of the authorities, this time I don’t care anymore. If they would like to confiscate my land, they can do that. Whatever they say, I will not replant anymore.”

HURFOM estimates from its interviews that there are 20 farmers in Mudon Township alone who have totally lost their crops to this year’s flooding and are being threatened with losing their land because they cannot afford to replant.

Paung Township was affected by the same problems as Mudon and Kyaikmayaw Townships. HURFOM field reporters estimated that heavy rains in August caused over 7,000 acres to be flooded in Paung Township. Our field reporters collected information about the difficulties of Paung Township farmers and documented them in our report.

Rainfall Flooding

Rice farmers traditionally plant in what is known as the ‘rainy season’ The full development of a rice crop is contingent on several steps. In June rice farmers first plow wet soil and then scatter rice seed in fertilized fields. After a few weeks, the rice seedlings sprout and are then replanted, and then the field is flooded at low levels for an average of 150-170 days. Rice crops need a large quantity of water to grow; about 50% of the plant can be seen above water, and the other half is rooted and submerged.  In a normal agricultural timeline the rice can be harvested after 5 months.

The month of August saw record rainfall in Mon State. While seasonal rainfall normally measures an average 220 inches a year, rainfall for August 2009 was recorded as being nearly 80 inches. While flooding does occur every year during the rainy season the extreme and continuous volume of rainfall, this year farmers were unable to drain off their fields before their crops drowned. Farmers throughout the area claimed that this year’s flooding lasted about 5 weeks, after which all submerged paddy plants had drowned. According to an agriculture expert from Mudon township, losing their crops so far into the growing season means that farmers do not have enough time to replant and harvest a crop during the rainy growing season, as the hot season commences January; there is not enough time to clean out the paddy fields of debris, plough, sprout, replant, and re-grow a rice crop in such a short amount of time.

Rainfall Flooding Impacts

Farmers in Mon state invest a great deal of money in planting their crops on a year-to-year basis, spending their savings from the previous harvest on labor, seeds, and fertilizer. Therefore, the loss of farmers’ rice crops in the August flooding is more than the loss of a year’s income – it represents the loss of Mon State’s farmer’s savings. With their financial safety nets gone, farmers are unable to afford the costs of replanting, and have no choice except to face potential punishment from the Burmese government.

.3The six townships of villagers have all been farming their lands for generations, and some have been farmers for 40 years themselves. These villagers rely on farming as their primary means of survival. In particular, Mudon, Paung, and Kyaikmayaw Townships are the main rice producers in Mon State. Most of the residents in those townships survive by farming. They can’t afford to replant again after the water level decreased on their farmlands. In addition, about HURFOM’s sources estimated 70% of plantations have also been destroyed by flooding in the lowland areas of Ye, Thanbyuzayat, and Moulmein Townships These three areas have been producing a small amount of rice in Mon State. Between this year’s flooding, and rising rice and paddy land prices, farmers in these areas are facing near-destitution. In addition, the farmers also face forced labor, money extortion, forced assistance in planting  of the Burmese Army’s paddies, and confiscation of property by the local authorities and troops.

Nai Phae’, of Kamawet village, said, “I planted 20 acres in this year; therefore I need to hire two people to help with my farm [full time]. I pay one of them 100 baskets of rice for a year, and I pay the other one 75 basket of rice for a year. I invested 1,200,000 kyat in my farm this year. I hired 25 people to transplant my farm over 10 days. I paid them 3,000 kyat for each per day. Last year, I could produce 1,200 basket of rice. I think this year this probably will decrease. In our area, there are about 3,000 acres of paddies flooded.”

Nai Thein Mong, Thoemia village, Mudon Township, said, “I owned 24 acres of paddy field. I hired two workers to help me with my rainy season paddy plantation. I agreed to pay them 125 basket of rice per year. I invested about 600,000 to plant the rainy season paddies, that included fertilizer and hiring the people who were transplanting. Because of flooding, 5 acres of my paddy field have been destroyed.”

Nai Win Oo, a Kwankapwe villager in Mudon Township, said, “I hired one worker to care for my paddy field. I invested about 500,000 kyat; that included hiring transplanting workers for 3,500 kyat a day and a package of fertilizer for 20,000 kyat to start my rainy season paddy plantation this year. Last year, I got 500 baskets of rice from my farm. 5 acres of my paddy had been destroying this year so I can’t know how much rice will we get.”

Nai Htaw Rot, Pharouk villages, Moulmein Township, said, “I had 10 acres of paddy field. I hired one worker and gave him 80 baskets of rice. I bought 3 packages of fertilizers for 20,000 kyat each. As for the 15 paddy transplanting workers, I paid 3,000 kyat for a person each day. It was ten days until we finished transplanting. Last year, I produced 450 baskets of rice I don’t know how many basket of rice we will get for this year. About 700 acres of paddy field are still left around our area, others were flooded.”

Nai Win, Kwantar villager, Mudon Township, said, “I hired two workers to develop my 15 acres of paddy fields this year. We had agreed to pay 100 baskets of rice for each worker for the year. I invested 700,000 kyat for planting the rainy season paddies this year. I harvested 1,200 baskets of rice last year. I don’t think we will get the same amount of last year. This year we wasted more than previous years. I had paid 2,500 kyat to hire transplanting workers, but I agreed to feed them breakfast and lunch. In our areas, we about 500 acres of paddy fields flooded.”

Nai Nyut Mine, a Kowkapone villager from Mudon Township, said, “I planted 10 acres of paddy fields this year. I hired two workers for 300,000 kyat per year. In addition, 500,000 kyat was spent on fertilizers. Last years, I harvested 450 basket of rice. I also had to pay 2,500 kyat to hire transplanting workers and fed them breakfast and lunch.”

Said Nai Khun Bo, 47 years old, Kohdon village, Kyaikmayaw Township.

“The main reason for flooding was heavy rain and the water overflowed onto the paddy field. The water in the Artaran River was rising up and could not flow out easily, therefore our plantation flooded for about 35 days. Last year there was also flooding, but it was just a few days long and the water run out drained out from the plantation fields. Also this year flooding is exactly in time for paddy pollination steps so the paddy was easy to destroy. I wasted about 400,000 kyat on fertilizers and hired the workers. I just put fertilizers in a week before the flooding. The agriculture manager in the areas ordered us to replant our plantations. But, we don’t have any money to re-start our farm project again. I just hope to get enough rice for our family to survive. We also have been loaned others people’s money. Now, I don’t know where will we get the money to pay them back. It’s impossible to replant again because now is September, where do we get enough rain to replant our paddy again. Even though they will arrest me, I won’t replant again.”

Paung, Mudon, Kyaikmayaw Township are the main rice producers in Mon State. Because of heavy rain in August, most of the paddy field in those areas was flooded. Most of the townships’ farmers hope to get enough rice for themselves and their families, but this year’s terrible circumstances are making even the possibility of basic survival questionable. Most of the farmers in Tarana, Kawdon, Kawpanaw, Maekaro, Kawone, Khonemanin, Kyoneone, and Nedon villages,  in Kyaikmayaw township had been facing the same problems as Nai Khun Bo. Most of farmers in the area have had their paddy fields destroyed by flooding.

Said Ko Kyaw Aye Htun, 40 years old, Kawpanaw villager, Kyaikmayaw Township.

“Because of heavy rains in August, the river overflowed onto our paddy field. If we look at around our paddy field, we didn’t see our rice plants just water overflowing onto it. I’m very unhappy about that. I planted 10 acres of paddy fields but after the water level decreased only one acre of paddy field was growing, all the rest died during the flooding. I had invested about 70,000 kyat per acre. I didn’t have the money to invest that amount so I borrowed other people’s money to start farming this year. Now, nothing left for me. I am in debt about 500,000 kyat to other people. I don’t know how to get that a mount of money to pay them back. My wife is forcing me to work in Thailand.”

According Ko Kyaw Aye, about 200 farmers and 1,500 acres of rainy season paddy fields had been flooded in that area. “Don’t tell us to replant again, the rice was destroyed in the field and we don’t want to clean it. We are depressed by doing farm work this year,” he added.

Burmese Government Abuse

Despite the losses of Mon State’s farmers, the SPDC has instituted a policy of repairing lost paddy fields, in hopes of meeting last year’s production quota and because of possible governmental surveys from high level agricultural administrators in heavily farmed areas (regardless of flood losses).

In the first week of September, the Township Pace and Development council (TPDC) held a meeting with the Burmese government’s Agriculture Manager. They analyzed how the flooding affected the area’s rice production, conferred with the Burmese Agricultural Department, and analyzed how much rice Burma was expected to produce and sell this year. After surveying the dismal production numbers, the TPDC ordered the farmers to achieve the agricultural output the government had previousl expected for the year; the farmers were forced to replant.

Said 70-year-old Oo Myint Kyaw who owns 25 acres of farm fields in Tarana villager, Kyaikmayaw Township:

“The situation created more problems for the farmers. Although the farmer faced the flooding of their paddy fields and losing their plantations, the local authorities never came and asked us if we needed support and help.” Oo Myint Kyaw’s paddy plantation is the township where Burma’s agricultural department likes to lead plantation tours, because the paddy fields are located near the motor road.

Oo Myint Kyaw also said,
“They [agriculture committee] are irresponsible. They just know how benefit to themselves. Because they forced me to be “show” my paddy plantation, I patiently drew the planting lines get them to be straight lines and to look beautiful. I owned 25 acres of land but 10 acres of land I needed to plant to “show” the plantation to the Agriculture committee. I spent 80,000 kyat per acre. I also used 3 to 4 packages of fertilizer per acre. In August, when the heavy rain occurred, no one from the Agriculture committee came to look at the field. Two day ago, they came to look around but they didn’t give any help and support.”

One of the government Agriculture managers in the area claimed that there have been about 10,000 acres of rice paddies destroyed by flooding between Kamarwat and Naine Hlone village. He said, “I feel sorry for the farmers. If we look at the current commodity prices now, it will cost a lot of money to restart their farm to produce enough rice to please the state. We can estimate how much money they lost on their farms this year. Next year rice prices will rise and our consumers will also face difficulties; therefore, the government should give support to the farmers to replant their plantations again. However, the local authorities have forced farmers to replant to boost production in the damaged areas.”

A famer from Mudon Township went on to explain “Now they force the farmers to use Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) seeds to replant the destroyed plantations. It will cause more problems for the farmer. The local authorities just want to achieve their desired production amounts.” Despite the fact that it grows quickly, many farmers are hesitant to use GMO rice, as it is not as popular with consumers. Farmers also have to keep their seeds for replanting, which means that once they start planting with GMO rice, their future crops will be compromised.

According to U Yone, 65 years old from Kohdon village, Kyaikmayaw Township, “I have been farming the whole of my life, but I never was satisfied with outcome of farming. We rarely had leftover money from selling our rice. The reason we did not make money from our farming is because a couple of years ago, we took out loans from the government to pay for paddy fields.  We also have to pay for extortion money for local authorities, forced labor, and village security. The money that we get from selling our rice was used as extortion money. This is the same situation with the  paddy purchasing loans. With the heavy rains in this year, we lost 15 acre of our farm. We can’t afford the money and human resources to replant again. I think our family will be starving in the coming years. Hopefully, the Township agricultural committee will not forced us to plant again.”

Additional Burdens for Mon State’s Farmers
Forcing Farmers to Guard the Gas Pipeline
In addition to forcing farmers to deal with the repercussions of this year’s flooding and the trails of replanting without governmental economic assistance, the Burmese government has placed additional burdens on the shoulders of Mon State’s agricultural communities by forcing famers to assume responsibility for the maintenance and security of its Kanbauk-Myaigkalay gas pipeline; farmers are also expected contribute their labor to the Burmese government-owned rice paddies.

To avoid a possible explosion and leak of the Kanbauk-Myaigkalay gas pipeline, or attacks from armed groups, the local SPDC Township authorities have ordered the village civilians between Ye and Thanbyuzayat Townships to guard the pipeline. The gas pipeline starts at the Kanbauk gas field in Tenasserim Division, runs through Mon State, and eventually provides gas to a cement factory in Pa-an Township of Karen State. The pipeline route passes through into many townships in Mon State such as Ye, Thanbyuzayat and Mudon townships; it cuts through many of the townships’ orchards, rubber plantations, and paddy fields.   The poorly constructed pipeline has occasionally burst or been damaged by rebel forces. Due to this damage to the pipeline, the Burmese Army in the area concerned has instructed local civilians to increase security in the area. Each household is forced to guard the pipeline for 24 hours as part of a rotating schedule, and village headmen order households who miss their turn to guard the pipeline out of their villages.

According to Maung Aye, 34, a rainy season paddy farmer from Waewinkara village, farmers in the area have been ordered by the Burmese Army to fence the pipeline, to cover the pipeline with soil, and to maintain security around it.  Farmers who fail to perform these duties are punished, even during the emergency situation of the August floods.

Due to the army’s orders, some farmers have to hire day-laborers from the village and pay them to handle burying duties; the greater the length of pipeline that passes through a particular farm, the greater the labor costs for that particular farmer. The labor cost for one day is about 3,500 Kyat and the farmers have to pay for all labor costs (Maung aye said he spent 7,000 Kyat for two days hiring day laborers to complete his pipeline duties). After spending extra money to hire laborers to handle their shares of the pipeline duties, farmers are even less able to pay for the costs of replanting their rice paddies after the flooding.

Nai Bloh, 56, a paddy farmer from Doma village in the southern part of Mudon Township, said he has to spend a lot of money in labor costs to cover the gas pipeline with soil and bamboo every year. This year, he had spent almost 70,000 kyat  for his share of  pipeline maintenance. “It is too much for me to spend this money on fencing and covering the gas pipeline but I have no courage to act against their orders. Otherwise, my five acres of paddy lands will be confiscated,” Nai Bloh explained.

Farmers Forced to Work on the Burmese Army’s Farms
Farmers whose lands are situated near those owned by government authorities, or land owned by the Burmese Army, are always forced to labor on these lands as well as there own.1 The farmers are constantly forced into performing a variety of activities on the government’s or army’s farms for entire cultivation periods. When the authorities or army celebrate an important occasion related to agriculture, the farmers are again forced to contribute their labor.  For example, in the second week of June 2009, Army officers from Waekali based No. 4 Military Training Center ordered Waekali village committee to send 45 farmers (both men and women) to plough and plant rainy season paddies on 15 acres of land owned by the battalion.

“Our village had to send 45 farmers to work for No. 4 Military battalion owned paddy fields with no payment. It took two week to finish our duty of ploughing and then planting the paddy seeds. I heard that farmers from other village were forced to work in the battalion’s paddy farms as well.” Nai Kon Blai, a Waekali resident reported.

During the entire cultivation period of various crops – rice, peanut, corn, cane and others – local authorities or the Burmese Army’s battalions always use the farmers or the civilians in the area as laborers.   The villagers or the local civilians are forced to work on a rotating, unpaid basis.  Normally, this type of forced labor starts in June when the rainy season begins, and ends in November or December of harvest season.  Between their duties on SPDC-owned farms, farmers in Mon State have little time to undertake the the arduous process of cleaning and replanting their paddy fields after the August floods.

Opinions

Despite the SPDC-ordered replanting efforts, many area farmers believe that such widespread flooding and loss of paddy crop will have long-term negative consequences for farmers and their families throughout Mon state.  HURFOM field reporters spoke with region’s farmers, many who voiced their expert opinions on the widespread impacts would be of the destruction of this year’s rice crop.

Ye Win, 35 years old, Burmese, said to reporter:

“For sure, in 2010 there will food crisis in Mon State. Farmers cannot produce enough rice for people in this area. Another thing is that if there is not enough rice from Mon State, people will import rice from other states. Prices will increase from transportation and resale costs. Also, there are more people here.  The population has been increasing in Mon state.  Middle Burma people are coming to Mon state to find work.

According to U Nyein Ngwe, who owns 15-acres of rice paddies, al totally damaged by flooding, he has never faced this level of damage the whole of his career as a farmer life. He estimated that this year flooding will cause huge problems for the farmers in Mon State.

“I spent about 70,000 kyat per acre. I planted 15 acres for this year. I really hope for a good outcome for this year. About 70,000 kyat is including fertilizer cost, paddy-transplanting workers cost. If the authorities forced us to replant again, I can only afford two acres. If I combined all the costs of what we lost for this year, it would cost about 1,000,000 kyat. Although they want us to replant our plantation, it’s too late to replant our plantation. If we replant again we must wait for another 5 months to get to this step again. It’s possible to replant again. We don’t want to loose a second time of our plantation.”

“For this years plantation, we had been borrowing some money to buy fertilizer and rent some people for transplanting for the 15 acres of plantation. This year we lost everything,” U Nyein Ngwe added.
Other villagers around Paung Township also have been facing similar problems.

A Paung  Township rice trader claims:

“Next year rice prices will rise, and that this year’s harvest will not produce enough rice. If there is not enough rice from Mon State, rice from Pegu Township and Thailand will have to be imported into Burma. If we estimate all the transportation costs and trader benefits, the rice prices will rise enormously next year, I think. Even the farmers will need to buy rice for themselves.”

Conclusion:

As a crucial part of Burma’s economy and a key element of peoples diet’s throughout the region, the widespread loss of rice crops in Mon state has and will continue to be devastating to the region.  Not only have the livelihoods of numerous farmers been destroyed, but the loss of a crucial crop will be a dire knock to the region’s economic stability and will threaten Burma’s people with widespread malnourishment and starvation.

While the extreme seasonal rain is clearly the fault of no one, the losses caused by the subsequent flooding, and the failure of dams designed specifically to prevent such flooding, are the responsibility of the Burmese government. Rather than meeting this disaster head-on, and addressing the current and potential future consequences of this catastrophe, the SPDC has pursued of a policy of deluded ignorance. By forcing villagers to replant a second crop that they cannot afford to plant, in season that will end before the crop can mature, the SPDC administration has demonstrated its characteristic lack of comprehension of the most basic domestic and economic processes.  In addition, forcing farmers hard-hit by the crop loss to turn their attention to repairing and guarding the Kanbauk-Myaingkalay natural gas pipeline drains what little money farmers might have saved, and undermines farmers’ efforts to recover from this year’s loss.

A clear-cut solution to this disaster is not forthcoming, and tragically it will negatively impact thousands of lives across Mon State.  For this reason HURFOM hopes to emphasize the significance of the Burmese government’s responsibility in exacerbating the effects of the flooding in Mon state, and its culpability in future negative domestic and economic developments.

Introduction

Burma’s military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is notorious for its oppression of the democratic opposition led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and for human rights violations against ethnic nationalities who participate in liberation movements. In response to these violations and constant suppression, citizens are continually fleeing Burma.

There are over 1 million Burmese migrants working illegally and unsafely in Thailand1. Nearly 140,0002 refugees from assorted Burmese ethnic groups are seeking shelter in Thailand’s refugee camps and over 500,0003 people are displaced on Burma’s eastern border.

The following report details the many ways in which children, living in Burma or in migrant communities, are sexually harassed and abused due to the unstable environment created by the SPDC.

Background (Conflict and migration)

In Burma, armed conflict has occurred throughout Shan State, Kayeh (Karenni State), Karen State, Mon State and Tenasserism Division, where millions of members of ethnic minorities are living. The SPDC has named these conflict zones ‘Black Areas’, denoting their “unsecured” nature. The SPDC subsequently uses this to justify the numerous human rights violations it commits in the areas.

Your browser may not support display of this image. In Mon State since 2000, the SPDC has deployed over 20 military battalions. Additionally, they have implemented a population transfer project under which Burman workers are relocated Mon areas to replace Mon workers who have migrated to Thailand. Many retired SPDC personnel have been allowed to stay in Mon villages, and have been given ‘authority’ by local Burmese army commanders. In many cases, these retired Burmese soldiers and Burman migrant workers sexually harass and beat children.rmese migrant workers at a seafood production factory in Mahachai

Burmese migrant workers at a seafood production factory in MahachaiFacing widespread human rights violations, conflict, economic hardship and taxation, many Mon and other ethnic minorities decide to flee illegally to Thailand for better incomes and new jobs. In order to avoid police, they travel through jungles, rivers, and mountains.

Regularly children are withdrawn from school and the entire family migrates in search of new jobs. Of the thousands of migrant workers that move daily into Thailand, an uncountable number are children. Since the general population in Burma is unaware of any laws condemning ‘child labor’ or that the Burmese government has signed the Convention on the Rights of Children (CRC), children also migrate to Thailand for work.

It is very difficult for migrants to obtain legal status, and the majority work illegally in unsafe conditions in Thailand.  Female migrants face additional difficulties, as they cannot always find work and many of them have to rely on their husbands, fathers and male friends for survival. Most female migrants stay in narrow rooms, in rented houses that are not secure. Because of these unsafe conditions, females living in the migrant communities of Thailand are often raped or sexually harassed by neighbors, Thai police or gangs.

Some Thai and international NGOs have helped workers in Thai migrant communities prevent sexual violence and abuse. However, because the migrant communities are so large, it is difficult to prevent harassment in every location.

Children are particularly vulnerable in Southern Burma

Conflict Zones or ‘Black Areas’

Armed conflict is fairly constant in Southern Burma. The New Mon State Party (NMSP), the largest Mon ethnic political group, agreed to a ceasefire with the SPDC in 1995, although several Mon splinter groups continue to fight with the SPDC creating conflict zones with in Mon State. Similarly, the SPDC, by collaborating with Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), a Karen ceasefire group, has launched a military offensive against the main Karen rebel group, Karen National Union (KNU). The offensive has created several conflict zones within Karen state. ‘Black areas’ also litter parts of Tenesserim division, within which the SPDC regularly fights with Mon and other ethnic minority groups.

The SPDC is constantly active in Ye Township in Mon State and in Yebyu Township in Tenesserim Division. When the SPDC launches military offensives in these conflict zones, the villagers endure various violations. Children are often sexually assaulted and or beaten, while men and women are taken as porters, or accused of being rebel supporters and killed.

Your browser may not support display of this image. An example, taken from a report made by the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), is detailed below:

Burmese Army troops in northern Tenesserim Division forced all residents of Amae village (Mae Taw village in Burmese) to abandon their homes and plantations in November. On the same day, the troops raped a 17-year-old girl and severely beat a young man.

Captain Pan Zar and 80 troops from Infantry Battalion (IB) No.107 entered the village on November 11, 2008. After accusing the residents of supporting an armed Mon rebel group in the area, the troops ordered the villagers to relocate. Each household was also ordered to pay the soldiers 50,000 kyat, and the residents were prohibited from visiting farms and plantations in the area.

The villagers were given virtually no time to prepare for their departure. sources said they left the next day, bringing only what they could carry and leaving behind the majority of their belongings, as well the timber and other valuable construction materials in their homes.

The soldiers assaulted at least one villager as they ordered the villagers to relocate. “One young man from the village asked the captain, ‘if you do like this, where will we go to live?’ said an eyewitness from Amae. “The captain replied, ‘you can go and live anywhere, but not in this area. After that he grabbed the young man and hit him in the head with the butt of his rifle. Once the young man had fallen down, the captain hit the young man’s leg and it broke.”

According to another source, soldiers also raped a 17-year-old girl as she worked on a betel-nut plantation nearby. The resident, who spoke with the victim’s mother and then quoted her to HURFOM, said that she was crying as  time she told the story. “My daughter is only 17-years-old. She was raped by 7 soldiers,” the source quoted the mother. “Those soldiers are not humans. They are like animals. They are the same as evil, both the captain and his soldiers. My daughter nearly died, and now she has tried to kill herself many times.”

The 60 households found themselves in extra-ordinarily difficult circumstances. “Now we are in a very bad situation because we could not take much food or household things. And we have not much money. We also have to find land to live on and all new materials for building a home. It is so expensive we cannot afford it,” said a former resident. “Now I am staying at my friend’s house, but I cannot stay there for a long time. I have to find a way to solve the roblem – I want to migrate to Thailand to find a job, but I have no money even for transportation. My wife, my two sons and I have no idea where we will go.”

This is only one of many stories from Tenasserim Division, although many Mon families have suffered. Mon and Karen human rights workers cannot travel freely to several parts of Southern Burma, and as a result the majority of sexual assaults remain largely undocumented.

Non-Conflict Zones in Mon State

An increasing number of children in Mon areas have been sexually harassed, following the increased deployment of Burmese Army battalions in Mon State, part of the Army’s implementation of the ‘population transfer project’.

Your browser may not support display of this image. Hundreds of Burmans from Central Burma, (Pegu and Rangoon Divisions) have migrated to Mon State seeking jobs, as workers in Mon state are paid better than workers in other parts of Burma. A day can earn 1,500 kyat per day in Central Burma, while they could earn 3,000 to 3,500 kyat per day in a non-conflict zone in Mon state.

Migrant workers are employed at a variety of locations in Mon State; rice paddy fields, rubber and orchard plantations, transportation jobs, brick-making factories, etc. They also live on the rice paddy fields, plantations and in the forests near the villages. Several reports have been made about migrant workers stealing from or harming local Mon State villagers. Because of such activities, children are not safe in their homes, while traveling to the rice paddy fields, while working or living on the plantations, or at the factories.

Below is an example from Kya Inn Seikyi Township in Karen State:

In November 2008, a 15-year-old girl was raped and savagely murdered by a Burman man. A 47-year-old eyewitness from Innk Gwa village, Kyar Inn Seik Kyi Township explained the event.

The girl was from Pakapaw village, Kyar Inn Seik Kyi Township, also known as Moulmein district in the New Mon State Party Controlled Area.  The girl worked as a beef seller, and on the day she was killed, had gone to her uncle’s village to sell beef. At 4:00 pm after the shop was closed, her uncle sent her back to her village before returning home himself.

On the return trip she was raped by a 33-year-old Burman man. After raping her, he killed her by striking her on the head with a machete. According to the eyewitness, “I saw him throw her dead body into a field at a farm which is very close to the village. I think it happened around 5 or 6 pm. I ran and collected some farmers who were working around there and we arrested him and brought him to the New Mon State Party (NMSP) Moulmein district headquarters.”  The crime of rape and murder will most likely result in an extended jail sentence, though the length of a possible sentence could not be confirmed.

“We feel sorry for the Burman people and offer them jobs and allow them to live in our village. Sadly, a girl in our village was raped and brutally killed by a Burman man.  Before, our village was a very peaceful place.  But now as more Burman people have moved in, we have been cheated, had our motorbikes stolen, faced outright hostility, and now one of us has been killed” a source reported, who had recently spoken to a villager from the area.

He added, “Most of the migrant workers are from upper Burma and are working here or in other villages in the area.” He surmised, “There are approximately 1,000 Burman people in our village, and have increased in population this year”.

The source also reported a villager saying “Most of our villagers migrated to Thailand and left their farms and homes. We have a shortage of workers and therefore we must use the migrant workers who arrive from upper Burma looking for work.

In some cases, even though the village headmen inform the commanders of local military battalions of criminal conduct and abuses, their complaints are not taken seriously, and detained culprits are not arrested or prosecuted.

In some areas, Burmese battalion commanders appoint Burman migrant workers as village headmen, or as heads of local militia forces. Community leaders then lose their authority and control of the villagers.

Sexual harassment in Mon migrant workers’ communities

Domestic Violence

In Thailand, migrant workers have very restricted accommodations and of them live in fear because they do not have work-permit cards. When an entire family migrates to Thailand, they usually live in very narrow houses or rooms. There is no separate space or private areas in these living situations. Father, mother and children all share the same space. In such circumstances, girls often face sexual harassment from male relatives.

In the example below a father repeatedly attempts to rape his 14-year-old daughter:

On December 28th 2008, a 14-year-old girl, Ma K—T—W—, was raped by her father in Mahachai, Samut Sakhon Province, Thailand.

Your browser may not support display of this image.

The girl, a Burmese migrant teenager, was raped in December while her mother was in the hospital. According to a neighbor, “Her father tried to rape her many times until he succeeded while his wife was in the hospital. After she had been raped, she dared not to tell her mother and was also afraid of being raped again; she ran away from home with the help of a Thai man.”

The girl’s mother called her and asked her to return home. She also asked why she ran away with the Thai man. The girl told her mother the reasons and explained that she was afraid to be home alone. Her mother then sent her to a village in Mon State.

A few months later she returned to Thailand to help her sick mother. One day, her mother went to a celebration with relatives and left her in the house. At around 3:00 p.m., after the girl had finished taking a bath, her drunken father tried  again to rape her.

The girl escaped and immediately phoned her aunt and asked for her mother to come back home. Her mother knew the reason and though she wanted to complain to her husband, she was afraid of being beaten and dared not to inform Thai police.

Your browser may not support display of this image. Her concerned neighbors, however, informed the Labor Right Promotion Network (LPN) and asked to have him arrested.

According to a source close to the victim, “Her mother doesn’t want to put her husband in jail because she is sick and relies on him. She couldn’t survive without his help, though he committed rape many times and needs to be punished. Therefore, LPN board members are not permitted to set him free.”

In some situations, because of financial and tradition circumstances wives do not challenge their husbands actions.

Gang rape

Migrant communities in Thailand are not properly protected and many families fear the local authorities. To avoid precarious situations, migrants usually stay in their rented rooms until leaving for work. Local gangs are aware that the migrant communities are not properly protected, and their members often exploit defenseless migrant families.

In the instance below, gang members in Bangkok pretended to be Thai police officers and raped a young girl:

A 12-year-old Burmese migrant child was gang raped by 5 Thai men posing as police in Minburi Sub-district, Bangkok.

Early in the morning, at around 2 a.m. on May 2nd, a group of 5 men came to the apartment where a Burmese migrant family was living. Pretending they were Thai policemen coming to check their work permit cards, they ordered the workers to open the door.  Upon entering they half-heartedly checked work permit cards, ignoring some of the residents, and proceeded to search each room.

According to the aunt who was living with the child, “They captured the two children by showing us their guns and they stole a mobile phone which cost around 5,000baht as well as another 25,000baht in cash.” The girl who is from Ye township, works with her aunt at a construction site in Minburi, while her mother works farther away in Bangkok.

The men then drove away with the two children and after a few minutes stopped their car near a banana farm.  One man held the 18-year-old boy at gunpoint while the others took the girl out beside the road. According to the 18-year-old boy, each of the men then raped the young girl.

“During the rape she nearly lost consciousness because of the pain. After they raped her, they left both children on the side of the road with 100baht to get a ride back home. The girl was so terrified she couldn’t speak,” said the victim’s aunt.

Lost and unable to get back home, the children proceeded to walk along the road.  Back home the aunt had prepared a search party to sweep the neighborhood, and luckily found the two children at about 6am.

The 5 men were not immediately followed for fear an encounter would bring additional violence. The Burmese workers were also worried about being arrested as some of them did not posses a work permit card.

Additionally the victim’s mother didn’t want to contact the police about the case because, as a migrant worker, if the police needed to question her about the incident, she would have to go to the police station. Leaving work and missing that time could result in the loss of her job.

The migrant family did inform their employer about the incident, but he took no action other than to send the child to the hospital for a medical check. The employer never contacted the police for fear the 5 men might have actually been police officers. He was concerned that if they were real police the men would make problems for him and his business, as well as the potential loss of face over the incident.

However the doctor who preformed the medical examination informed the employer that in fact the rape of the 12-year-old was not a small issue, and because of its significance the police should be contacted

When workers from Burma migrate to Thailand, they do not want to leave their children alone with other villagers. In some cases parents have withdrawn their kids from schools so that the families can migrate together. When they arrive in Thailand, the children are not able to attend school and are too young to work in factories. Therefore, children have to stay alone in the apartments, rental houses or play grounds. Children in these situations are extremely vulnerable to attacks, sexual harassment, or exploitation by traffickers.

Sexual assaults by employers

In Thailand, many migrant women are sexually abused or raped by their employers. They rarely report the abuses, and as a result sexual harassment is on the rise among female Burmese migrants in Thailand.

In some cases, when the Thai wives are absent from their homes, the domestic workers are repeatedly raped and harassed by the Thai husbands. In some instances wives allow their husbands to harass the domestic worker; some Thai wives believe that it is normal for a Thai man to have a minor wife.

It is dangerous for under-aged girls to be domestic workers. Below is an instance of a Thai man sexually assaulting a young girl:

On July 7th, 2008, a 16-year-old Mon woman working in Zin Song Bun village, Om Noi Su-district, Krathum Bean district, Samut Sakhon Province, Thailand was abused and sexual harassed by her employer, during a routine massage.

Mi Win, worked as a house keeper and was also in charge of taking care of a 60-year-old patient. The patient suffered from a number of ailments and could no longer walk. Part of her duty included daily massages, and moving him from his bed to his wheelchair. She was required to follow him should he need assistance.

According to Mi Win, “He had touched my breasts and hugged me three or four times before. This was the fourth time he tried to sexually abuse me during 10 months of working there. I was so afraid I quit my job.”

She went on, “I am not only taking care of the patient, I also have to work from 6 am until well after dark. I have to do a lot of house work including sweeping, washing clothes, and I have to bathe their dogs three times a week. It is a lot of work for 3,000 baht and I was exhausted every day. However, I had to deal with it to support my poor family in Burma.”

Mi Win comes from Karen State, Ha-An Township and has been working as a house keeper in Thailand for about a year and a half.

Many female migrants are stuck in domestic work and encounter sexual harassment. Often times they have little to no contact with their friends and do not know how to flee. Additionally, many of them do not leave their employers houses, do not have work-permits, and are afraid of losing their jobs or being arrested by the police.

Childhood sexual abuse on the Thai-Burma border and in Burma’s rural communities

Instances of sexual abuse with in Burma are hard to document because of the controlled press, the limited number of organizations specializing on children’s rights and cultural boundaries that frequently restrict and confuse abused children. In interviews with NGOs on the border, WCRP gathered important information about ongoing childhood abuse and victims’ recovery processes.

The approach and abuse

In most refugee camps and border villages, refugees and villagers’ shelters are narrow and provide little or no safety for the female population. Commonly, while parents head to work children are left at home alone, or with relatives. Because of the lack of safety and parental supervision, social and relief workers in border areas have noticed an increase of sexually abused children.

A Mon woman community leader, from Three Pagodas Pass explained:

Your browser may not support display of this image. “I often heard about the sexual harassment toward girls in the villages. Most of the girls are parentless. Their parents left to go to Thailand and they stay with relatives, sometimes with elderly grandpas and grandmas. The men who tried to rape them firstly bought some food or came to the door and pretended to be the child’s parent. Then, they have an opportunity, and they rape them.

“Many children never… speak out about what has happened to them after being sexually harassed. Like the new leaves on a tree are destroyed, the children seriously suffer ‘mental stresses’. They are afraid to meet with people or to stay alone and the avoid staying near men.”

Sexual abuse is not always blatant; often in border communities neighbors or family members are the predators.

In the following example a little girl is raped by her neighbor:

In January 2008, on the Burmese side of the Thai-Burma border town, Three Pagodas Pass, a 4-year-old Burman girl was raped by her neighbor, a 30-year-old Burman.

The victim lived with her mother in a small rented house. Everyday the girl biked home from nursery school and waited for her mother to return from the factory. While waiting, the child would often play at the neighbor man’s house.

By promising a toy, the neighbor man lured the waiting girl to a secluded shaded area behind his house. There he held the child on his lap and raped her. After the man released the girl, she returned home to wait for her mother.

The mother was completely unaware of the assault.

2 days later the mother overheard her child crying during urination. She immediately examined her daughter’s vagina and noticed severe injuries. The girl then explained that the neighbor man “put his stick” inside her.

They immediately went to the free hospital in Paline Japan where a medic contacted Stop Violence Against Women Program (VAW).

VAW took the child and mother to Kwai River Christian Hospital in Sangkhlaburi and paid for their transportation, food and medical cost. There a doctor confirmed that a man had penetrated the young girl and tested for dieses.

Burmese township authority arrested the man and he was tried at a court in Three Pagodas Pass Town. It has not been confirmed whether or not he was sentenced to jail time.

Abused children need to learn how to identify perpetrators. If girls are harassed by their fathers, step-fathers or a man from the neighboring house, they have few opportunities to relate their stories or receive help.

Because it is difficult for migrants and people living in border communities to collect evidence and prove a rape, offenders often go free and continue to abuse children.

While rape is a common form of child abuse, sexual assault can have many forms which parents and community members should be aware of. The child rights coordinator from Human Rights Education Institute of Burma gave WCRP a few examples of sexual abuses they have documented:

· Children are threatened or lured away from the community and raped.

· Inappropriate but non-violent touching

· Photographing naked children.

· Watching pornography with children.

Parents, community leaders, religious leaders, villagers and teachers need to be extensively educated about sexual abuse. Additionally, school teachers must understand the nature of sexual abuse, so they can explain, warn, and protect their students.

Mental and physical suffering

Children, especially girls, that are sexually abused suffer from severe mental and physical problems. Rarely are there organizations within Burma equipped to handle these post-trauma problems. The director of Social Action for Women (SAW), an organization that provides protection for children, explained to WCRP;

“Most sexually abused children suffer mental problems. Soon after the harassment happens, we have found that they suffered from ‘fear’. They felt so afraid of men and would not like to stand in front of a group of people. They felt there is a black spot (unlucky turn) in their lives.”

Children who are sexually harassed are commonly too terrified to tell their parents. They are afraid of their parents’ punishments and accusations of carelessness. In some cases girls are unknowingly pregnant.

According to a field coordinator from the Labor Rights Promotion Network (LPN) “after a child is sexually abused they feel helpless, frightened and extremely insecure.” He added “The number of child rape cases are increasing in migrant areas and the assailant is usually a family neighborhood character.”

If NGOs knew a child was being harassed then they could protect the child from the predator. Mental suffering is a long-term issue and communities need to have recovery or rehabilitation centers to treat the children’s mental and physical ailments.

Physically, children can be infected with sexually transmitted diseases, specifically HIV/AIDS, and endure strenuous injuries. Child protection NGOs and healthcare workers examine injuries, test for diseases, provide medical assistance and safe houses in some areas. Most children who are saved by NGOs or other authorities need immediate medical and physical treatment or rehabilitation. Unfortunately, it is difficult for children in the migrant communities of Thailand and almost impossible for children in Southern parts of Burma to contact NGOs, and consequently most sexual assaults go untreated.

Conclusion and suggestions for future protection of children

If abuse from the SPDC continues, and unsafe living conditions persist in the migrant communities of Thailand and Southern Burma, then children will continue to suffer.

Within migrant communities, the Thai authority should be creating a safe environment and an atmosphere of security rather than one of fear. At the same time, the SPDC should be protecting the rights of children, promoting these rights, and adhering to the CRC. Currently the regime constantly violates the convention, and no one holds them accountable.

Until the SPDC changes its actions, or an international force holds them responsible for the uncountable human rights violations it commits, children in Southern parts of Burma will continue to be raped and assaulted.

1 Human Rights Foundation of Monland; Without a Choice: Increased economic migration from Mon State to Thailand, September 2008

2 Thai-Burma Border Consortium

3 Thai-Burma Border Consortium

INTRODUCTION

It is not easy to make any claim that Burma is a nation free of violence and armed conflict.  However the Burmese military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), often cites the successful brokering of 15 ceasefires with armed insurgent groups, who have been brought ‘back into the legal fold’ throughout the late 80’s and early 90’s, as proof that it has brought peace to Burma. These ceasefires have radically altered the landscape of the civil war in Burma by bringing the direct conflict with most of the ethnic armed groups to a close.  However what has resulted is not peace, but a quieter violence, between smaller insurgent groups that did not sign ceasefires, and the Burmese army.  This supposed peace has been characterized by continued violence and abuse conducted against civilians in parts of Karen State, Mon State, and Tennaserim Division who have been trapped between insurgent groups, and the Burmese policy of total destruction of its opposition. During August, the Human Rights Foundation of Monland-Burma (HURFOM) has focused its concern on the continuing abuses and serious human rights violations in Southern Burma and would like to highlight ongoing rights abuses faced by the local inhabitants and the consequences these have on the livelihoods of these residents.  HURFOM field reporters have been documenting instances of forced relocation, land and property confiscation, arbitrary extortion and sexual violence through the testimonies of these individual victims, since March 2009.

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SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The scope of testimonies and cases in this report have been gathered by HURFOM field reporters inside Burma in the areas of Yebyu and Ye townships inside southern Burma. Accounts of abuse were documented though interviews conducted by three filed reporters in targeted areas or through interviews with victims who had already fled their homes to either other safer villages or the Thai-Burma boarder. Real names are not included to protect the identity of those involved. Due to an increase in the number of SPDC army camps and seriously restricted travel in the targeted areas, the data collected here is a sample of the much broader systematic abuses conducted by Burmese army forces.

BACKGROUND

Beginning in early December 2008, various Burmese army battalions, managed by the SPDC’s Military Operations Management Command (MOMC) No. 8[1] of the coastal regiment command, have launched a sustained offensive against Mon armed insurgent groups and the KNLA[2] troops in the areas between the northern Yebyu of Tenasserim division and southern part of Ye Township, Mon State.   By the end of July 2009, the continuous offensive had affected nearly 30% of the total population, displacing over 30,000[3] ethnic Mon, Karen and Tavoyan civilians due to serious human rights violations.

In this offensive, the Burmese Army’s, Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) No. 282, 273, and Infantry Battalion (IB) No. 31, which is based at Khaw Zar sub-township of Ye township, sent nearly 800 troops into the areas to launch attacks against 70 soldiers from the Mon insurgent armed groups [4] Rahmonya and Nai Chen Deng, and smaller unnamed insurgent groups. Additionally, Burmese Navy forces from Mawyawaddy (navy troops) based at Moulmein, Mon State, also committed several cases of human rights abuses against local villagers from northern Tenasserim Division and southern Ye township. This well organized military campaign has been aimed, not only to win the continued war against insurgent groups, but, according to local military watchdog groups, as psychosocial campaign against the civilian population to end support by Mon villagers for the insurgent groups.

This campaign of purposeful rights violations by the Burmese Army has come to embody a policy similar to the ‘Four Cuts’ campaign that began in 1989. The ‘Four Cuts’ campaign, called “Hpyat lay hpyat”, was designed effectively as a scorched earth offensive, starving insurgent groups of food, recruits, information, and shelter.  Areas subject to the campaign were declared ‘free-fire zones’ by the SPDC, giving Burmese soldiers free reign to commit abuses against villagers and ‘shoot to kill’, making little distinction between insurgent soldiers, and regular civilians. Entire swaths of the area were cleared of villages, and thus support, for insurgent groups[5].

Similarly, in the current offensives, the Burmese Army has attempted to enforce a policy of complete destruction of support systems, committing abuse intended to make civilian support of insurgent forces impossible.

Throughout this offensive, many villagers have been relocated, forced to pay large amounts of money as taxes, and have been detained and tortured over accusations of being rebel-supporters. Civilians face complete travel restrictions, unable to leave their villages and banned from going out to work in their own farms.  Some villagers, including women, have been seriously beaten when the Burmese soldiers found them outside of their homes. Women have also suffered sexual harassment, rape and gang-raped by the Burmese soldiers. Many have fled from their homes to escape such sexual assault displaced not only in Mon State, but also to the Thai-Burma border.

The Burmese army has deployed more troops in Tenasserim division 2003 to keep the area under firm SPDC control. While the Burmese Army has overrun several rebel bases, it has been unable to successfully rout or suppress continued armed insurgent activity.   Due to the use of guerrilla tactics to continue fighting Burmese Army forces, the area remains out of SPDC control, and if thus deemed unstable, a justification by the army for its actions.  The subsequent abuses of arbitrary taxation, intentional depopulation, sexual assault, land and property seizer, and other human rights violations that result from this offensive affect villagers rights to life and property, daily.

The following 4 sections will contain individual accounts of abuse and human rights violations that villagers have faced, and analysis of these documented cases within the context of the SPDC goals mentioned above.

Arbitrary Taxation:

Amongst the most pernicious of abuses practiced by troops in the SPDC’s recent campaign of violence and abuse in northern Yebyu and southern Ye Township, has been arbitrary taxation.  Consistently villagers find themselves trapped between trying to meet the demands for money from insurgent groups, and the arbitrary taxes the local battalions demand to undermine villager support of the same insurgent groups, regardless of weather they have or have not had contact with any group.

According to residents near Kywe Thone Nyima village, army forces based in the area have used security concerns as justification for collecting additional taxes in their village. This arbitrary taxation for supposed security purposes has diminished the income of many villagers, making it difficult for them to survive in the area.

Mi Cho, a 17 year-old villager from Kywe Thone Nyima village, Yebyu Township, explains how his village is trapped between paying insurgent groups, and avoiding subsequent additional fines, or violence, from the local battalion:

Village headman Nai Mg Shwe, who is 56 years old, forced villagers to pay 5,000 to 10,000 kyat to the Mon insurgent group, Rahmonnya. We have about 200 to 300 households. In early August, Nai Mg Shwe called all the villagers to discuss the options for giving Rehmonnya 5,000,000 kyat and the decision was made to collect 5,000 from each household. Our villagers didn’t let the Burmese battalion that’s located outside our village know about this. The Burmese troops and the insurgent forces try and find out the operations of each other. So villagers get problems with their fighting in the area. Most of the villagers needed to borrow money to pay the insurgent group. That’s the reason for leaving my village; I can find a job in the border area. I hope I can send money back to my family [that’s] there. Now I am working to tap the rubber.

During the second week of May, LIB No. 104 based in Long Lon village, Lieutenant Colonel Swe Thint and 50 soldiers forced villagers to pay 2,000,000 kyat during an attempt to clear insurgent groups out of Kalaingnyaw village.

Ko Nge, a 20 year-old villager from Kalaingnyaw explains how they had to pay the 2,000,000 kyat or risk losing their village.

Lieutenant colonel Swe Thint suspected our village had communicated with the insurgent groups. So, he asked to meet with the village headman; however the village headman got very sick, and lay down at home. So instead Swe Thint went to meet with abbot in the village. He said, ‘If you don’t give the amount that we asked, we will destroy your village.’ But the abbot also told him that our village doesn’t have any communication with insurgent groups. Finally, the abbot promised him [Swe Thint] the village would pay the money that he ask for. Every family has to pay over 10,000 per household. Our family had to sell two cows in Yebyu township to afford paying for the money they are extorting form us. Now, my parents don’t have anything left for their livelihood. I hope to get more income to help my family, and came here to the border area to find a suitable job in.”

Maung Ngan village has faced similar problems from arbitrary taxation as Kalaingmyaw. Maung Ngan village had about 90 households in 2004, however now most of the villagers have fled due to years of excessive arbitrary taxation and abuse.

According to the Ko Hlaing Oo, a 30 year old Maung Nagan villager, the excess taxation of insurgent forces and SPDC troop drove him from his village, to seek a job that would provide money for his family still at home:

In the second week of June, one of the Mon insurgent groups entered our village. They kidnapped three boats with the three boat’s drivers, and put them in the middle of the sea. After that, they demanded 2,000,000 [kyat] for each boat. Our village needed to pay 6,000,000 [kyat] to get back the people and the boat. When the Mawyawaddy Navy Headquarters [MNH] heard about the situation, MNH’s Major Khin Mg Oo came to our village. Major Khin Mg Oo called the headman U Suu and his secretary, then beat them in front of the villagers. The Major demanded the same amount of money that we already paid the insurgent group. They troops also kicked the villagers who negotiated for paying a smaller amount of money. However after that the Major Khin Mg Oo decided to only demand 2,000,000 kyat. At the end of the June, our villagers had to pay that amount of money to the MNH. My family had a debt to pay of over 100,000 [kyat]. I knew my parents couldn’t afford to pay back the money with their income; therefore, I left from the village and am trying to support them.

Burmese army battalions have also justified the arbitrary taxation carried out in the area as necessary for spending on local development projects.  This form of taxation takes money from village households, supposedly to cover the costs of the construction project. Adding insult to injury, villagers are often required to then work as uncompensated manual labor on the project.

During the last year, Burmese troops based near Kywe Thone Nyima village have been collecting money and forcing villagers to work extending the battalion barracks. Soldiers from MNH have ordered that one person from each household must work on the building extension project. If villagers can’t supply a person to work, the household must pay to excuse themselves from the forced labor.

A 30 year old, Kywe Thone Nyima villager who wished to remain unnamed, describes the difficulty of having to work as forced laborer or pay a fine to the local battalion:

In the first week of June 2009, Captain Zay Yar, 32 years old, commend village headman Nai Mg shwe to collect one male from every household [for work]. We started in June, alternating every 60 [days], approximately, to work on the barracks building. They [troops] forced 30 villagers to work on the building every day. The troops forced us to carry and split wood. One of our neighbors Daw Yone had to pay 7,000 kyat to Captain Sa Yar because she doesn’t have a male in her house. Daw Yone is also a widow and a day laborer in the village. Even though Daw Yone went to village headman Nai Mg Shwe to request money, he said ‘you are the one in this situation, you can get yourself out of it – it’s not my concern.’… If we keep going like this, our village will not last for the future.

Similar to project construction, villagers are forced to perform roles that the military would conventionally fill.  Burmese army troops will guard a town, ostensibly to keep insurgent forces out; However, villagers are forced to stand as a perimeter guard, shielding the army troops from immediate insurgent attack. For those who do not want to fill this role, or who cannot, villagers must pay a tax for the soldiers to perform their job.

Nai Kyi, a 43 year-old farmer from Kywe Thone Nyima village explains about these security issues in his town:

Mostly troops from the  Navy Headquarter are based in our village. Captain Myit Wai gave the reason for their presence as providing security, and collected money from the villagers. They collected 3,000 kyat for security each month. However, they [troops] didn’t set up security guards outside the village, they just stayed inside the village. Instead, they forced villagers to guard outside the village. Although they collected money in the village [for security], they instead forced the villagers to guard as security outside the village. During last three months, I have been forced to guard as village security for the last 7 times. If villagers are absent for [being] a security guard, you have to pay 3,000 [kyat] in fines. My father and younger brother’s house have been fined 30,000 kyat from being absent from their security responsibility. My uncle doesn’t have son and he was also unhealthy. But Captain Myit Wai didn’t consider this and fined him 30,000 kyat.

In some cases villages are overwhelmed, not by paying a single large cost, but many small costs.  Besides taxes from local battalions and insurgent groups, villagers can face other arbitrary taxes from government administrative organizations.

Naing Soe Naing, a 29 year-old from Alaesakhan village, Yebyu Township detailed some of these arbitrary taxes his village faces:

Collecting money has increased in our village. Both the Burmese battalion and Mon Rehmonnya are collecting money from our village. The reasons for collecting the money are: villager security cost – 1,000 kyat, taxes to battalion and militia groups – 500 kyat, village development and VIP travel – 500 kyat, rental for a motorbike, truck for a commander, or patrol – 500 kyat.

Nai Pho Htwe, a 45 year-old farmer from Alaesakhan village, Yebyu Township explains the effects this overwhelming arbitrary taxation can have:

Villagers have to give directly to the LIB No. 282 battalion commander and his comrades. In addition, the Village Peace and Develop Council [VPDC] has been collecting money from the villagers. In our village, we have about 600 – 700 households. The authorities get a lot of money every month. Also, the military and other authorities know that our villager crop is betel nut and that our son and daughter are working in Thailand. That’s the reason the authorities try to pressure more tax [from us]. By working on my farm, I get just enough for my family to spend. I can’t afford for my children to go to school. If we continue to live here, absolutely, we will have to continue paying the military battalion. Therefore, I decide that we will leave from this village. At the movement, I am trying to find a job in the border area.

Intentional Depopulation:

Over last six months, HURFOM has been documenting the abuse by Burmese Army forces working to remove or relocate villagers in northern Yebyu Township, Tenasserim Division. Most of these cases of abuses occur in relation to the activities of Mon insurgent groups, called Nai Chan Dein Group, and a newly formed group called Nai Khin Maung[6]. The very obvious goal is that without the support of area villages – willing or forced – insurgent group support structures will be undercut.

Nai Kon Aye, a 56 year-old farmer whose home was burned after being forced to move from Amae village, located at northern Yebyu township, Tenasserim Division reported to HURFOM field reporters that early May:

We have been forced to leave our home by Burmese Navy Force because of these Mon rebel groups. They came and asked quotas of huge amount of financial support from us several times. As a consequence, each time the Burmese Navy, who had been patrolling near the village, threatened [that] all of us [would have] to move by accusing us of being in contact with the Mon rebel armed group.

Mi Khun Kyi, a 55 year-old villager, who left Khayan village with her friend Nai Win, explains about the depopulation of her village, and her decision to leave:

I grew up and stayed in this [Khayan] village while I was a child. But the situation in 2009 has made us leave our village. In May, Burmese soldiers destroyed all our family’s life reducing us to poverty. In May, we have paid 50,000 for extortion taxes to the LIB No. 282. We didn’t have jobs to get that amount of money. Our property was then take during the increasing extortion of taxes. Therefore, our family decided to leave from our village. Since, we have decided to say here [northern Ye township] permanently as long as we can. This area is silent because it is a little far from the SPDC forces. If we compare our location before with now, this area [Northern Ye Township] is more suitable for our family. I will not go back there [old village] if the Burmese troops have been there. Now, I think, there are just 70 households left in the village. Our family also can’t go back there because we left from our village in secret.”

Nai Aung Hsein from Byaik village describes the situation in which LIB No. 282 forcibly depopulated his entire village after finding out his village had had contact with insurgent forces, but had not reported it:

In early May 2009, A company from LIB No. 282, lead by lieutenant Myint Mg…entered  into Byaik and went to see the village headman, Nai Suu Nage, a 47 year old ethnic Tavoyan, and his secretary Nai Sein Mae who is 43. [They] asked about the insurgent groups activities. While asking, they also beat them with bamboo sticks because they said the village headman didn’t tell them about insurgents visiting before. After they beat him, they arrested the village headman. They called all villagers and commanded them that ‘you have to leave your village in one week’. Our village has 45 households. Some of the ethnic Tavoy relocated to the Yebyu Township and our ethnic Mon moved to Northern Ye Township in Zebyutanug, Lamine Ywathit, Kharot-kharee villages.

Nai Soe Myint, a Kalaingnyaw villager, explains how the SPDC forces used excessive arbitrary taxation to drive him and other villagers from the village:

Our village paid two times for both groups during this year. The first time was 2,000,000 [kyat] and second was 1,500,000 [kyat] for both the rebels and SPDC forces. The [SPDC] troops really want to destroy small villages like ours because they want to combine all the small villages into one village. It’s easier for them to control all village from communicating with the rebel groups. [if they cannot destroy the village] the troops make a reason from [villages] communicating with insurgent groups, and then collecting a huge amount of money from the village. Finally, the villagers can’t afford the extortion of money and have to leave from the village. The [SPDC] troops already know the strategy will work for them. Now we have to leave our village.

Nai Plai, related to Mi Cho, described the gravity of the situation on Kywe Thone Nyima Island, and the effect of the Mawyawaddy Navy Headquarter [MNH] activities in the area in early August:

Now, about 70% of the young men have left the village to find a job in other areas because most of families don’t have enough income or money to pay the tax of either the insurgent group or the local Burmese battalion. I also am hoping to help my family’s income. But, work here is not supporting me because we get only 70 Baht per day. Before I came here, my family had to pay 3,000 kyat to the Burmese soldiers [from MNH] every single month. … all families in the village had to pay this same thing. Village headman Nai Mg shwe always asked villagers for more money then the SPDC asked him to collect. He always try to keep some leftover for himself.

There are about 200 or 300 households on Kywe Thone Nyima Island. Most people survive by farming rice, fishing and cultivating crops. Previously the village had possessed a very strong economy, as the residents around the area were able to take advantage of the village’s location. However, because of its distance from more populated areas and cities, it has suffered greater instances of abuse; without oversight, there is little accountability for abuses conducted against villagers by local military authorities and insurgent groups, who seek to extort money through ‘taxes’, and carry out other human rights violations.

Sexual Assault:

Though condemned by the SPDC on paper, the human rights violation of Sexual assault sadly continues as an abuse committed by SPDC troops in the area. Due to security concerns for victims, as well as the threat to those who spoke about such assaults, this is the only case this report has been able to document in detail.

During an SPDC operating against the Mon insurgent group ,Rehmonnya, several women were raped by soldiers from the MNH in Magyi village. A HURFOM field report was able to interview a person who witnessed the assaults on August 8th.

aid Nai Kyi, Magyi villager.

At about 11:00 am on August 8, when I went to the southern part of the sea to find some turtle eggs, I saw 3 young girls rapped by 5 solider on a farm. The 3 young girls screamed for help, but no one was around there. The 3 girls are around 20 to 25 [years old]. One girl was [gang] rapped by 3 soldiers and the other 2 were raped one at a time. I needed to hide in a brush because I had to make sure the soldiers did not see me. If they had seen me – I strongly can say they would have shot me. When they finished rapping the girls they [soldiers left from that place. I think those solders were from the Navy troops that are based in A Phit village, Yebyu Township.

Because of this rape case, a HURFOM field reporter went to confirm the information in a separate interview. A Mon teacher in that area verified that is what had happened in the assault. “Yes, this rape case did happen with 3 young Mon girls, but we can’t say their name for their own security. That is always happening for the Mon women because the military troops take advantage of our ethnic people. We can’t do anything about it at the movement. All we can do is just keep watch.”

Land and Property Seizer:

The abuse of land and property seizer serves a duel purpose for Burmese army units. First, having enacted a policy of “self reliance”, the SPDC encourages its units to gather any resources they can from area villagers, ostensibly to keep maintenance costs of their own unit down. Second, the seizer of the few resources villagers possess works towards the previously stated SPDC goal of undercutting village capacities to survive, thus denying insurgent groups opportunities to gather resources for themselves.

In July 2009, Captain Khing Mg Kyin of Battalion No. 273 divided his force to patrol separately in the Alaesakhan village area. The troops money and goods belonging to  villagers and vehicle passengers who were crossing through the area.  The troops justified the confiscation and tax, saying that they were just collecting money for their food supplies.

Ma Yin Aye, a 40 year-old Alaesakhan villager, explains how her and other passengers’ money and goods were sized after being stopped at a check point:

We need to provide something for their food. The soldiers stopped our car and tried to check all the passengers’ goods as if they were trying to find drugs. I knew the captain, Khing Mg Kyin. He is from the LIB No. 273. He didn’t allow our car to go and said each passenger had to pay 2,000 kyat each. We had about 20 passengers into our truck. He also took one container of cooking oil and some vegetables from our truck. In addition, he also took one carton [10 packages] of cigarettes.

Lort Taing residents also reported that captain Khing Mg Kyin, and soldiers from LIB No. 273 were shooting villagers chickens, pigs and ducks to taking them as food from villagers, without permission.

U Kalar, a 60 year old Kyaukadin villager also described his encounter from soldiers from LIB No. 273 killing and taking his son’s livestock for their own food.

Last month, LIB No. 273 captain Khing Mg Kyin and his troops shot our chickens to make their food. When my son went to stop them, they intimated him with their guns, saying ‘I will shot you if you come and interrupt again’. My son didn’t dare to try and stop them again. They [troops] took 8 chickens. It cost us over 30,000 kyat. When we reported this to the village headman, he said, ‘Don’t come and talk about the troops – you’re not the only one to face this kind of problem; almost all the villager have been facing this kind of problem. We have to follow what the troops say – if we don’t follow what they command, they will beat and torturing us.’ Because the village headman said this to me, I have nothing I can say to him about that anymore…As for me, I had to serve 5 times for [forced] portering while I stayed in this village. The military battalion also confiscated my farm. When I saw the soldiers killing my son’s chicken, I was very sorry for my son. But, we can do nothing to take revenge on them [troops].

According to Nai Myit, a villager from Kywe Thone Nyima village, the army used travel restrictions as a guise to steal villager’s crops and destroy their fields:

They [MNH forces] only allowed villagers to work on their farms or outside the village from 6:00 am to 6:00 pm. Because of ban on sleeping [on the farms] in the nighttime, most farmers have lost their crops. Mostly, the troops have been stealing the crops they were growing. Not only do they steal the farm products, but also destroy and uproot our fields. The troops say the reason for the ban is that they can just focuses on  the villagers and not confuse them with the insurgent groups. Because our plantations are destroyed and our farm products are lost, we couldn’t stay there anymore. That’s the reason I left my village and came to find a job here [Northern Ye].

Similar incidents have been described in Khamayan village and Sanngantaw village.  Villagers were accused by local troops of supporting the insurgent forces. As punishment SPDC forces collected punitive taxes and confiscated land belonging to villagers.

According Nai Beh, a 50 year old villager from Sanngantaw village, he had his family could no longer live under the punitive arbitrary taxation enacted by LIB No. 273 against the village for supporting insurgents, and moved.  He explained, “In early June, I moved to live in Ye township where my relatives are located. I’ve heard the military has since confiscated my farm that is 3 acres wide and located in the Sanngantaw areas.”

Villager Agency:

This month HURFOM has focused part of its research on the topic of villager agency[7].  In particular, this research has hoped to provide a more full picture of villagers who suffer the systematic SPDC army abuses.  Rather then focusing on villagers as helpless and passive recipients of abuse and rights violations, this research focus on documenting the acts of empowerment villagers practice, resisting the excesses of SPDC abuse occurring daily.

Within the spectrum of research for this report, several villagers were willing to describe their efforts to mitigate the abuses they faced at the hands of local battalions.

Nai Win, a 43 year-old Khamayan villager, describes his village’s attempt to negotiate against a forced relocation, under the threat of death, with LIB No. 282:

In May, the SPDC Light Infantry Battalion No. 282 accused our villagers of supporting the rebel groups. They [troops] tried to move all the villagers to another place. We reasoned with the troops, saying that we grew up in that place, we don’t want to move, and that we also haven’t communicated with any of the rebel groups; However LIB No. 282 did not accept our claims….[and] gave us three days to move from the village. They also threatened us, that if we didn’t move, they would kill us all. During the second week of May, village headman Nai Pan Nywe and his secretary Nai chit Thwe called all the villagers to attend a meeting and discuss the options for negotiating with the military battalion. Our entire village agreed to pay the troops 2,000,000 kyat to stop them from forcing the village to move. When we collected all the money, we went to give to the commander but the commander did not accept our money. We asked him to not move our village, after wich he asked for 2,500,000 kyat so that he would ask permission from the higher position military officers. We all agreed to give him that amount of money. In my life, I have never had to pay that amount of money before. From poor families, the village collected 30,000 [kyat] and 50,000 [kyat] to 70,000 [kyat] from the rich families. As for our daily workers like me, they had to borrow money for the neighborhood and then pay them back slowly[8].

Naing Soe Naing, a 29 year-old motorbike owner from Alaesakhan village, Yebyu Township, explains how he resisted efforts by SPDC soldiers to commandeer his motorbike:

The battalion has been collecting 5 motorbikes for soldiers to use traveling every day. For villagers who don’t have a motorbike, they must pay 500 [kyat] for petrol. I had bought my motorbike and had it only one year, but now my motorbike license plate and chain cover are destroyed. Our villagers can’t avoid the military. We don’t have a choice – they forced us to pay. However, I had an idea – when my[bike] duty arrives I take out all my motorbike parts like I am trying to repair it. When they [village headman’s secretary & soldiers] see my motorbike is being repaired they don’t take my bike, they just ask for the 500 kyat. Giving money is better then my motorbike.

Conclusion:

The ongoing campaign by SPDC armed forces to destroy the KNLA and Mon insurgent groups, Rahmonya, Nai Chen Deng and Nai Khin Maung, has done incalculable economic and human damage to the region. As noted in numerous individual testimonies, villagers have been able to survive within the region, living in their home villages, for most of their lives. But trying to live under the rights violations, and abuse systemically practiced by the SPDC, becomes more impossible with every act perpetrated against villagers.  For many, that point where a choice must be made between survival via displacement or assured destruction is quickly approaching.

In being forced to arbitrarily pay taxes to both Burmese armed forces and insurgent groups, villagers have little if any opportunity to gain any financial stability.  With money invested in the infrastructure of daily life, villagers can watch entire livelihoods vanish with the theft and seizer of farm animals and crops, or the destruction of a home or farm. Lacking infrastructure of employment, or means of making money, the SPDC is able to successfully displace villagers from their homes. Given the goal of SPDC forces – total control of the region – it is unlikely that Burmese army battalions will reign in their deliberate campaign of abuse against villagers, until insurgent groups have been driven from northern Yebyu and southern Ye Township.

However, as the final section of analysis in this report briefly demonstrates, villagers, despite the danger, are still active in determining their own fate.  Fully aware of the threat from systematic targeting of their daily lives by Burmese army forces, villagers devise methods of survival, or relocate to safer, more quiet area’s on their own terms. While overwhelming, these abuses must not be seen as completely unchallenged.  Weather villagers remain or chose to depart from their homes, it is villagers actions of resistance and choice that demonstrate their continued role as active participants within the regions political structure.

At the end of February 2009, the Karen Democratic Buddhist Army (DKBA) and State Peace Development Council (SPDC) joined forces in preparation for a campaign against the Karen National Union (KNU) territory to rout and destroy the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA). The ensuing campaign has changing the face of regional politics, long dominated by the presence of the KNU and its armed wing the KNLA.  With the loss of KNU Brigade No. 7, the KNU has been placed in an endgame position, preparing to defend the hart of its territory, Brigade No. 6, heavily populated with ethnic Karen. The fallout from Brigade No. 7’s defeat produced a tide of refuges who fled to locations along the Thai-Burma border, and the UNHCR administered refugee camps. They arrived bearing reports of abuses committed by SPDC and DKBA forces.  As the joint SPDC and DKBA force positions itself to carry out their assault on Brigade No. 6, HURFOM focuses this months report on the on going human rights abuses in the southern Brigade No. 6 area, that will form a crisis broader and more terrible then that seen with the fall of Brigade No. 7.
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The information contained in this reported has been collected during the recent conflict between the DKBA, SPDC and KNLA. The interviews and accounts of villager experiences have been conducted by HURFOM filed reporters in 18 villages located in the southern area of Brigade No. 6.

Background – Previous attacks and the fall of Brigade No.7:

In an attempt to strengthen security by seizing KNU controlled and in the eastern border territories, and to serve as the Burmese Junta backed border guard force, the DKBA has been increasing its attacks against KNLA forces since early January 2009. According to military action watchdogs and analysts, these attacks on KNLA controlled territory have been systematically organized by the Naypyidaw government to manage all Karen ceasefire groups by granting them administrative control of areas that include business and trading benefits. The SPDC’s aggressive strategy of backing the DKBA attacks against KNLA forces is also part of its policies regarding the post 2010 election. The arrangement of the BGF and acquiescence of the ceasefire groups satisfy intended state goals, and allow for greater control over what would effectively be administrative territories on the eastern Thai-Burma border.

In early April 2009 the joint forces of the Burmese army and the DKBA mounted attacks on KNLA controlled areas in Pa-an District, Brigade No. 7 and overran KNLA Battalion No. 201 near the Valaeki area, eastern Karen State. According to a Karen humanitarian worker who lives in Mae Sot, because of the attacks committed by the joint force of Burmese army and DKBA, about 500 ethnic Karen families fled to Thai soil, many loosing their property and food.  In addition to the displacement, the humanitarian worker reported that at least 220 young men were pressed into service as DKBA soldiers. “We have received two DKBA soldiers (aged 23, and 24) who were seriously injured during the fighting between KNLA military camp No. 201 and DKBA Brigade No. 907. They just joined the DKBA, having been forced to join about 2 months ago. They are originally from Shwe Gun township, where the DKBA forced them to join their army,” she said.

According to the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), around 200 civilians fled to Thai-Karen villages located on Thai soil, as a result of the fighting. HURFOM field reporters have confirmed that even now many displaced families are still located at Thai-Karen border villages.  In certain instances the assaulting joint force crossed the border to pursue refugees. “They [DKBA troops from Battalion No. 907] even attacked and looted peoples’ belongings inside Thailand, on Thai soil in the second week of May [2009].”

After a month of fighting between the SPDC and DKBA joint campaign agaisnt the KNLA, the headquarters of the KNLA Brigade No. 7 fell on June 21st, 2009. A Karen community leader who lives on theThai-Burma border, explained in a post-conflict analysis the struggle between the Karen groups, and the fall of brigade No.7:

This is the first time that the Burmese government has been able to claim control over these KNU/KNLA areas, with the help of a Karen ceasefire group, in 60 years. But this civil war ended in over 4,000 villagers having fled their homes, around 250 troops dead from both sides, at least 30 villagers killed on suspicion of supporting rebels, some Karen ladies were raped, many under aged children suffered starvation and thousands of Karen residents lost their agri-business and food for their families. So, if the pro-junta forces, DKBA, think deeply about this victory, they should not feel proud. This is not their victory but their master’s – the Burmese Junta’s victory over all Karen people.

The loss of this territory over the past months has been the most drastic defeat for the KNLA forces in years.  Brigade no. 7 served as major military hub, comprised of camps and a base that was the headquarters of KNLA Battalion No. 201.  As the keystone defensive position in the region, when Battalion No. 201 fell on June 21st, the other camps were effectively decapitated.

For many area residents daily life and survival has been difficult since the fall of Brigade No. 7. As clashes occurred between the joint force of the DKBA and SPDC against the KNLA thought June, over 3,000 villagers have fled from the Pa’an, North and East Dooplaya Districts – territory previously controlled by KNLA Brigade No.7 – to the Thai-Burma border. The number refugees driven from their homes by the assault and the subsequent abuses against Karen civilians indicate the very real danger which people have faced during attack on, and the fall of, Brigade no. 7.

By looking at the previous human rights violations committed by the joint SPDC and DKBA campaign, in comparison, the scope of the coming conflict over the Brigade No. 6 territory has much greater potential to become a significant humanitarian crisis.

Brigade No. 6:

Brigade No. 6 is effectively the heart of Karen territory.  Established at the beginning of the insurgency in 1947, the area contains 20% of the total Karen population.  According to a KNLA Captain from Brigade No. 6, who is inactive due to poor health, Brigade No. 6 is also the backbone of the KNU because of the economic support the area provides. He explained also that besides benefits from taxation, they receive the support of the people.  The area’s strength is derived from the peoples desire to be a community and support their fellow Karen people.  This civilian network provides surveillance, political, and physical support. Despite the increasing numbers of DKBA and KPF since 1997, the KNU’s power has not diminished because, he explains, of the support of the people.  For the Captain, without the support of the people, the Karen cause would become weaker and weaker.

Research and interviews for this report focused on the four areas of the KNLA Brigade No.6 territory.  These are: the east and west Zami river areas, Maekatha area and Ko Du Kwel area between Three Pagoda and Kyainnseikyi township. As the violence between the DKBA, SPDC, and KNLA intensifies, the 18 villages in the area will bear the brunt of abuses and casualties that result directly from the advance of the combined force against the KNLA. The area is primarily populated by Karen people though other ethnicities reside there as well.  Based off the information available, HURFOM estimates that there area population is 70% Karen, 10% Mon, 10% Burmese, 10% Shan and Indian. The livelihood of residents mostly consists or farming, with 70% of villagers working as farms to survive, 15%  working as day laborers, and 15% making their living as traders and sawyers.

Deployment: SPDC, DKBA, KPF:

The SPDC armed forces, also known as the ‘Tatmadaw’, have been primary adversary of the KNLA since it began fighting for its independence on Febuary 7th, 1947. In advancing towards Brigade No. 6, the SPDC has stationed its troops in the Anankwin village, Three Pagoda township. In addition, they have deployed Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) No. 357 in Tounng zun village and Infantry Battalion (IB) No. 32 in Three Pagoda town, under the Tactical Command No.2. It is dividing into two battalions, LIB No. 357, which will operate and defend the Chaung-Son areas and LIB No. 356 that is based out of Taung Thee village.  This in turn is divided into 2 columns, No.1 and No.2.  Most recently HURFOM has learned that on July 26th General Thet Nai Win, deployed IB No. 22, originally from Pa’an, which will command LIB’s No. 201, No. 204, No. 206, No. 208 and No. 209.

Burmese troop activities have also extended beyond the Three Pagoda area, to KNLA brigade No.6 territory east of the Zami River in Kyainnseikyi township. The main SPDC battalions in the area are IB No. 203, in Paya-Ngoke-Tho village, IB No. 208, in Khut-Khwar village and SPDC Artillery Regiment (AR) 313 based near the Three Pagoda Town.

The DKBA formed in 1994 after its leaders, Chairman That Htoo Kyaw and monk U Thu Zana split from the KNU.  On April 13th, 2009 its commander Tha Tu Jaw met with Southeast Command (SEC) General That Nai Win, and officially accepted the SPDC’s offer to reform as a Border Guard Force (BGF). This effectively placed it under Burmese government control in exchange for material support.  The DKBA currently fields 5 brigades, divided into 22 Infantry Battalions, for a total of over 6,000 soldiers, and, according to DKBA sources, intends to recruit another 3,000 troops by the end of 2009.

The DKBA has stationed Battalions 901 and 906 in Kyainnseikyi town and Tha Gon Daing village. Additionally, the DKBA constructed an economic and liaison office in the Three Pagoda town. This office is used for fundraising and community liaising throughout Three Pagoda area and the Southern Duplaya District.  The DKBA economic and liaison department is commanded by Soe Moe Aung. According to information gathered from the DKBA community, Saw Lar Bwel (a.k.a) Hna Khan Hmwe will lead the DKBA troops in the coming assault on Brigade No. 6. As of July 26th, Nga Khan Mhwe has been made Brigade Commander of DKBA Battalion No. 5

The KPF split from KNU In 1997.  On March 30th, 2009, its leadership met with SEC General That Naing Win, to accept a position as a BGF in Three Pagoda town under the SPDC command. In accepting the position they were allowed to undertake a special military training conducted by SPDC forces.  The KPF can field a force of 3 battalions, or at least 500 soldiers. KPF battalion No.3 is based in the Three Pagoda area, and has set up 2 checkpoints to regulate traffic.

Brigade No. 6 is the goal:
After defending against the sustained 10 months of attacks, the KNLA has lost most of their administrative areas especially with the fall of Brigade No.7 and northeastern Brigade No.6 areas.  Additionally, because of this prolonged offensive, the KNLA has lost its intensity and ability to maintain controls over the rest of their area, where most of their administrative bodies are situated, in the southern Brigade No. 6 territory along the eastern Thai-Burma border. According to analysis based on movements of the Burmese army and its backed DKBA battalions, other large-scale assaults will be conducted against the KNLA Brigade No. 6 areas. This certainty of continued violence, and the fall of brigade No. 7 headquarters, has instilled a great deal of fear amongst civilians living in the Brigade No. 6 areas.
A 58 year old resident, who requested his name be withheld, and who is well acquainted with the armed conflicts in the Karen territory, explains:

When one looks at their [SPDC & DKBA] military activities, they will bring their guns to bear on Brigade No. 6 [KNLA]. We heard that the Burmese army is including LIBs No. 275, No. 356, No. 357, AR 313 and IB No. 32 in its preparations in the three pagoda areas. Similarly, the DKBA Kloh Htoo Baw Tactical Command, managed by Commander Saw Lar Bwel, and his senior fighters have been planning to carry out another offensive against Brigade No. 6. In reviewing these preparations we can see another round of intense fighting will continue soon.

Nai Lwin, a business man who has lived and run his business for over 30 years in the Brigade No. 6 area explained that based on his experience, the joint attacks of the SPDC army and DKBA forces will not be succeeded, and unlike Brigade No. 7, the geography and political support in the area are specifically tailored to be able to support and allow for the long term survival of KNLA troops in the area. “I don’t think the Burmese Army and its militia can beat the KNLA again in this [Brigade No.6] area. The Karen rangers from KNLA side will be more cunning than other side in these [Brigade No.6] areas.”

The prospective civilian crisis:
As has been seen in Brigade No. 7 area, the potential for violence to the Brigade No. 6 civilian population is enormous.  According to a high level officer from KNLA brigade No.6 administrative area, if violence breaks out, around 5,500 villagers who live in these areas will be directly affected.  Because of the season, fall out from the conflict will reach beyond immediate displacement, to long-term debilitation of the local economy. The KNLA officer explained, “We are especially concerned about the local rice farmers. If they do not finish cultivating crop during this rainy season, they will be in trouble throughout the whole year. Violence could resume at anytime in these areas right now.”

Based on the information that has come from the KNU Kyainnseikyi township office, the affected populations will be more numerous than the above officer estimated:

Dooplaya District has lots of wide and flat, as well as hilly areas. People have been living in these areas many years. Most of what people farm here is rice, betel nuts, rubber and vegetables. If there are more armed clashes between the Burmese army, DKBA and KNLA, at least 7,000 villages will drive from their homes. They will flee to the eastern and southern borders where the UNHCR refugee camps are located. For those people who live in Kyaik Don, Azin villages (of Kawkareik township), Win Lone, Phaw Nae Mu, Mae Sa Kit villages (of Kyainnseikyi township) will use the jungle road to flee to the Noh Poe refugee camp run by the Thai government and the UNHCR. Similarly for those villagers living in the areas of Ko Du Kwel, Kyun Chaung and Ta Dein villages (of Three Pagodas township), they will have to flee to Baan Tom Yan refugee camp located near Halockhanee Mon resettlement camp on the Thai-Burma border.

Ongoing Human Rights Abuse in the area:

In advance of the assault on Brigade No.6, appropriate attention must be paid to the potential for human rights violations in this area to be far more numerous and sever then those documented during the fall of Brigade No. 7. HURFOM’s field researchers have collected information documenting the experiences of villagers in Brigade No. 6 area that have suffered human rights abuses at the hands of SPDC and DKBA forces.  The reported instances of abuse are broken down into 4 categories of the most commonly occurring abuses:

a)    Seizer of Supplies
b)    Travel Restrictions
c)    Forced Recruitment
d)    Forced Portering.

Seizer of supplies – money and food:

In an internal document issued on July 19th, 2009, the Burmese military Southeast Command (SEC) instructed Tactical Command No.1 based in the Anankwin, Three Pagoda township to demand that households give two baskets of rice and other vegetables (1 basket equal to 32 Kg) to military forces. If a household does not have the rice to meet the demands, the military will take 10,000 kyat.

While it was not ordered in the document, as an additional threat military forces have been telling villagers if they cannot afford to pay they will be forced to work as porters instead. SPDC forces have been collecting food supplies from Anankwin, Taung Son, Ko Du Kwel, Khone Khan, Tanpayar, Laypoe and Lone Si villages. These requisitions of food supplies do drastic damage to each household’s economic potential.  For many the food taken had served as the only means of survival for the family.

A 45 year-old Anankwin villager, who is a victim of these arbitrary seizers, explains how he has been affected:

I already gave them 2 baskets of rice. Now, I have nothing left in my house. If you can’t afford 2 baskets of rice you need to pay 10,000 kyat. But, if you can afford to pay with rice or money, they will force you to serve as a porter. Now, I need to work hard and replenish my rice for this rainy season.

Saw Mann Lay (name changed due to security issues) a 28 years-old Ko Du Kwel villager explains about wide spread seizer of supplies, and about the difficulty this causes a village as a community:

On that day, the SPDC soldiers collected rice and other food supplies from about 90 households in Taung Son village. In our village Meh Pra [locally known as Ko Du Kwel], over 50 households have had to pay rice and food supplies. But we don’t know yet what will happen with the villagers who can’t afford to pay either money or rice. If they can’t, our village has to support them. We don’t have any other way; either some villagers help them to give supplies to the military, or they will be serving in the porter service.

The military telegram acquired by HURFOM specifically orders SPDC forces who are gathering food to tell each household that the supplies will be used to support the DKBA soldiers led by the Saw Lar Bwel, who are advancing towards KNLA Brigade No.6 territory. According to a DKBA liaison officer in Three Pagoda Town, “We have not commanded troops to collect food supplies from the villagers. Also, we never allowed our troops to collect food supplies from the villagers.”

Travel restriction:

Travel restrictions have been place on villages throughout the area of advancing SPDC and DKBA forces.  These restrictions, used as a security measure, to cut off potential aid villagers are able to provide KNLA forces, undercut the local economy, and provide justification for arbitrary shootings carried out by the SPDC.

On July 12th, in Anankwin and Taung Zun, Operational Command No. 2, a division of LIB No. 357, banned villagers from entering or leaving villages located between Three Pagoda and Kyainnseikyi villages. According to HURFOM field reports, this restriction has caused problems for many villagers whose survival is dependent on farming in the areas outside of their villages.

A 24 years old Karen villager, who lived in the Anankwin area, told a HURFOM field reporter that they have been banned from working a full day at their farms, and the dangers of trying to continue to farm:

On July 12th, the LIB No. 357, Column No.2, started to operate in the area ­– there are about 50 soldiers included in the Colun. They commended the villagers not to work outside the village. In blocking the roads, our villagers who make their living in farming, have been struggling to survive. They [LIB No.357] commend the villagers that they must stay in the village 24 hours a day. As for me, I rarely go back to sleep at home – I just stay on my farm. Because of this I need to hide whenever I see the SPDC soldiers come around. If I didn’t hide they would think that I’m with the rebel groups and they would kill me. At the moment I’m facing difficulties because I alone can’t work my farm.”

According to filed reports, travel restrictions have been place on Aninkwin, Tanpaya, Khon Khan, Toungzun, Lay Pho, Maezali, Lonesi, Apalon, Thet Kel, and Myintharyar villages.

By banning travel outside of villages, 70% of villagers are now without work. Because most villagers sole income comes from their ability to cultivate and harvest their crops, travel bans destroy the local economy and peoples ability to survive.  However it is important to note that in some cases where villagers have been kept from farming for a living, they have taking to trading in order to survive.

A 45 year-old Tanpaya villager explains the extremely difficult situation travel restrictions place upon villagers who try to make a living farming:

The SPDC declared that they would not provide security for the people who are working on their farms or in the jungle. In addition, they said not to blame them [SPDC] whenever they mistake someone as a member of a rebel group and shoot them if they’re working on a farm or in the jungle. That is the reason the SPDC has freighted people to not leave the village. As for me, I just have this job during the rainy season. If we don’t have an opportunity to work on our farm in this year, I can’t imagine where my family will get rice for eating during the next years. We also do not have others jobs to do. Therefore, we are waiting for the SPDC soldiers to leave the area and allow us to work on our farms.”

A lieutenant from the KNLA Battalion No.16 said of the travel restrictions:

[The] SPDC army heard about some of the DKBA and KPF soldiers deserting to the KNU armed group. In July, Some of member from KPF Battalion No.3 and DKBA Battalion 901, which is based in Chaungwa, Kyainnseikyi township, Lieutenant Saw Kae Kae and the members [of his unit] deserted to the KNLA Battalion No. 16. I think…that’s the reason the SPDC wants to block communication and food supplies between the local people and KNLA army around Anankwin. Also, the SPDC can separate the villagers and the rebel groups. Therefore, the SPDC has banned residents from going out from their village.

U Pho Hla, (name changed for security purposes), a 60 year-old Taungzun villager explains how villagers have faced this abuse before, and how it affects their livelihoods:

Four years ago, the SPDC soldier also banned the villager to go to their farms. Now, the villagers are facing many problems because the SPDC banned travel during the farming season. They can’t cultivate their farms. If they can’t work on their farms this year, they will not have food for the next year…If they don’t have money to buy anything, they won’t be able to survive anymore. At the movement, we do not know the SPDC will let us travel again. The village headman dares not ask LIB No.357 to end their travel restriction. We can only guess at what will happen next in the area.

Columns No.1 and No.2, from LIB No.356, which is based in Taungdee, declared that villagers cannot sleep on their farms, in Taung Thee village. From Column No.2 Captain Myo Aung announced that they would not take responsibility if they mistook a farmer for a sympathizer with the rebel groups. As a result many people are freighted…and dare not to go to their farms.

Daw Aye (name changed for security purposes), a 54 year-old Taungdee villager described how SPDC forces have shown little regard for the lives of villagers who must farm under travel restrictions:

LIB No. 356 allows work on farms in the daytime. However, they are not allowed to sleep on the farms at night time. If forces from LIB No. 356 suspected anyone of communicating and providing food support for the other groups, they will arrest and kill them. Therefore, our farmers don’t have security anymore. Because of the worse security, the farmers in the area dare not go to work on their farms…Last year, the SPDC soldiers mistook people on the farms as working with the rebel groups and killed two villagers in the area. They did not take any responsible after they shot them. They just said, ‘We mistook them for part of a rebel group’.

A 45 years old of Mon trader, who trades dry goods in the areas, explained to HURFOM field reporters that even traders have been banned from travel:

In the early morning of July 11th, we tried to trade our dry goods in Maekatha. We couldn’t get across the road because the DKBA guard said Lieutenant A One banned crossing and wouldn’t allow traders to cross. Before we could pay money to open it whenever they block the gate. Now, even though we gave money, they didn’t accept it and didn’t open the gate. They [DKBA] said that security was too tight. Today we also tried to go to Three Pagoda but they didn’t allow us and we are driving back now.”

Forced recruitment:

As the SPDC and DKBA combined force prepare for the coming conflict, they have pressed villagers into service to bolster their ranks. Starting in the second week of May, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) battalion No.999 began recruiting villagers to enter into military service.  Villagers unwilling to join were extorted by the DKBA for large sums of money. “DKBA Battalion No. 999 General Chit Thu commanded that at least 30 villagers have to enlist in the military service.  The new soldiers must be single and between 18 to 30 years old,” said a 27 year-old Karen villager from Htee Leh village, Pai Kyone township. “We have to pay 25,000 baht if we refuse to join the service; in comparison, they will pay us 25,000 kyat per month if we join.”

Forced recruitment began after the Mon State Peace and Development Council (PDC) Chairman General That Naing Win met with DKBA and Karen Peace Force (KPF) leadership separately at the end of April. “After DKBA leaders met with the General That Naing Win, they started to recruit and collect new soldiers for their battalions,” said the Karen Nation Union (KNU) District-level Chairman from Pa-an District.

The DKBA and KPF leaders met with the General That Naing Win in April to discuss changing their armed groups into BGFs. That Naing Win announced that each border guard battalion would consist of 326 soldiers. If they didn’t have the necessary number of soldiers they would have to combine two battalions to achieve the numbers that they were required. According to sources, the DKBA didn’t want to destroy their old battalion and didn’t want to combine with KPF, so they began a campaign of forcing villagers enlist in their military service to achieve the necessary number.

HURFOM has confirmed that over 100 people have fled in response to attempts to forcibly recruit soldiers from Thi Sa Ma, Taung Soon and Naung Bo villages, in Pai Kyone township.  According to a member of the KNU Township-level Administration of Bridge No. 7,  “On May 20th, the villagers started arriving in Lae-Paw-Hae refugee camp.  Now there are over 100 people in the camp. Most of them are near middle age and from Pai Kyone township, Pa-an District. Since Colonel Chit Thu began forcibly collecting manpower in the area, the villagers have fled their homes to find new shelter.”

Kaloh Say, a 28 year-old Taung Soon villager, explained his decision to flee from his village:

I accepted the idea that Karen people can determine their fate by themselves; therefore, the DKBA emerged in the last couple of years.  Believing the Burmese Junta’s ideology and killing each other are unacceptable for all the Karen people.  It’s the reason why I don’t want to participate with them [the SPDC].  I don’t have 25,000 baht to pay them, so my friends and I decided to go to the Lae-Paw-Hae refugee camp.”

Forced Portering service:

The forcing of villagers to work as uncompensated porters is another frequent abuse practiced by the SPDC and DKBA combined force.  July is the height of the rainy season, making travel difficult, and porters are used to carry additional equipment and food as the force advances. The widespread use of forced portering appears to be a tactical decision and is practiced by both SPDC and DKBA forces.  The porters, drawn from the local Karen population, have also been forced to guard military camps, being the first line of defense, and used as human mine sweepers, walking in front of the advancing column.

On the July 26th, a DKBA commander, Kyaw Kyaw, and about 20 soldiers, arrested 40 villagers from Asoon and Lamphan villages’, which are located in Kyaninnseikyi township.  According to local sources the 40 villagers were forced to work as porters, carrying DKBA supplies of ammunition, food and additional equipment.  It is unclear if the villagers were also forced to work as human minesweepers.

The Exact numbers of residents arrested to work as porters is unknown, and a concrete number is difficult to obtain.  One victim of forced portering told HURFOM that numerous arrests occurred as troops passed through on roads and through farms, during working hours and at night.

On July 11th, SPDC IB No. 32 arrested 15 residents in Three Pagodas Pass town to porter in its continued offensive against KNU brigade No. 6.  A source told HURFOM that this action was triggered by the desertion of 5 soldiers and that the 15 villagers would be used for portering and guiding the troops to try and catch the 5 soldiers.

According to a resident who lives near the IB No. 32 camp, all villagers arrested by troops were going to be used as porters and guides while the troops try and eradicate KNU brigade No. 6.  “I am sure those people are going to be used to clear the land mines [as human minesweepers] and carrying things, because my friend has had such experiences.”
According to sources, no one dares to walk on the road after 9 p.m. because the soldiers set up checkpoints for questioning and arrests. Some are afraid of going to work and others are afraid to sleep at home in case the soldiers come and arrest them.

U Maung Aye, a 39-year-old portering victim and resident of Yakalar told HURFOM that impending fighting between the DKBA and the KNLA worries him.  Aye’s high-land rice paddy has not been harvested yet and he said that without a profitable harvest this year he would not be able to pay back loans he’d taken out in 2008.  In that year, he was arrested by SPDC Infantry Battalion  No.18, led by Lieutenant Colonel Hla Min, for a month of forced portering.  When he got back from portering his crop was gone.  He and his family rely on yearly crops from his cultivation.
“Because I could not harvest [last year’s crop] I had to borrow 50,000 kyat to buy seeds for this year,” he said. This year he doubled the size of his paddy crop from last year, wanting to earn enough to pay back his loans.  If he fails this year, he told HURFOM, he has no idea what to do because the interest rate of his loan is high.

A17-year-old boy from Htee Khein village explains his fear of being forced to work as porter for the SPDC:

I am so afraid of portering, when I was young my dad was arrested by SPDC soldiers and he didn’t come back; some people said he went over a land mine and died.  Also, some tell me SPDC soldiers treat their porters badly and I don’t want to be porter.  I don’t know where I should go to be safe.

Residents of the different villages endure similar circumstances, including Htee Khin, Ko Du Kwel, Khaewee, and Pon Khaw. These villages are on the way of SPDC troops traveling between Kyainnseikyi and Three Pagodas town. Residents report having to leave home only at night out of fear of the SPDC arresting them and conscripting them into forced portering. In addition, more than 30 villagers from Htee Khein alone suffer from diseases including dengue fever and malaria

Perspective – Fears and opinions of local villagers on armed conflict:

U Po Ka Lar told HURFOM field reporters when he was young he served as a KNU soldier and has extensive combat experience.  He has since retired and worked as a farmer. When the DKBA joined with SPDC troops to clear out KNU Brigade No.7 in June, U Po Ka Lar said that thousands of innocent Karen villagers suffered. He added that DKBA Lieutenant Colonel Saw Law Pwe, an expert on the area, will lead a joint offensive with SPDC troops.

He also said he would prefer not to go anywhere, because if he flees his home, he will lose the cultivation of his high-land rice paddy and will thus have no food for the coming year.  ”I pray for both the DKBA and the KNU to think about their residents, because I believe that for both of them the goal is the freedom of the Karen,” said U Po Ka Lar.
Local residents told HURFOM that their situations are dire because they are too afraid to leave their villages for the cultivation of their crops and trading with other nearby villages for essential goods.  Some fear SPDC troops because of past experiences: soldiers routinely rape women and arrested the men for portering.

According to U Nye, a 60-year-old Lay Ta Waw villager, in the Maekatha area:
Maekatha area has experienced nonstop gunfire. I grew up in this area and I know a lot about the conflicts of this area. Most conflict in these areas [have been over] territories [contested] by Karen and SPDC troops. Fighting did not last very long in the past. Now I am so worried because the DKBA will coordinate with SPDC troops, fighting will last longer and residents will face more problems [including poverty and starvation]…The DKBA and SPDC troops will not find it easy to clear the KNU out of brigade No. 6 because the area is very wide…the longer they take, the more residents will face bad situations.

HURFOM field reporters met with five residents from Lay Ta Waw village, which has 30 households and is located 9 miles outside Three Pagodas Pass Town; the interview subjects left their homes and moved to the temporary resettlement camp Ban Don Yan, located near the Mon resettlement camp of Halockhanee.

Most of villagers who live in the Maekatha area, Kyun Chaung area and Ko Du Kwel area mainly rely economically on high land rice paddy cultivation; when they heard about the DKBA cooperation with the SPDC troops and the plans to clear out the KNLA Brigade No.6, many villagers worry about their ability to tend to their crops and clear their land.  If they are not able to do so, they will face a future food shortage when their next crops cannot be cultivated.

A 49-year-old female Go Du Kwel resident explained how fighting could cause significant starvation amongst civilians and soldiers alike:

If the KNU and DKBA are fighting, all of us villagers will face starvation in the coming year.  They will also face this [situation]; we are their rice pot. If we can’t harvest our crops this coming year it means that their rice pots will also have a hole.  They also will face starvation and I pray for them not to fight each other at this time.

HURFOM field reporters questioned a low-ranking officer of the KNLA about what their army should do if the DKBA and SPDC troops clear out Brigade No.6. He replied that, “The KNLA is ready to fight but we will avoid it as much as possible because villagers are working on cultivating [their crops].”

According to a betel nut plantation owner from Maw Pahtaw Klo village, Maekatha area, all the villagers are afraid the DKBA and SPDC troops will block the way for villagers escaping from the fighting.  He said, “If the DKBA and SPDC troops block the way for villagers to escape from the fighting, all the villagers will die.”

A 20-year-old Lay Ta Waw resident expresses her frustration over the length violence has gone on in Burma:

I am sick and tired of the civil war in Burma; they have been fighting since I was young, now I am growing up and they are not finished yet, and many innocent villagers suffer because of it…Karen people will kill the Karen, but what are they fighting for?

Conclusion:

After 60 years of fighting, the Karen National Union now prepares to fight the greatest battle for its survival in its history.  With the loss of Brigade No. 7, Brigade No. 6 is the foremost bastion of KNU held territory.  It is not difficult to recognize that the abuses that unfold from the fall of Brigade No. 7 will be mirrored in the coming assault on Brigade No.6.

HURFOM hopes this report makes clear the danger of a human rights catastrophe unfolding in the Brigade No. 6 area. The abuses committed by the advancing combined SPDC and DKBA forces make the potential for extensive civilian casualties likely.  By restricting civilian travel, and taking food supplies, the forces trap the population with no means of survival.  Those who are forced to porter, guard, clear land mines, or who are pressed into armed service, face death by being involved directly in the conflict. For many villagers their only interest is to live their daily lives without the threat of these abuses.  The future livelihood of the Karen people is the livelihood of the KNU and DKBA – whatever the outcome of the assault on Brigade No. 6, the biggest loss will be a civilian one.